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Introduction 
Language is in its essence not ut-
terance of an or ganism nor is it 
expression of an animal. Thus it 
is never thought of with exactness 
in its symbolical or semantic charac-
ter. Language is the clearing-andi 
concealing advent of Being itself. 
All of Heidegger's work has been concerned with one question: 
the Seinsfrage. He approaches the question from many directions, 
but one direction seems to predominate: a phenomenological analysis 
I 
of language. The quote above, along with the now famous character-
ization of language as "the house of Being," evidence the significance 
Heidegger places on language in his quest of Being. Hhat is the 
meaning of these claims? Why did Heidegger focus on language? Is it 
merely an application of his ontology, or perhaps just a means to an 
end? Or is there a more signi f icant relation between language and 
Being? These are the questions that the following work is desi gned 
to answer. 
Heidegger has said: " ... reflection on language, and on Being , 
has determined my path of thinking from early on ,2 Though I 
will not t ouch upon the works prior to Being and Tim~, I have tried 
to incorporate everything he published from that work on. After 
Being and Time his work can be seen in two broad categories - a re-
thinking of past philosophy and being und envay on a ne\v path of thinking. 
1Heidegger "Letter on Humanism" trans. by Edgar Lohner in Phenomen-
ology and Exist entialism ed. Richard Zaner and Don Ihde (Ne\v York: 
Capricorn Books, G.P . Putnam 's Sons, 1973) pp. 155- 6. 
2Heidegger On the Way to Language trans. by Peter D. Hertz (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 7. 
These are not totally separate tasks for, a s he says, " . .. we can 
learn thinking only if we radica lly unlearn what thinki ng has been 
t raditionally.' ' ! With th ese conside ration s in mind, I have divid ed 
this work into five sections : the first deals with the import a nce 
2 
of language to the question of Being as approached in Being a nd Time ; 
t he second with the relation of l anguage and Being in Heidegger ' s 
rethinking of the roots of the history of West ern philosophy; the 
t hird with the meaning of Being as i t was finally worked out in 
t he late works; the fourth with the meaning of language in thes e 
late works and how it relates to the meani ng of Being; and finally 
in t he fifth I step back to ask for the significance of Heidegger's 
work on Being and language to our quest for wisdom in general . 
The first four sections necessarily stay as close to Heidegger's 
thinking as possible. My ma in goal has been to und erst and Heidegger, 
and in order to do this I have attempted to give an interpretation 
t hat presents Heidegger ' s way as consi s t ent and insightful, for to 
find fault prior to this attempt is not really to find fault . In 
short, my prime conce rn is to find Heid egger, and only i n the las t 
section do I give some hints as to whe re we can go beyond him . 
Despit e this, I do not intend to merely repeat what Heidegger said, 
rathe r my hope is to give an interpretation that helps open up his 
enigmatic and often misund erstood \.Jritings . For this reason I chos e 
neither to give a book to book summary of Heidegger's work (as, for 
example , Richard s on did in He idegger: Through Phenomenology to Though t) 
1Heidegger What is Called Thinkin~ trans. by Fred D. Wieck and 
J . Glenn Gray (New York: Har per Torchbooks, Harp e r & Row 1968) p. 8. 
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nor a purely problematic approach that raises the questions of Being 
and language in general . Rather, I tried to trace a continuous 
development through various broad stages of He idegger's caree r to 
find how he approached and worked out the relation of Being and 
language. 
To see how this is done we must start with a preliminary 
indication of how the issues are viewed by him. As the op ening quote 
indicates, he is concerned with language in what he calls its onto-
logical dimension rathe r than its antic. He is not after facts and 
information about language, but rather the Being of language and 
how this Being is related to Being in general . To und erstand this 
distinction (i. e ., between the t\.JO different approaches to language ) 
we must give a preliminary sketch of the question of Being itself, 
for this distinction springs from the so ca lled 'ontological differ ence', 
the differ ence between Being (Sein) and beings (seienden; things , 
entities ). Objects that can stand before us as things with propertie s 
that can be defined and analyzed have traditionally been the prima ry 
conc ern of philosophy and science. However, the happening of the 
standing before us of the object is a completely different issue; 
this is the thing's Being, and cannot be viewed as a thing itself. A 
conc ern with information about things is an antic study, while a 
concern with the standing before ( i.e. , Being) is an ontological one , 
and its me thodology must be as dif fe r ent as that which it is studying . 
We can infer only that 'Being ' cannot 
have the character of an entity. Thus 
we cannot apply to Being the concept 
of 'definition' as presented in tra-
ditional logic, which itself has its 
foundations in ancient ontology and 
which, within certain limits, provides 
a justifiable way of characterizing 
"entities ." The indefinability of Being 
does not eliminate the question of its 
meaning; it demands that we look the 
question in the face.l 
Thus when we ask for the Being of language we are searching for 
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how language occurs as what it is, and this is not merely a definition 
or a list of features about language . In traditional terminology it 
would be said that we are looking for the essence of language, but 
we must be careful to note that an essence has been historically 
considered as an abstractable form or definition that is separate 
from the concern of existence, and this is not how Heidegger views 
it. For him the distinction between essence and exist ence is a pre-
judice of the development of metaphysics, and the question of Being 
really lies at the source of this distinction. 
If the questions raised are though t 
through even roughly, the illus ion 
of being a matter of cours e , in which 
the distinction of essentia and 
exist entia stands for all metaphysics 
disappears . 2 
Therefore, when Heidegger raises the question of Being, he is 
not raising the same issues as traditional metaphysics. He is neither 
searching for a substance that whatever is actual (i . e . , exists) 
possesses such as a substratum, the will to power, or unity, nor is 
1Heidegger Being and Time trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) p. 23 . 
2Heidegger The End of Philosophy trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1973) p . 3 . 
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he attempting to give an eternal definition of what is "truly real" 
about some thing. Being for Heidegger is the process of standing 
before (presencing) of the entities which are present, and this pro-
cess of presencing must be thought on its own t e rms and not merely 
as the dichotomized essence or exis t ence of an object. 
As we shall see it is a different task to ask for the Being of 
something, like language, and the meaning of Being itself. 1 To a sk 
for the meaning of Being is to ask how it is that there is anything 
at all, i.e., why is there something rather than nothing? Toques-
tion the Being of langua ge is to ask how language occurs as language, 
and as such is closer to the ques tions of traditional metaphysics. 
However, if we insist on the t erms of metaphysics, the Being of 
language addresses itself to both existence and essence , for as we 
noted Being lies at the source of this distinction. However, it is 
misleading to insist on questions of essence and existence, despite 
the ability to do so, for this is still not thinking the Being of 
language in the \vay it is meant to be thought. As Heidegger summariz ed 
what he is ques tioning when he asks for the Being of something: 
But what really are we asking? Why the essent 
(Seiendes ) as such is. We are asking for the 
ground of the essent: that it is and is what 
it is, and that there is not rathe r nothing . 
Fundamentally \ve are asking about being. We 
are asking about the being of the essent. 
We are 2questioning the essent in regard to its being. 
1Though we shall see that language can not be considered as an entity 
among the others of the world, our first approach to it sees it that way, 
and though the Being of langua ge will eventually lead us to Being qua 
Being, they are clearly not the same. 
2Heidegger Introduction to Me taphysics trans. by Ralph Manheim (G arden 
City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co ., Inc., 1961) p. 26. Essent is 
Manheim's translation of Seiendes (i.e. ,entity, thing, existant etc. ) 
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Thus whether questioning the Being of an entity or Being itself 
a new type of thinking is needed . We must learn a type of thinking 
that lets the mysterious dynamics of Being come forth, and not a 
thinking that encapsulates everything in the clear and distinct 
categories of "Logical Reasoning." To explain and ~nd~_r.s tand Being 
was the goal of traditional metaphysics. 1 Because this means placing 
the meaning of Being within the limits that the medium of human 
reason constitutes, Heidegger sees that its mode of thought is one 
of re-presentation, and thus regardless of its assertions is basically 
subjectivistic in nature . This is why he sees the history culminating 
in Nietzsche whose Will to Power is the essence of all metaphysical 
thinking of control, adaptation, and manipulation, and why he considers 
his quest for Being to be a needed radical new beginning rather than 
a developed continuation of the tradition. 
His attempt is to return to the Presocratics, the source of 
Western thought, and show how the development of metaphysics is only 
one direction that thought could have taken. Heidegger is not in a 
real competition with this tradition since he is trying to follow 
out a different branch of thought, and not perfect or add to the old 
one. Metaphysics is suited for understanding and explaining universal 
structures and essences of things, but it is not suited for the 
thinking of Being as the presencing of whatever is present . Heidegger's 
attempt at overcoming metaphysics is, therefore, not a nihilistic 
1Bergson \vas among the first to be bothered by the alienating 
distance of this traditional view, and his method of empathy as an 
alternative to ~nd~_standing contains many of the seeds of Heidegger ' s 
thought. 
--
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destruction, but an Aufhebung; a return to Being itself that exposes 
metaphysics for what it is - an epoch of Being that is characterized 
by the submission of the world to the logic and categories of 
rationality, and thereby a for ge tting of Being itself. As he develops 
his own thinking he is not illogical or irrational, but claims that 
for the thinking of Being a different kind of thought from what is 
commonly known as logic and reason is needed. As he summarizes it: 
Calculative thought places itself und er 
compulsion to mast e r everything in the 
logical terms of its procedure. It has 
no notion that in calculation every-
thing calculable is already a whole 
before it starts working out its sums 
and products, a whole whose unity 
natura lly belongs to the incalculable 
which, with its mystery, ever eludes 
the clutches of calculation. That 
which, however, is always and every-
where closed at the outse t to the 
demands of calculation and, despite 
that, is always closer to man in its 
enigmatic unknmvableness than anything 
t hat "is," than anything he may arrange 
and plan, this can sometimes put the 
essential man in touch with a thinking 
whose truth no "logic" can grasp. 1 
The clarity and development of this paragraph makes it obvious 
that Heidegger is overstating his position when he claims that the re 
is no logic to his thought. But what is important is that he is 
after a ne\v mode of thinking, one that cannot be r educed to traditional 
1Heid egger "\fuat is Hetaphysics" trans. by 
Crick in Exis t ence and Being ed . Werner Brock. 
Regnery Co., 1949) p. 357. 
R. F .C. Hull and Alan 
(Chicago: Henry 
--
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thinkin g . This new mode of thought will first allow us to approach 
Being in the way proper to it , and thereby first enable us to ask for 
the Being of language in a n~nner s uited to finding the r elation of 
Being and language. HO\vever, a difficulty arises for , as we shall 
examine later, 1 our thinking is not independent from our language, 
and thus until we know the Bein g of lan gua ge we cannot know the Bein g 
of thought, and until we know the Being of thought we cannot properly 
think Being . As we saw above, to ask about the Being of language or 
of thought is not to formalize a unique essence of them, but rather 
to ask how they stand with Being itself. That is, to ask for the 
Being of language or thought is already to ask for the relation of 
Being, language , and thought . Until we do this we cannot know what 
the proper mode of thinking is , but it must also be noted that we can-
not find Being, lan guage , and thought until we are thinki n g properly . 
We are thus caught in a circle of interrelations between our three 
major issue s , which unexpectedly has given us a preliminary answer 
to why language is important to our quest of Being . 
Though this circle makes us wonde r whether we can ever start, l et 
alone s uc ceed , in the project we intend, we must view it as a methodo-
logical difficulty that forbids any traditional logical structure (e.g., 
deductive , inductive, transcendental, or dialectical) but does not make 
it completely impossible . We must recognize that though He discuss 
thinking, language, and Being individually, the truth of each one can 
1
see for exampl e the relation of legein, noein and logos in the 
chapter on the early Greeks. 
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only emerge in light of the others for they are not really independent. 
Thus the full significance of our thesis emerges in the unfolding develop-
ment which occurs rather than being stated or asserted . What is said 
at each stage along the way is not an isolated explanation that later 
will be related to other isolated explanations . Nor is any one sec-
t ion any type of logical consequence of another section . Each part 
is an inextricable component of the devel oping interplay of inter-
r e l ations which is the only possible methodology for thinking how 
Being , language , and thought stand with one another . If we under-
stand how to approach the work in this way we have once again un-
expectedly found ourselves in the midst of the iss ues rather than 
merely introducing them , for we are a l ready thinking in the " non -
logical" way , that is , we are already unden.;ray to thinking Being by 
thinking the belonging together of language, thought , and Being . 
With these introductory remarks we hope to have given a pre-
l iminary sketch of the issues by shmving how they are dealt \vith . The 
circle of interrelations we discus s ed and the resulting concern with 
t he development as crucial to understanding the individual statements 
is in l ine with the way Heidegger sees the parts of his own career: 
" • •• only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain 
access to what is to - be-thought by Heidegger II. But [ the thought of] 
Heidegger I becomes possible only if contained in Heidegger II. " 1 As 
1
Heidegger ' s fonvard to Heidegger : Through Phenomenology to 
Thought by W. J . Richardson ( The Hag ue : Martinus Nijhoff , 1963) p . 
xxii. Though ' Heidegger I and II ' refers specifically to early and 
late Heidegger the same point holds for any one part to any o t her . 
10 
we mentioned in the beginning, we do not want to merely repeat what 
Heidegger stated, and we now see that this would be a mistaken approach 
for it would be reducing his significance to a collection of independent 
statements and ignore the importance of the active process and develop-
ment. Therefore , our own methodology will hopefully be true to him 
by thinking along the path with him. Our interpretation is not, of 
course, a final and complete word on Heidegger , but we hope it will 
be s uccessful in disclosing the Being of Heidegger's concern with 
Being and language. 
One thing is necessary, though, for 
a face-to- face converse with the thinkers: 
Clarity about the manner in which we en-
counter them. Basically , there are only 
two possibilities: either to go to their 
encounter , or to go counter to them. If 
we want to go to the encounter of a think-
er's thought, we must magnify still further 
what is great in him. Then we \vill enler 
into what is unthought in his thought. 
Everything here is the path of a respond-
ing that examines as it listens.2 
1What is Called Thinkin g? p. 77. 
2Heidegger Poetry , Language , Thought trans. by Albert Hofstadter 
(N e\v York : Harper & Row , 1971) p. 186. 
..... 
I. Being and Time: Discourse as the Language of Being. 
Our aim in th e following trea tise is 
to work out the ques tion of the mean-
ing of Being and to do so concrete ly. 
Our provisional aim is the interpreta-
tion of time as the possible horizon 
for anr understanding whatsoever of 
Being. 
11 
On the first page of Being and Time Heidegge r tells us his task, but 
unfortunately this task was never completed. The book opens with a 
preliminary analysis of Dasein, and ends with the t empora lity of 
Dasein, never reaching the concrete analysis of time and Being which 
was scheduled for the third divis ion of part one. 2 Posterity is 
plagued by the question of why the work was never completed, and 
what the significance of the unfinished sections really is. 
The fact of the matter is that in a sense Heidegger's goal was 
completed , and the third division could only have r epea ted what was 
already said. Dasein can only be und ers tood in terms of the ques -
tion of Being, for othenvise Being and Time must be v ie\ved only as 
philosophic anthropology, a possibly interesting and rewarding path, 
but one that Heidegger repeatedly repudiates. Therefore, the ques-
tion of Being is really an issue every step of the way, and in that 
sense the task of Being and Time was achieved. 
Why then did Heidegger simply not print the original division 
outline and have a short concluding final chapter indicating how the 
question of the meaning of Being has been dealt with already? An 
!Being and Time p. 19. 
2"In thus interpreting Dasein as temporality, however, \ve shall not 
give the answer to our leading question as to the meaning of Being in 
general." Ibid. p. 38 . 
2 
.interesting possibility he might have chosen not to do this is because 
he realized that though in one sense the book was complete, in a more 
significant sense one book could never sufficiently deal with the 
question of Being . In other words, Being and Time is both comple te 
as it stands and also could never be complete, no matter how ~uch 
was added to it . I t is one way to Being , and Heidegger ' s mistake 
was that at first he thought i t was the definitive route . Later h 
realized that though t he general content of the book was valid , 
important, and in a sense complete, at the same time it was only a 
beginning and therefore had to be understood as such. Being and Time, 
we now realize, is an introduction to the later works, and not a 
completely self-standing enterprise . As an introduction it works 
in t he mysterious way of setting the concerns of t hat which follows, 
but the significance and truth of thes e concerns can only be under-
stood if seen in the light of that which follows . These reasons 
might explain why Heidegger was willing to publish the book with its 
open ended quality , and it is with these ideas in mind that we 
approach it . 
Our concern is with language and we therefore make no pretense 
of giving a complete account of Being and Time. We intend to deal 
only with t hose sections most directly related to understanding the 
role of language in understanding Dasein, Eeir.g, and their relation-
ship . Our first step must be t o try and make clear what Heidegger 
means by Dasein. Taking heed of our previous warning, we must be 
guided by the question of Being from the very beginning . 
~----------------------
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'Dasein' is often translated as 'man ' or 'human being,' and there 
certainly are grounds for doing so . However, this translation can be 
very misleading, and t ends to mis guide the reader in the direction of 
erroneously interpre ting Being and Time as primarily a study of man. 
But if 'Dasein' is not a direct equivalent for 'man ' what is it? 
Let us first look what a few commentators have said. 
In direct or literal translation into 
English, this word means 'to-be-there .' 
Such a litera l translation does not 
adequately express the meaning of the 
word which it has in the German lang-
ua ge or in which it is used in Heidegger's 
philosophy .... In German, Dasein means 
'existence, ' 'life, ' and 'presence.' 
Generally it expresses the concrete-
ness of here and now. In Heidegger's 
philosophy t he word ' Dasein' retains 
all these shades of meaning in 
contemporary German but in a deepened 
and unified way. Primarily, Dasein 
for Heidegge r is the presence of Being 
in concre te life and situations. Man 
is the only being who has an under-
standing of Being , therefore, only for 
man can Being be present. Han is the 
place of the presence of Being; he is 
this presence . Man is Dasein. Dasein 
is not identical with empirical man, 
but rather his essence. 1 
In other words, the ego, the subject, 
is not the Da-sein . Dasein is rather 
the understanding (Lichtun g) where 
Being 'opens' itself and therefore 
'understanding' occurs.2 
1
vincent Vycinas Earth and Gods (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961) 
pp. 24-5. 
2Egon Vietta "Being, World and Understanding" Review of Meta-
physics #5 1951 /52 page 166. 
Though in traditional German philosophy 
it may be used quite generally to stand 
for almost any k i nd of Being or ' exist-
ence' which we can say that something 
has (the 'existence' of God for example), 
in everyday usage it tends to be used 
more narrowly to stand for the kind of 
Being that belongs to persons. Heidegger 
follows the everyday usage in this re-
spect, but goes some\vhat further in 
that he often uses it to stand for any 
person who has such Being and who is 
thus an 'entity' himself. 1 
Though I find this last quote misleading because the final sentence 
suggests 'Dasein' is concerned with an entity rather than Being, it 
indicates why there arose so much confusion over the meaning of 
Dasein and Being and Time as a whole. It shows that Heidegger often 
uses the term for an entity, i.e., as an ontic term, while the other 
quotes show that it also stands for the Being of this entity, i . e., 
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an ontological term . As we saw in the introduction this is the 
ontological difference, and we must ask whether these two uses result 
from carelessness on Heidegger's part, or whether something significant 
about Dasein and Being itself is revealed by it? 
l~e first note that all three quotes make reference to man, or 
traditional philosophical understandings of man as ego or subject, 
but distinguish Dasein from this. They recognize that Dasein is an 
ontological concern, and not simply an antic or empirical one. The 
justifications for this move come from both the dictionary definition 
of 'Dasein,' and from its etymology . For someone as concerned with 
1John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translators footnote Being 
and Time p . 27. 
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language and etymology as Heidegger , these clues are not to be ignor ed 
for the s ake of a neat and clea r word s ubstitution for ' Dasein. ' Let 
us turn to Being and Time itself for t extual support for some under-
standing of Da s ein in line with these e tymological hints. 
And be ca use we cannot define Dasein ' s 
essence by citing a "wha t" of the kind 
that pertains to a subject-matter, and 
because its essence lies rather in the 
f ac t that in each cas e it has its Being 
to be, and has it as its own, we hav e 
chose to designat e this entity as "Dasein," 
a term which is purely an expression of 
its Being . 1 (p. 33) 
So when we designa t e this enti t y with the 
t erm ' Dasein, ' we are expressing not its 
"wha t" (a s if it v1ere a t able , hous e or 
tree ) but its Being . (p. 6 7) 
Thus Das ein is neve r to be taken onto-
logically as an instance or special 
case of some genus of entities as 
things that are present-at-hand .(p. 68 ) 
One of our 
that if we 
that which 
completely 
of Dasein. 
first t asks will be to prove 
posit an "I" or subject as 
is proximally given , we shall 
miss the phenomena l content 
(p. 72) 
Dasein doe s not fill up a bit of space 
as a Real Thing or it em of equipment 
would. . . (p. 419) 
What emerges from thes e quot es is that the word ' Dasein' do es refer 
1Not e the last three words i n German are "als r e ine r Seinsa usdruck" 
and should be tra ns lated "as pure Being expression" l eaving out the 
possess ive "its" which indica t es the r e ified s ubstantiali t y which is 
pre s ently in ques tion. 
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to man, but in terms of his unique Being and not in terms of any ontic 
properties . Unfortunately, as we shall see, Heidegger waivers in his 
recognition of Dasein as an ontological concern. Oft en he calls 
Dasein an entity, which makes it an ontic rather tha n a n ontological 
term. Further, as the history of interpretations of Being and Time 
testify, th e entity he is concerned with is man. Thus he falls in 
the trap of having his fundamental concept (Dasein) speak about man 
himself r a ther tha n of Being-in-the-world. However, we will att emp t 
to maintain the ontological interpretation of Dasein as strictly as 
possible for it seems clear that the reason Heidegger used the term 
'Dasein' rathe r than more common t erms for man or man's Being was 
that he wants to reach a new conception of man's Being in its r ela-
tion to Being in general. In ord er to gain further insight into 
hmv Heidegger views this unique way of Being we again turn to Being 
and Time. 
Dasein is in such a \vay as to be some-
thing which under s t ands something like 
Being. (p. 39) 
"Being-in" is thus the formal existential 
expression for the Being of Dasein, which 
has Being-in-the-world as its essential 
stat e . (p. 80) 
Dasein is its disclosedness. 1 (p. 171) 
... only as long as Dase i n is, 'is there' 
(gibt ~) Being .... As we have not ed 
Being is dependent upon the under-
standing of Being ... (p. 255) 
1Disclosedness (Er schlos senhei t) can signify either a laying op en 
or the state of being laid open. 
If no Dasein exists, no world is 'there' 
either. (p. 417) 
Th ese quotes indicate tha t Heidegger is interes ted in the Being 
of man insofar as man allows for, or enables, the emergence of what -
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ever is. He is not interested in man's Being as body, soul, rationality, 
will, as a socia l, cultura l or political entity , or any combination of 
these. Of course much of what he says is pertinent to th e under-
standing of man in thes e respects, but that is secondary. His prime 
conc ern is to reach Being itself , and his conc e rn with man is to 
shmv him in relation to the question of hoH anything can first be 
present. '' ... the analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented towards 
the guiding t ask of working out the question of Being ."1 
Dasein is not a blank screen that records or reflec ts the world, 
rather it enable s the world to be there altogether, in itself, not in 
a mind, soul or rea l m of mere appearance. Nor should Dasein be viewed 
in the sense of a tra nscendental s ubjec tivism whereby it constitutes 
entitites, for Dasein is not a subj ec t, but man in his fundamental 
unity \vith the \vorld, and because Dasein does not constitute the "Wha t" 
or cont ent of entities, only the ir ability to occur as entities . Dasein 
constitutes or enables th e appearance of whateve r is, and as such 
without Das ein entities could not be there, i.e., there could not be 
anything. 
In this way \ve seem to have identified Being and appearing, and 
since this connection is of crucial importance to Heidegger, it needs 
1Being and Time p. 38. 
some further clarification. Though he spends a great deal of effort 
distinguishing his ph enomenological concern with one of appearances, 
he does conclude: "And finally one can use ' appearing' as a term 
for genuine sense of 'phenomenon' as showing itself." 1 To use it in 
this correct way we must be careful to note that he does not mean 
appearing in th e sense of mere appearance as opposed to the "really 
real," nor appearing in the Berkeleyan sense that only when some-
thing is sensually experienced (i.e., appears) does it exist; he 
does not need to resort to a God to grant Being to the tree alone 
in the forest. For what he means by Being is that which allows 
something to occur as what it is, 2 and this is not dependent on a 
continuing subjective reception. In order to und ers tand in what 
way appearing and Being are then brought together for Heidegger we 
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must first see how the question of Being is und erstood. The ques tion 
of Being is rais ed in the light of the question "why are there en-
tities rather than nothing?" Heidegger devotes a great deal of 
energy in Introduction to Me taphysics, and elsewhere,to just raising 
this question. Merely to utter it is not enough. For this question 
to be truly asked we must hold ourselves in the sway of Nothingness, 
over the abyss that is not the negation of something positive, but 
nonbeing itself. Only then do we not take it for granted that there 
already are entities and merely ask for their original cause. Only 
1 Ibid. p. 53. 
2Ibid. pp. 25-26. 
in the face of Nothingness can the meaning of Being itself be asked. 
Instead this essent, through questioning, 
is held out into the possibility of non-
being . Thereby the why ( i .e., "why are 
there essents rather than nothing?") 
takes on a very different power and 
penetration. Why is the esser.t torn 
away from the possibility of non-
being? Why does it not simply keep 
falling back into nonbeing? Now the 
essent is no longer that which just 
happens to be present, it begins to 
waiver and oscillate, ...• 1 
What is it to Be? vfuat is the meaning of Being? 
Asked about in this light Being is no longer questioned as a 
first cause, nor as a property or quality of things, for in both 
these cases it too wo uld be something among all the things of th e 
world, and we would have to ask about its Being . Being cannot be a 
something, entity, or anything that is, for it is the is itself . 
Why are there entities rather than nothing? Because Being . \.fuat 
does it mean to Be? It means to be there , to have abiding presence, 
to be held up over a nd against th e void but not disappear in it. 
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It is in this sense that we say Being means appearing. Appearing not 
taken as appearance , i.e., perceptual manifestation or semblance , 
but as first coming on the scene, being there, existing. 
Thus we must keep in mind that the expression 
'phenomenon ' signifies that which shows itself 
in itself, th e manifest .... When 'phenomenon' 
signifies 'semblance,' the primordial signifi-
cation (the phenomenon as the manifest) is al-
ready included as tha t upon which the second 
signification is founded. 2 
1Introduction to Metaphysics p. 23. 
2 
Being and Time p. 51. 
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It is in this sense of phenomenon as showing itself that we have 
interpreted appearance and Being, and why in his quest for Being 
Heidegger feels he is continuing the essential path of phenomenology. 
Clearly, we have not in the least answered what it means to 
appear, what the meaning of Being is, or why there are entities 
rather than nothing. All that we have done is establish the 
path of the question. We have only first begun to lay out that 
about which we are questioning, i.e. Being as presencing, appearing, 
being there. But, though just a beginning, that is a big step for 
it is the beginning. 
The project of Being and Time is to show the role Dasein plays 
in the meaning of Being. As the etymology of Dasein indicates, it 
is strongly relevant to the question of Being (S ein) itself. Dasein 
is man, but man in his Being as that which allows whatever is to Be. 
When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 
'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself.' 
In such a case this sort of thing can be 
neither understood nor not understood. 
In such a case even entities within-the-
world can neither be discovered nor lie 
hidden. In such a case it cannot be said 
that entities are, 1nor can it be said that they are not. 
We are now in a position to return to a question we raised 
earlier. We have seen that Dasein refers to man's Being in a very 
special way, and yet we have noted that 'Dasein' is often used to 
stand for the entity man itself. The significance of this double 
usage is summarized in one sen t ence: "The 'essence' of Dasein lies 
in its existence." 2 To clarify what this means we turn briefly to 
!Being and Time p. 255 
2 Ibid. p. 67. 
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"Letter on Humanism." In this work the Being of man is defined as 
1 
"standing in the clearing of Being." Heidegger goes on to say 
"Ex- sistence can only be said of the essence of man, i.e., only of 
2 the human way 'to be,'" and "All that man is, i.e., in the tradi-
tiona! language of metaphysics the "essence" of man, rests in his 
3 
ex- aistence." It should be noted that Heidegger writes existence 
in this work as 'Ex-sistenz' (rather than 'Exi~tenz' as in Bein£ 
~nd Time) in order to emphasize man's transcending himself, and 
standing in the light (truth) of Being. From this we see that 
for Heidegger man is man only insofar as he stands in this rela-
tion to Being, i.e., insofar as he ex-sists, insofar as he is Dasein. 
Thus Dasein is understood as both man and the emergence of whatever 
is, because man in his essential Being is this emergence. If he were 
not this emergence he would not be man and the world would not be 
"there. " Man as Dasein constitutes the "there" (da- sein), so that 
there can be something rather than nothing. "This entity Dasein 
carries in its o~mmost Being the character of not being closed off, 
in the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness. 
By reason of this disclosedness this entity (Dasein), together with the 
Being- there of the world, is 'there' for itse1f."4 
vle now have explained why 'Dasein' can be used as an equivalent 
of 'man,' and yet preserved the full significance of this word. It 
1 
"Letter on Humanism" p. 154. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Being and Time p. 171. 
is only with this effort that sense can be made of Heidegger's 
claim that his late work is not a reversal of Being and Time. 1 
We must make a constant attempt to understand Dasein in res pect 
to the emergence of whatever is, and not as man understood in some 
subj ectivistic sense. As Heid egger summarizes it: 
But to lay bare the horizon within Hhich 
something like Being in general becomes 
intelligible, is tantamount to clarify-
ing the possibility of having any und er-
standing of Being at all - an understanding 
which itself belongs to the ~onstitution 
of the entity called Dasein.-
With the understanding of Dasein that we have reached it is 
not surprising to see Being-in-the-World declared as Das ein's 
basic state. The analysis of Dasein is therefore an attempt to 
unravel the structures (existentialia) of Dasein as Being-in-the-
World. Heidegger is careful to point out that Being-in-the-Vorld 
is a unitary phenomenon, it is not the glueing together of t\vO 
separate objects. "Subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein 
and the World." 3 Thus the task is not to bring together two sides 
1
"The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is 
justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in 
mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain 
access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But (the thought 
of) Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in 
Heidegger II." Heidegger's preface to Richardson's Heidegger: 
Through Phenomenology to Thought p. xxii. 
2Being and Time p. 274. 
3Ibid. p. 87. 
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of a dualism, but rather to show how and in what way Dasein is 
Being-in-the-World. Chapter V of Being and Time, in which language 
(Discourse) is discussed, focuses on just this issue. It is en-
titled "Being-in as Such" and is meant to "se t forth the ontological 
Constitution of inhood itself."1 Therefore, as a preliminary to 
an examination of the role of Discourse it is necessary to examine 
the chapter as a whole in order to understand what is meant by 
the "inhoodness" of Dasein. 
We start with a quote that further elucidates how Being-in 
is to be approached: 
Being-in is distinct from the present-
at-hand insideness of something present-
at-hand 'in' something else that is 
present-at-hand; Being-in is not a 
characteristic that is effected, or 
even just elicited, in a present-at-
hand subject by the 'world's' Being -
present-at-hand; Be ing-in is rather 
an essential kind of Be ing of this 
entity itse lf. But in that case, what 
else is presented with this phenomenon 
than the commercium which is present-
at-hand between a subject present-at-
hand and an Object present-at-hand. 
Such an interpretation would come 
closer to the phenomenal content if 
we were to say that Dasein is the Being 
of this 'between.' Yet to take our 
orientation from this 'between' would 
still be misleading. For with such an 
orientation we would also be covertly 
assuming the entities bet\.;een which 
this 'between,' as such, 'is', and we 
would be doing so in a way which is 
ontologically vague. The 'between' is 
1Ibid. p. 79. 
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already conceived as the result of the 
convenienta of two things that are present-
at-hand. But to assume these beforehand 
always splits the phenomenon assunder, 
and there is no prospect of puttinT it 
together again from the fragments . 
This quote is crucial for understanding Heidegger's project, 
and it leads us to an understanding of Being-in as an existentiale 
of Dasein that constitutes Dasein in its very special mode of Being. 
We have understood the Being of Dasein as its Disclosedness, Dis-
closedness not as a property or accidental attribute of Dasein, but 
as its fundamental Being. We now must see that this Disclosedness 
constitutes the 'inhood' of Being-in. The key to unraveling the 
structures of this phenomenon lies in the "there" (da) of Dasein: 
When we talk in an ontically figurative 
way of the lumen naturale in man we have 
in mind nothing other than the existential-
ontological structures of this entity, that 
it is in such a way as to be its "there."2 
This "there" is the root of Dasein' s having a world, i.e. Being-in-
24 
a-world. It is through its Disclosedness that Dasein is its "there": 
" . .. disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to 
which it is its "there"."3 In other words, Dasein, Disclosedness, 
'There,' and Being-in are ontologically the same- Dasein is Being-
in because it is its Disclosedness, by which it is its 'there' 
1 Ibid. p. 170 . 
2 Ibid. p. 171. 
3 Ibid . p. 263. 
(i.e., Disclosing Being-in-the-World). Thus, the structures of 
disclosure not only constitute the 'there' of Dasein, but, since 
Dasein is Being-in-the- World, these structures also constitute the 
'there' of the world. This is a difficult point to grasp without 
reducing ourselves to an idealism, but we must recognize that there 
is an inherent connection between disclosing and constituting which 
emerges from the primordial interrelation of Dasein and the world, 
and not from a subjectivity. Constitution is not to be understood 
as one side molding or constructing the other, but rather as "make-
up" or structure which allows both Dasein and the world to first be 
what they are. In short, because there is Dasein, because Dasein 
is "there" as the disclosing of Being which it is, a world can 
emerge as something that Dasein is already alongside (present-at-
hand) or within (ready-to-hand). "To say that in existing, Dasein 
is its "there," is equivalent to saying the \vorld is "there;" its 
Being-there is Being-in."1 
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The "there" is not to be understood in the sense of geometrical 
space of the present-at-hand. Rather than referring to a specific 
location, it is that which makes possible all ideas of location, 
whether spatial or temporal location of the objectified present-at-
hand or the lived involvement of the ready-to-hand (e.g., the near-
ness of Athens and the distance of my glasses when reading Plato). 
To speak metaphorically, the structures of the "there" constitute 
1 Ibid. p. 182. 
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the stage which gives the entities of the world a place to unfold, 
and without which, therefore, nothing could Be. And as the constitu-
tion of a stage affects the Being of a play that takes place within 
its region, the constitution of the "there" creates a r egion tha t 
inherently affects the Being of the world. Not as a molding of a 
world that already is, for just as a play is not (a play) unless 
it has some t ype of stage within which to 'come to life', nothing 
is unless it has a place to be, i.e., unless the "there" of Dis-
closure provides the open spac for it to emerge. 1 Thus Disclosed-
ness, as that which constitutes the "there" of Dasein and thus the 
"there" of the world, is what constitutes the possibility of the 
being there of whatever is. There are four basic structures of 
Disclos edness: State-of-mind (Bef indlichkei t), Understanding 
(Ver stehen), Discourse (Reden ), and Falling (Verfallen). An ana lysis 
of these will thus give us how, whatever is, can be. 
Stat e-of-mind is an existentiale of Dasein that is known to us 
as mood. Hoods reveal something special: 
Phenomenally we would wholly fail to 
recognize both what mood discloses and 
1Though the metaphor of a stage is misleading because the "there" 
is not a pre-existing spatial 'container' as a stage seems to be, we 
chose it because of the sense of independence of a play yet the influence 
the stage has on the structure of its Being. The 'there' is what 
Heidegger later calls the free or open space, and though this does not 
exist apart from the things which appear within it, we felt the idea of 
a stage conveys its significance. 
how it discloses, if that which is dis-
closed were to be compared with what 
Dasein is acquaint ed with, knows and 
believes 'at the same time' when it has 
such a mood .... for the mood brings 
Dasein before the "that-it-is " of its 
"there" , which, as such, stares it in 
the face with the inexorability of an 
enigma. 1 
Thus, the facticity of the being there of something is revealed in 
mood, and not a specific whatness of that which is there. This 
determination of the "there" of Dasein constitutes it as already 
alongside something, i.e., as confronted with a given, and is 
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characterized by Heidegger as "thro\vness" (Ge\vorfenheit). In other 
words, the "there" of Dasein is revealed as a heine 'delivered over' 
to something, i.e., it is not an isolated pure ego but is cast in-
to a place where it can be affect ed. At the same time the world 
is revealed as "there" as something that matters . 
The fact that this sort of thing (i.e. , 
something within t he world ) can ' matter' 
to it (i.e., Dasein) is grounded in ones 
state-of-mind; and a s state-of-mind 
it has already disclosed the world-as 
something by which it can be threat-
ened for instance .... Dasein's openness 
to the world is constituted existentially 
by the attunement of a state-of-mind.2 
State-of-mind is one way in which the "there" is constituted: 
Dasein is "there" as something thrown and as attuned to its thrown-
ness, and the world is "there" as something which is in such a way 
1Ibid. p. 175. 
2 Ibid. p. 176. 
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as to matter. State-of-mind both reveals and constitutes the "there." 
In short, insofar as whatever is, is "there," and the "there" is 
revealed and constituted by Dasein, which is characterized by state-
of-mind, whateve r is "there" must be disclosed and constituted as 
something that matters in one way or another. 
Und er the strongest pressure and resistance, 
nothing like an affect would come about, 
and the resistance itself would remain 
essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-
the-world, with its state-of-mind, had 
not already submitted itse lf ( sic~ schon 
angewiesen) to having entities within-
the-world "matter" to it in a \vay which 
its moods have outlined in advance.l 
State-of-mind is one exis t ential structure whereby the "there" 
is disclosed in its Being; Underst anding is a second. It is 
equiprimordial with State-of-mind, which means that though we can 
consider them separately they in fact are always toge ther in the 
revelation and constitution of the "there." Heideg ge r defines Under-
standing as "the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-
Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself 
what its Being is capable of." 2 Another way of saying this is that 
Understanding is charact erized by "projection" (Entwurf), which means 
that it places Dasein 'ahead of itself' and as 'more than it already 
is.' Understanding thus reveals the world in accordance \vith future 
possibilities, and not as factual here and nmv given as State-of-
mind does. 
1 Ibid. p. 177. 
2Ibid. p. 184. 
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Understanding is not the thematic, conscious grasping of some-
thing present-at-hand, rather it is the ground of this insofar as 
the "there " of whatever can be known is constituted by its po s sibilities . 
I can comprehend that this item in front of me is a hammer because 
its possibility of driving in a nail is available to me. The 
existentiale Understanding is what makes possible my ability to 
reach ahead and be aware (at some level of consciousness) of 
possibil ities . Understanding does not reveal specific possibilities, 
but just as State-of-mind makes possible specific moods by disclosing 
and constituting the world as something that matters, understanding 
makes possible the derivative modes of comprehending, knowing, recog-
nizing, seeing, etc . which do make use of specific possibilities. 
\fuat Understanding does is to reveal possibility as possibility, by 
projecting ahead . 
Furthermore, the character of under-
standing as projection is such that 
the understanding does not grasp 
themat ically that upon which it pro-
jects - that is to say possibilities. 
Grasping it in such a manner would 
take av1ay from what is projected its 
very character as possibility, and 
would reduce it to the given con-
tents which we have in mind; whereas 
projection, in throwing, throws be-
fore itself the possibility as 1 possibility, and lets it be as such. 
Thus Understanding is an existentiale of Dasein that constitutes 
it as more than it immediately is, and lets it reach ahead to that 
which is not actually present. Remembering that Dasein is its 
1 Ibid. p. 185. 
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Disclosedness and the interconnection of disclosure and constitution, 
we can conclude that whatever is disclosed is constituted in its 
Being by its possibilities. In other words , whatever is "there" 
is so as it is becaus e Unders tanding is open to its possibilities. 
Understanding does not primarily have the role of delimiting some-
thing in advance of its becoming (being) present, rather Under-
standing's role is to disclose and constitute what is present here 
and now by reaching (proj ecting) ahead of the here and now a nd 
op ening up the possibilities which enable that which is present to 
be "there" as it is. "In the projection of Understanding, entities 
are disclosed in their possibility." 1 
As was noted, Understanding does not explicitly work out the 
possibilities, but th is can be done by what Heidegger calls I nter-
pretation (Auslegung). 2 
The projecting of the Understanding 
has its mvn possibility - that of 
developing itself. This development 
of the Understanding we call "inter-
pretation" .... In interpretation, under-
stRnding does not become something 
different . It becomes itself . Such 
interpretation is grounded existentially 
in understanding; the latter does not 
arise from the former. Nor is inter-
pretat ion the acquiring of information 
about what is understood; it is rather 
the working-out of possibilities pro-
jected in understanding.3 
1Ibid. p. 192. 
2
we bre~k with the Macquarrie and Robinson convention and 
capitalize 'Interpretation ' since it is a primary existentiale. 
3 Ibid.pp. 188-189. 
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Another way of putting this is that Interpretation is the elabora-
tion of the 'fore-structures' of Understanding. That is, in Inter-
pretation something gets explicitly disclosed as what it is. This 
'~' is not a tacking on of addi tional qualifications to a true 
or naked entity; rather, since the "the re" is r evealed and constituted 
by Understanding in accordance with its possibilities, the as-
structure is inherent to the Being of whatever the re is. 
It seems tha t this l eaves us with a circle in which all our 
unfolding knowledge of the world is an interpre t a tion which is "pre-
ordained " by the fore structures of Dasein's possibilities , i.e., 
by Understanding. 
But if interpretation must in any case already 
op erat e in th a t which is understood, and if it 
must draw its nurtur e from this, how is it to 
bring any scientific r es ults to maturity with-
out moving in a circle, especially if, more-
over, t he understanding which is presupposed 
still operates within our common information 
about man and the world? 1 
But this circle is not to be thought as a vicious circle of sub-
jectivity because Understanding provides the structure that simply 
det ermines the fact tha t whatever is is (at least partially) constituted 
by its future, i.e., its possibili ties, while the un fo lding of thes e 
possibilities is grounded in the thing, and in no way is dictated by 
a subj ec t. Dasein provi des the structures in accordance with which 
something may Be something at all, the things themselves provide 
what is known and understood. This point is seen in Heidegger's 
1Ibid. p. 194. 
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discussion of meaning. He states: "Meaning is an existentiale of 
Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 'b ehind' them, 
or floating some\.;rhere as an 'intermediate domain'. ,l This does not 
mean that the meaning of an entity is tacked on by a subjectivity, 
rather it says that \vhatever is "there" is disclosed and thereby 
constituted by the structures of Dasein, which includes Understanding 
and its r e sulting meaningfulness. 2 Thus meaning belongs to entities 
in their very Being, and not as something tacked on. Therefore, 
though we s a y that meaning and knowledge are rooted in Dasein we 
are asserting anything but a subjectivism. 
To furth er clarify these notions Heidegger turns to an analysis 
of a derivative mode of interpretation : Assertion (Aussage). II 
we may define "assertion" as a "pointing-out which gives some thing 
a definite characte r and \vhich corrnnunicates" ."3 In other words, an 
assertion communicates to someone a definite character of something 
by means of predication, and thereby that something is pointed out, 
i.e., shown to be there. It is different from Interpretation in 
general because Int erpretation does not have to be carried out in 
1 Ibid. p. 193. 
2Though "meaning" will be discussed later, we note: " ... "meaning" 
must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosed-
nes s which belongs to Understanding." Ibid. 
3Ibid. p. 199. It is interesting to note that both the German 
'Mitteilen'and the English'communicate'etymologically speak of taking 
part together, or sharing, and this is just the sense Heidegger intends -
a sharing in the thing and not the imposition of one person's thoughts 
on another. 
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word s or a statement. The placing into words is not an irrelevant 
difference, for assertion has a very definite structure of its own 
that discloses and constitutes the world in its own way. Assertion 
entails a specific judgment abo ut the thing and thus changes the 
relation of Dasein to the thing. The thing is taken out of its 
orig inary involvement with the world and possibilities, a nd is placed 
on a pedestal, as it were, to be v iewed in a detached way and in a 
specific manner. This mode of relating to the object is what we 
have been calling the present-at-hand. Presence-at-hand, however, 
is only one mode of Being, and according to Heidegger not a pri-
mord ial one. 
Interpretation in general does not necessarily formulate the 
poss ibilities in a thematic statement: in picking up the item in 
front of me and driving in a nail Hith it I am Interpreting it. 
In so doing Interpretation is operating in the ready-to-hand; rather 
than the present-to-hand. Assertion, on the other hand, takes the 
entity out of this originary "there" of the ready-to-hand, and 
const itutes and reveals a ne~..r and different "there" - that of an 
isolated and delimited factum . 1 
We hasten to point out that not every thing put into language 
do es what assertion does - poetry being the most striking counter 
example. Assertion is one aspect of language, and one that can provide 
access only to a limited and derivative mode of Being . It is in 
this light that Heidegger's critique of traditional philosophy finds 
1In the later works this mode is called Framed (Ge-stell ) thinking. 
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its directive. Heidegger says that because of the fetters the 
history of philosophy has placed upon itself with logic it has 
forgotten Being; and the importance logic has been given arises 
out of an int erpretation of logos as assertion. " ... by knowing 
that logos has been interpreted in a way which is ontologically 
inadequate, we have gained a sharper insight into the fact that 
the methodological basis on which ancient ontology arose was not 
a primordial one. The logos gets experienced as something present-
at-hand and interpreted as such ... "1 We hasten to point out that 
Heidegger is not r efuting logic, but merely exposing its limitedness . 
As he says elsewhere: "The very idea of "logic" disintegrates in 
the vortex of a more original questioning" 2 and '"'Logic" is only one 
exposition of the nature of thinking ."3 
In short, logic's predominance in the history of philosophy 
arose from cons idering logos strictly as predica tive judgment, and 
thus limiting the scop e of the world to the present-at-hand. There-
fore, it is not the significance of logos that is to be diminished, 
but we need to reinterpret it in a more fundamental manner which 
recognizes that the interpretation of logos has degenerated from a 
fundamental understanding of language, to language as assertion or 
judgment. 
1Being and Time p. 203. 
2
"\vhat is Hetaphysics" p. 342. 
3
rbid. p. 365. 
35 
In his attempt to rethink logos he introduces the term Discourse 
(Rede) which he considers a translation that can help recover the 
full significance of logos. " ... the basic signification of logo s 
is "discourse" ... "1 As he points out this does not help us any 
until we work out what is meant by Discourse itself, but the 
direction this will take is clear for he says '' . . . the function of 
the logos lies in merely letting something be seen, in letting 
entities be perceived .. . " 2 We have thus been led from an analysis 
of Understanding to Interpretation and then to Assertion, which 
finally led to Discourse itself. 
The basic stock of 'categories of signi-
fication', which passed over into the 
subsequent science of language, and which 
in principle is still accepted as the 
standard today, is oriented towards dis-
course as assertion .. . The task of lib-
erating grammar from logic requires 
beforehand a positive understanding 
o f the basic a priori structure of dis-
course in general as an existentiale . 3 
We now move on to a discussion of Discourse itself, in order to 
bring out how Heidegger views language and to see how it fits to-
gether with the project of Being and Time as a whole. We start with 
a group of excerpted quotes that give a basic characterization of 
Discourse . 
1Being and Time p. 55. Though not elaborated in Being and Time 
this conception of logos is grounded in the connection of logos to 
legein (originally 'to lay forth' now 'to say ' or ' to tell ' ). This 
will be dealt with explicitly in the next chapter. 
2 Ibid . p. 58. See note 1. 
3Ibid. p . 209 . 
The existential-ontological foundation 
of language is discourse ... 
Discourse is the articulation of 
intelligibility (Verst andlichkeit ) ... 
That which can be articulated in inter-
pretation and thus even more primordially 
in discourse is what we call "meaning " ... 
The way in which discourse ge t s expressed 
is language ... 
Hearing and keeping silent are lossibilities 
belonging to discursive speech. 
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From these quotes two major points emerge : first, we see that what 
Heidegger has in mind with Discour se is the ground of language and 
not identical to it; and second, Discourse, as an existentiale of 
Dasein's disclosedness reveals in some way something that is some-
how prior to it. What this means is that Discourse cannot simply 
be considered as an entity present-at-hand that is an attribute of 
man,
2 it must be viewed in its Being, and this Being lies in its 
r evelation and constitution of the "there," i.e. in its making 
something present. 
Heidegger states that there are four items that make Discourse 
what it is: what is said in the Discourse, what is talked about, 
the manifesting (Bekundung) and communication. However, we cannot 
assume to have a full understanding of the Being of Discourse by 
1
rbid. pp. 203-204. 
2
••were language not ontological, it could not disclose anything 
pertaining to the world ... Language cannot be just another thing (have 
antic, that is, psychological status) for then it would net be a 
discloser, but itself be in need of being disclosed." Loy Vail 
Heidegger and the Ontological Difference (University Park: Penn State 
University Press, 1972) p. 163. 
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merely putting together explanations of these four components. 
Discourse must be seen in its own light, and viewing it in terms 
of its components is only a step in that direction. What these 
aspects do tell us is that Discourse is primarily concerned not 
with itself but with a manifesting communication of the world. 
This concern of Discourse with the world is further evidenced 
when we remember that "hearing" and "keeping silent" are \vays of 
Discourse . They are not merely derivative modes, they are essential 
to it. In so far as Discourse is primarily an opening up of the 
world, and not necessarily a delimiting judgment about it, "hearing" 
and "keeping silent" are necessary. When words are spoken the 
words themselves are not as important as what they let be heard. 
True Discourse is not mere wor ds, as is exemplified in the cry of 
a desperate man \·lho pleas "Can you hear \Yhat I am saying?," or the 
angry parent \vho threatens "You did not hear a word I said" and is 
not really satisfied by the child's ability to re-call the words. 
Words are not enough for Discourse, for Discourse is primarily a 
communicative opening-up to the world, and \VOrds in themselves do not 
always do this. 
At this point we are led to two crucial questions: exactly what 
is that to which Discourse opens up, and in what way does Discourse 
have input into the constitution of that which is opened up. 
Heidegger states: 
Discourse is the articulation of intellig-
ibility (Verstandlichkeit) .... That which 
can be articulated in interpretation, and 
thus even more primordially in discourse, 
is what ~ve have called "meaning ." That 
which gets articulated as such in discur-
sive articulation, we call the "Totality-
of-significations."l 
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We have made brief note of meaning in the discussion of Interpretation, 
but in order to deal adequately with the questions we have now raised 
it is necessary to return to this point. 
The first thing we must not e is that by 'meaning' Heidegger does 
not have in mind 'a definition'. He uses the word Sinn, which like 
the French sens, has the connotations of sense and tendency, so that 
we can talk of the meaning (Sinn) of a painting, a play, or any ob-
ject in general, as well as of a sentence or a word. 2 To clarify 
meaning we must see it in relation to significance (B edeutung), which 
as that which is Articulated (specifically laid-out or opened up) 
must be similar to meaning but not identical - meaning being that 
which can be Articulated. Since it is through Discourse that signi-
fications first are, and since Discourse is more fundam ental than 
spoken language, Heidegger can say "To significations, words accrue. 
But ~vord-Things do not get supplied ~vith significations. " 3 By this 
1Being and Time p. 204. The connection between intelligibility 
(yerst andlichkeit ) and Understanding (Verst ehen) is, as we shall see, 
a crucial one, and is unfor tunately lost in translation. 
2This is why Heid egger can speak of the meaning of Being and not 
just the meaning of 'Being.' See Manfr ed Stassen's Heideggers Philo-
sophie Der Sprache in Sein und Zeit. 
3Being and Time p. 204. 
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Heidegger is saying that though our access to significations may 
be through words, the words get their guidance from significations. 
To find the right words we must first listen to the significations 
(significance) of a situation - i.e. Discourse must occur. 1 It is 
in this same sense of significance being prior to words that meaning 
is prior to significance: - though it is through significations 
that meaning gets expressed (articulated), significations get their 
guidance from meaning. As human speech must listen to Discourse, 
Discourse must listen to meanings. But how can meanings be listened 
to if they are by definition unarticulated? 
We take as a clue for the answer to this question the fact 
that meaning is introduced and discussed in connec tion with Under-
standing. It is in the structure of Understanding that our answer 
lies. " •.. "Meaning" nust be conceived as the formal- exis tential 
framework of the disclosedness which belongs to Understanding." 2 
Now, since the di sclosedness of Understanding is characterized by 
projection, we can see that meaning is constituted by the 'fore-
structur es '. These fore-structures constitute the interconnection of 
the world, in so far as they reach ahead of the 'here and now' in 
order to constitute that which is 'here and now' as what it is. 
I understand that someone is Just, because I have a fore-conception, 
though not necessarily explicit or specific, of a range of possibili-
ties of behavior of this person. This fore-conception of possibilities 
1 
"We never come to thoughts. They come to us. That is the proper 
hour of discourse" Poetry, Language, Thought p. 6. 
2Being and Time p. 193. 
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is in accordance with having a fore-conception of the meaning of 
Just; and the fact that philosophers can try for thousands of 
years to articulate what it means to be Just, shows that though we 
in some sense understand the Just (i. e. have a fore-conception of 
the meaning of it) the meaning is not explicit or articulated 
(though it is that which can be articulated). 
We are now in a position to return to our question, and show 
how Discourse can be guided by the unarticulated meaning. Thou~h 
the meaning is not presently explicitly before us (and because of 
the complexity of things probably never completely can be) it does 
implicitly constitute our understanding of that which is presently 
before us, and thus is in some sense available to us. Listening 
to meaning is a matter of unravelling the meaning from what is 
given to us, i.e., articulating thos e characteristics of th e fore-
structures tha t make tha t ~vhich is before us what it is . "Both 
discoursing (Reden) and hearing are based upon Understanding . "1 
Discourse, therefore , does not mold the world according to its 
own design, rather it is the coming forth of a meaningful world, 
announcing itself in some articulated fashion, and this is why 
hearing is constitutive of Discourse. Discourse is thus not the 
making meaningful of what originally was not so (i .e. sense data or 
pure sensation), but rather direct attunement to meaning itself. It 
is in this way that we understand Discourse to reveal and constitute 
the "there" of the world, and thus recognize that it is not merely an 
1Ibid. p. 208. 
r ~ 
.... ~ 
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entity for scientific study, but more fundamentally an existentiale 
of Dasein's disclosedness. 
To conclude our analysis of the role of langua ge in Being and 
Time we must turn to Discourse as it is manifested most often, that 
is in its 'fallen everydayness'. Heidegger calls this form of Dis-
course "Idle Chatter" (G erede). He characterizes it as a closing 
off of that which is talked about, i.e. ,a lot of words that end up 
burying what they want to say. 
We do not so much understand the entities 
which are talked about; He already are 
listening only to what is said-in-the- talk 
as such. What is said-in-the-talk gets 
understood; but what the talk is about is 
und erstoo~ only approxima t ely and s uper-
ficially. 
This is significant for it points out that Discourse in its authentic 
state is characterized not by Hhat is said as such, but by what it 
lets speak. The gr ounc of Discourse is t he world, and Discourse is 
an existentiale that l ets the world speak; but idle chatter,on the 
other hand, gets its direction from what people want or expect to 
hear,or from a role or image that the speaker wants to project, and 
thus cuts itself of f from its true ground. 
1 
Discourse, which belongs to the essential 
state of Dasein's Being and has a share 
in constituting Dasein's disclosedness 
has the possibility of becoming idle 
talk and when it does so, it serves not 
so much to keep Being-in-the-World open 
for us in an articulated understanding , 
as rather to close it off, and cover up 
the entities within-the-world. 2 
Ibid. p. 212. 
2rbid. p. 213. 
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The danger of idle chatter is aggravated by the fact that it 
does not recognize itself for what it is. We believe we reach an 
und erstanding of what is talked about, even though this is just what 
it lacks. "Idle talk is the possibility of understanding every-
thing without previously making the thing one's own." 1 A prime 
example of this phenomenon takes place in museums, where in front 
of a great masterpiece, we hear so much chatter about "colorful, " 
"pretty," "Oh, I know this painting" and other such conversation 
that does anything but let the painting speak. 
Idle chatter is the form of Discourse in fallen Dasein. This 
is not a rare state of Being, for Falling is an existentiale of 
Dasein a way of constituting the "there." It is a way of Being-
in-the-world that is as real as any other, and one that we all 
spend most of our time in. "Falling reveals an essential ontological 
structure of Dasein itself . Far from determining its nocturnal side, 
it constitutes all Dasein's days in everydayness ." 2 However, it is 
important to recognize it for what it is, and to recognize its 
consequences. As a cutting off from the world, idle chatter, and 
falling in general, is the ontological root of alienation: 
1 
Ontologically this means that when Dasein 
maintains itself in idle talk, it is - as 
Being-in-the-world - cut off fron its 
primary and primordially genuine relation-
ships-of-Being towards the world, towards 
Dasein-with, and towards its very Being- 3 in. Such a Dasein keeps floating unattached ... 
Ibid. p. 213. 
2Ibid. p. 224. 
3Ibid. p. 214. 
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Heidegger has therefore laid the groundwork for much social and 
anthropologica l philosophy, but that is not his primary concern; 
he merely wants to lay bare the way Dasein constitutes the funda-
mental relation between man and the world. Discourse is an 
existential e of disclosedness, of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, and 
as a form of Discourse Idle Chatter reveals and constitutes Dasein 
and the world as being cut off from each other. But such a cutting 
of f from the world is only possible for a Being who is in a funda-
mental relation with it. 
To be uprooted in this manner is a 
possibility of Being only for an 
entity whose disclosedness is 
constituted by discourse as charac-
terized by und ers t anding and states-
of-mind - that is to say, for an 
entity whose disclosedness, in such 
an ontologically constitutive statei 
is its " there," its 'in-the-world'. 
At this point we conclude our interpretation of Being and Time . 
Before going on we must bring together the ground we have covered. 
We have attempted an analysis that shows Dasein as not merely an 
entity among others, but rather the Being of man in his fundamental 
relation (unity) with the world. The Being of Dasein is the revela-
tion and constitution of the world, and the Being of the world is 
its emerging and its being "there" as it is. Thus the constitution 
of Dasein is at the same time the constitution of the emergence (the 
"there") of the world. This "there" that we spent so much time 
1
rbid. p. 214 . 
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trying to expose is the place of something that allows it to be. 
The "there" of Dasein is its Disclosedness, its being in a posi-
tion to be open to the world and allow the world to emerge. Thus 
because of the exis tentialia of Disclos edness, Dasein is "there"; 
that is, its "there" is constituted by State- of-mind, Understanding , 
Discourse and Falling. The "there" of the world is also constituted 
by these existentialia, but seen in a diff erent 'direction'. The 
world's "there" is constituted by State-of-mind as something that 
matters, has facticity, and, though we did not examine t emporality, 
has a past. By Understanding the \vorld' s "there" is constituted 
with possibilities, more than what is actually (concretely) or 
factually present, that is, a future. Discourse constitutes the 
"there" of the world as something that can announce itself, be artic-
ulated. And from Falling the "the r e " r eceives a constitution as 
cut of f, alien, something to be manipula ted and controlled. It is in 
this way t ha t \vhatever is ("there") is "there" as it is because of 
the Disclosedness of Dasein, and why we can say that Dasein 
simultaneously r evea ls and constitutes the "there" of the world. 
\fuat has tradi tionally been considered as two separate real!:.ls, 
i.e., subjectivity and obj ec tivity, we express as a unity by saying 
that the structures we have examined are constitutive of (the "there" 
of) Being-in-the-world. Working out the structures (existentia lia) 
of Dasein, is thus undertaking the task of working out the structures 
of the possibilities of Being-in-the-world in general, i.e. of Being 
itself. We have not undertaken the task of discussing all the 
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structures, nor have we expressed them in their temporality, a pro-
ject necessa ry in order to show Dasein in its essentia l completeness . 
Instead, we simply gave an exergesis of the four basic existentialia 
that constitute Being-in as such, and in so doing the role of language, 
as Discourse, became a topic of obvious concern. We saw that Dis-
course is constitutive of Being-in because in its authentic mod e it 
is essentially a coming forth of the world, an articulation of the 
meaning of entities of the world. Without Discourse the structures 
constituted by Understanding, and also State-of-mind, since every 
Understanding always has a State-of-mind, would remain unarticulated, 
and thus the "there" would be reveale d and constituted in a quite 
different way. In fact, to be exact , since State -of-reind, Under-
standing and Discourse are equiprimordial in the constitution of the 
"there", 1 we would not have anything "there" at all. Discourse gets 
its dire ction from Understanding , but without the articulation of the 
world there would be nothing "there" for Understanding to underst and. 
Understanding gives us possibilities as possibilities and thus with-
out Discourse there would be nothing actual, which is impossible 
since possibilities are always possibilities of something actual . 
Discour se, as articulation of an intelligibility (und erstandability) 
which goes \vith a State-of-mind, is a gathering of facticity (thrown-
ness, past) and possibility (proj ec tion, future) into a self manifesting 
presence that is not otherwise "there." 2 Thus a concern with Discourse 
1Being and Time p. 203. 
2The threefold significance of logos (Discourse) as gathering, 
Saying , and Being-present will be of continuing concern. 
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is imperative for the question of Being, for without i t there would 
be nothing (nothing would be "there"). 
In this section we have raised many points that will continue to 
concern Heidegger in his analysis of Being . The relationship between 
Discourse and that which is (can be) articulated, as well as between 
man, Being, language, listening and silence have all been introduced . 
In the mere seven pages on Discourse Heidegger raises all these 
issues in an almost staccato form. It therefore seems that he was 
only beginning to realize the signif i cance of the se questions to the 
quest for Being. Thus I do not consider any of these issues to have 
been fully worked out, but they have been exposed, and Heidegger's 
vie\vS on them as presented in Being and Ti me have been given. In the 
later works we shall see a clarification and elaboration of these 
projects, goals and views of Being and Time, rather than an abandone-
ment of them, as many interpreters of the 'Heidegger reversal' main-
tain . This is not to say that Heidegger considers his first work to 
be perfect, or that the later works make no attempts to overcome 
mistakes, but the crucial issue of the relation of man, language, and 
Being is developed and not reversed as the categorical vie1ving in 
terms of subjectivity and objectivity might claim. In order to see 
this issue we attempt to make a brief comparison of the Heidegger of 
Being and Time to the transcendental idealism of Kant . 
It is an obvious concern to the consideration of Heidegger as 
an ontologist to ask whether or not he has gone beyond Kant. 
Heidegger holds the First Critique (up to the Dialectic) in high esteem, 
.. ~------------------------------------------------------- ----- ---
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though he has a fairly unique interpretation of it. However, the 
value of Heidegger's contribution to the development of ontology 
would be ques tionable if he gave us nothing other than a new version 
of transcendental idealism. We therefore must make a comparison 
of Dasein's disclosedness to the Kantian categories of intuition 
and underst anding - in order to see whether they are serving the 
same function. 
The most obvious difference between them is that Kant is 
after a justification of science and therefore finds the limits 
of experiencability of an object in terms of traditional logic, 
while Heidegger is after the meaning of Being in general, and there -
fore considers a concern ~ith the possibility of objects of science , 
i.e., concerns of the present-at-hand , of limited scope. Secondly, 
Kant's categories and forms of intuition are clearly understood 
as prop erties of man's finite rationality, and thus we are inescapably 
left with the unreachable thing-in-itself. On the othe r hand, the 
existentialia for Heidegger are not merely properties of finite 
man, but rather the constitutive structures of man and Being in their 
fundamental unity of Being-in-the-\vorld. Another way of saying thi s 
is that Kant starts with the Cartesian dualism between man and the 
world, and then tries to bring them together on the grounds of a 
transcend ental functioning of man, while Heidegge r starts with a funda-
mental unity - man and \<lDrld need each other, neithe r is primary -
and thus his task is to unravel the components or structures of the 
unity, rather than to piece together two divided realms. It is for 
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this reason that Heidegger is n ever plagued by the division between 
phenomenon and thing-in-itself ~ for him phenomenon cannot mean 
mere appearance, it mus t be understood as the thing manifesting it-
self, in itself. 
It should be noted that these two differences between the 
thinkers are rooted on a common ground. Kant tries to analyze the 
conditions of objectivity becaus e he understands the world as ob-
ject (present-at-han d) - an under s tanding that necessarily separates 
it from subjectivity which is understood as the unique thinking 
object. Heidegger , on the other hand , tries to unravel the meaning 
of Being in general, for rather than seeing the world strictly in 
terms of the objectivity of the present-at-hand, he r ecognizes 
another, more primary, mode - the r eady- to-hand - in which the aware-
ness of the world is no further removed than that of my o'vn sub-
jectivity.1 In the ready-to-hand the world's meaning and my meaning 
are intrinsically unit ed - a primordial unity and not t'vo separate 
realms affecting each other. 2 Thus Heidegger must be concerned with 
the ground of whatever is, the meaning of Being itself, and not with 
the subjective constitution of objectivity. 
However, notwithstanding these differences and our understanding 
of Dasein in light of Heidegger' s '"arning to escape subjectivist 
thinking (interpretation), there seems to be an inescapable link be-
tween Kant and Heidegge r. Dasein, though not equivalent to subjectivity, 
1Note that this idea is the root of the transformation of the 
Cartesian starting point of "I think" to an "I can" by thinkers like 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. 
2
see Being a nd Time p. 170; quoted p. (23ff) of this work. 
49 
is certainly 'tied' to man (i.e. constituted by human possibilities), 
and thus it seems as though Heidegger has merely made Being itself 
grounded in transcendental constitution. Even though constitution 
is understood as 'structure' or 'make-up' and not 'molding' or 
'constructing' (the traditional understanding of Kant's transcen-
dentalism), Dasein's equation with being human leaves the ground 
of Being in the being of (finite) man. Certainly because of the 
fundamental unity of man and world, and because Being is designated 
(op ened up) by a term of man's language, the question of Being cannot 
be asked apart from the question of man, but must Being be reached 
through a study of the being of man as in Being and Time? The 
answer is no, and Heidegger himself recognized this. That is why 
in the later works Dasein becomes understood more in the sense of 
existing or being-there in general, and not strictly as man 's 
essence,
1 
and why the later works emphasize that when in Being and 
Time he said "Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist_ ... "gibt es" Sein," 
(Surely, only as long as Dasein is ... is there Being (is Being given)) 
the "it gives" \vas consciously and carefully considered and the "it" 
which gives, is Being itself, the ground of man, Dasein and the giving. 
We reiterate that the analytic of Dasein in Being and Time is not 
thereby invalidated by these considerations. The fundamental struc-
tures of the "there" revealed by the unravelling of Dasein's 
existentialia are intrinsic to and cons titut ive of the meaning of 
1As early as Introduction to Metaphysics when concerned with 
man's being he always speaks of 'human Dasein' and not merely 'Dasein' . 
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Being, and this can never be forgotten . However, Being a nd Time 
itself occasionally f el l into traditional subjective traps becaus e 
it first def ined Dasein in the sense of the essence of man, and 
was thus guid ed by traditional unders t andings of man. lfuat has 
to be done is first und ers t and Dasein as the oc curr i ng unity of 
man and the world (Er eignis) and then und ersta nd man \vi thin the 
guidance of this understanding of Dasein. This is the rout e followed 
by the l a t e r works . Thus Dasein is essential to the ques tion of 
Being, and the l a t e r works maint ain this, but Dasein as Ereignis, 
not strictly as the essence or being of man, and c ertainly not as 
the entity man . Dasein is not an ent i t y , and as we hav e shown 
Being a nd Time itself tried to move in this direction, but could 
not fully c arry it out . 
Since Heidegger hims elf was led into t he problems of 'subjectivist 
thinking ' \vhile explicitly try i ng to lay out a n ew direction, the 
tend ency of the r eader to do so is c e rtainly an understandab le dan-
ger. Heidegger recognized thi s , and has said one of the problems 
with Being and Time was that the t erminology was too strongly root ed 
in traditional metaphysics (subj ectivist thinking ) for what he was 
saying to be really heard. This exposes another reason why a concern 
for language is import ant to him . If the init ial a tt empt to r each 
Being was failing beca use of l anguage di fficult ies , he must expose 
the being of language so that these difficulties can be und er s tood 
and thereby avoided . When we l earn that authentic language listens 
as much as it speaks, is guided by and gains its Being from what is 
talked about, is not always an assertion or judgment, and is not 
primarily a property belonging to man, we learn how to read 
Heid egger hims elf. Tied to this is a second consideration which 
indicat es the importance of language. On the first page of Being 
and Time we have seen Heidegger proclaim "Our aim is to work out 
the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely." 
We have also seen that the questions of meaning and the concrete 
working out of meaning are ontological problems solvable only in 
the ontology of language. From what we have done we realize that 
meaning is not linguistic definition, not a subjective formula 
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for a mere word. Meaning is rooted in that \vhich is "there" itself, 
it is its Sinn. Therefore, \ve know that when Heidegger asks "what 
is the meaning of Being ," he is not asking simply how man uses the 
word ' Being,' rather he is calling for a thinking encounter with 
Being itself . Thus by asking for the meaning of Being he is 
avoiding the circula rity of asking what is Being , i . e ., of asking 
for the Being of Being. He is not, however, abandoning Being itself 
for a mere linguistic concern. Thus, only by having worked out 
Heidegger's ontology of language and meaning were we able to under-
stand his project in the quest for Being. 
Thus Heidegger's concern with language is anything but an 
incidental interest or even an example used as a trial application of 
the power of his ontology. Rather , Being and language are intricate ly 
tied, not in the domain of one or the other, but in a unity more 
fundamental than either individual concern. 
Not the spoken word - itself a thing -
but the Saying, as the chime of still-
ness of which the spoken word is but 
an echo, bestows world and he nce also 
that wh i ch we call by the little word 
'is'. Word and thing, Saying and Being , 
are bound together in a unity.l 
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The task before Heidegger in 1927, and the one befor e us now, is to 
unravel how language and Being can be reached only in each others 
light. 
1J. L. Mehta The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (New York: 
Harp er & Row , 1971) p. 226. 
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II. Language and the origins of philosophy 
In our first section we have seen that in Being and Time 
Heidegger interprets logos as Discourse, and sees it as the essence 
of Dasein. 1 In this section we plan to elaborate the concept of 
logos as he developed it after Being and Time, where logos comes 
to mean Being itself, but as still tied to a concern with language. 
In this way we shall be developing an understanding of how language 
tied into his basic concern with the meaning of Being. We have 
seen hmv logo~ as Discourse has to do primordially ,.,ith Being-there, 
and not with human utterance. However, the human element can not 
be ignored, and one of the functions of this section will be to 
explore the relation of man as a thinker and speaker to logos under-
stood as Being. As this relation is discussed we will be touching 
on many areas that can only be fully elaborated in later sections, 
but ,.,e will have at least seen what issues are of concern in 
Heidegger's work with language, and how these are always directed to 
the basic question of Being. 
The concept of logos is developed by Heidegger in his work on 
the early Greek philosophers. Heidegger's analyses of the history 
of philosophy are notoriously unique, and we must therefore under-
stand how he views his approac~ to other thinkers. He states: 
Only when we turn thoughtfully toward 
what has already been thought, will 
we be turned to use for what must 
still be thought.2 
1Being and Time p. 47. 
2Heidegger Identity and Difference trans. by Joan Stambaugh 
(N ew York: Harper & Row, 1969) p. 41. 
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In various works Heidegger did perform this thoughtful r e turn to 
various thinkers, especially with the Greeks , Kant, Nietzsche, and 
Hegel. These works fulfill the promise of the never published 
s ec ond part of Being and Time, \vhich called for a "phenomenological 
destruction of the history of ontology," and in order to under-
stand what Heidegger was doing we must become clear on how he means 
'destruction'. He does not intend a nihilistic annihilation of 
everything the great philosophers have done, rather he views his 
task as the exposing of what is unthought or \vhat underlies what 
they have said. Thus when he calls for a 'destruction of the his-
tory of ontology' or says " every inte rpretation must do violence," 
he is neither calling for a reevaluation of their greatness nor 
for an unjustified misconstrual of what they said, rather he is 
calling for a violent shaking up of what they said, in order to ex-
pose their roots. Heidegger admits that much of th e though ts he 
draws out of the historical thinkers they themselves were never aware 
of: "The more original the thinking, the richer will be what is 
unthought in it. The unthought is the greatest gi ft that thinking 
1 
can bestow." 
Thus Heidegger approaches past philosophers as a philosopher 
himself, and not as an historian. As he says: "That \vhich really 
is, Being, which from the start calls and determines all beings, 
can never be made out, however, by ascertaining facts, by appealing 
to particulars." 2 He is not using the Greek thinkers as support 
~at is Call ed Thinking p. 76. 
2rbid. p. 66. 
for his own position, but rather he is attempting to bring us into 
a new and thoughtful relation with them that at the same time is 
bringing us into a thoughtful relation with Being itself as 
Heidegger is trying to approach it. Further, since he is after 
the unarticulated relation to Being that underlies these thinkers 
and not a factual determination of their specific intentions, any 
argument against Heidegger's interpretations, on the basis of an 
alternate interpretation of the writings, can not belittle the 
philosophical import of Heidegger's endeavor. Heidegger's goal 
in the return to earlier thinkers is the same as everywhere else: 
to disclose Being. He must ask about the Being of these thinkers, 
that is how they stand with Being: 
Destruction does not mean destroying, 
but dismantling, liquidating, putting 
to one side the merely historical asser-
tions about the history of philosophy. 
Destruction means - to open our ears, 
to make ourselves free for what speaks 1 to us in tradition as the Being of beings. 
As we have stated we will be concerned solely with the work 
Heidegger has done on the Presocratics, and more specificly on 
Heraclitus and Parmenides. Though he is concerned with various 
aspects of these thinkers, his attention focuses on a retrieving 
55 
of the significance and meaning of logos. In this endeavor he must 
be concerned with two other terms, legein and noein, and show how 
the current interpretations of these miss their true meaning, and 
how this affects our understanding of logos. 
1Heidegger ~at is Philosophy trans. by Jean T. Wilde and William 
Kluback (New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1955) p. 73. 
We must merely free ourselves from the 
notion that originally and fundamentally 
logos and legein signified thought, under-
standing and reason. As long as we cling 
to this opinion and even go so far as to 
interpre t logos in th e light of logic as 
it later developed, our attempt to redis-
cover the beginning of Greek philosolhy 
can lead to nothing but absurdities. 
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The retrieve of the Greek meaning of logos begins with the claim 
that rather than originally having the significance of reason, word, 
or judgment,it meant to gather or collect. "Originally logos 
meant, according to Heidegger, gathering or collection, having the 
sense of both collecting and collectedness; it was the primal 
gathering principle." 2 The support for this interpretation comes 
from an analysis of the etymology , a technique Heidegger repeatedly 
uses. H. G. Liddell states3 that logos is a verbal noun of legein 
whi ch in addition to meaning to say or speak, originally meant to 
pick up or pick out for oneself, and also to be counted among (e. g . 
the members of a group) . The sense of ga thering is also present in 
logeia which means a collection of money for taxes or charity. 
And Charles Kahn states: 
The term logos is a verba l noun, '"hose 
primitive meaning is inseparable from that 
of the verb legein to which it corresponds 
In its earliest usage (for example, in Homer) 
legein means either 1) to pick or gather, or 
2) to count or enumerate . The und erlying 
idea, reflected in both senses, seems to be 
1
rntroduction to Metaphysics p. 104. 
2J. L. Mehta The Philosophy of Mar tin Heidegger p. 144. 
3H. G. Liddell A Greek-English Lexicon Clarendon Press Oxford 1843. 
"to group or gather, passing from one thing 
to another ."l 
57 
The notion of logos as counting or enumerating is a common one (even 
as late as Plato's Theatetus), and what Heidegger is emphasizing is 
not the mere listing but the fact that in counting or enumerating 
we bring things into a grouping which gathers or holds together the 
individual things that are listed or counted. Thus the connections 
of logos and legein through the sense of gathering is scholastically 
supported, and as we continue this idea must be kept in mind. 
The sense of logos as a gathering which we have gained can now 
be used to interpret (i.e., enter a thinking relation with) Heraclitus 
in a vmy that is more valuable to us than some more common trans-
lations. Rather than und erstanding logos merely as The Word (as 
for instance John Burnet does in Early Greek Philosophy), we now see 
it as that which gathers together, and holds in a balanced tension, 
the warring opposites that for Heraclitus make up whatever is. 
"Logos is the steady gathering , the intrinsic togetherness of the 
essent (Seiendes); i.e. Being (Sein). " 2 In other words, logos is 
the binding force that runs through the world of becoming or flux 
and grants it the abiding permanence of Being in a similar manner to 
the way counting binds together the isolated entities which are 
enumerated. We can therefore, view Heraclitus not merely as a rela-
tivist,that results from a theory of pure process and flux of isolated 
1
charles Kahn "A New Look at Heraclitus" American Philosophical 
Quarterly Vol. 11 No. 3 July 1964 pp. 191-2. 
2
rntroduction to Metaphysics p. 110 
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opposites, as Plato seems to und erst and him, but rather as a thinker 
of Being, one \vho r ecognizes the diversity, change and tension of 
the world of things which we encounter, yet consta ntly has an eye 
on tha t which grant s it an abiding presence, i.e. Being. "Being 
is the gathering of this conflict and unr es t."1 
Thus, though it cannot be denied that logos has a meaning tied 
to language as the usual translations indicate, it, as our analysis 
of Discours e indicated earlier, is concerned with a more fundamental 
notion than 'language ' ordinari ly indicates. 
There can be tru e speaking and hearing 
only if they are direc t ed in advance 
toward Being, the lo gos. Only where 
the logos discloses itself does the 
phone tic sound become a word. Only 
where the Being of the essent (Seiend es ) 
is heard does a mere casual listening 
become a hearing .2 
In short, as a gathering , logos holds toge ther \varring fragments of 
transi tory becoming , and grants them Being. But we have under s tood 
Beir,g (and therefor e logos since the above quotes shm.,r the identifi-
cation of Being and logos ) as a presencing, coming-forth, or dis-
closure, and we must now see how ga thering and presencing belong 
together. It is for the purpose of developing this connection that 
a discussion of legein and noein becomes necessary. 
1Ibid. p. 113. Just as fire is the tying together the two 
distinct states of that which is burned. 
2 Ibid. p. 111. 
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The usual translations of legein and noein as saying and thinking 
are tied to the usual conception of Jogos, but we must now retrieve 
a more fundamental notion of these terms that coordinates with, and 
thus clarify, the new understanding of logos. The first step is 
to see how legein is viewed in a way which brings together the 
ideas of saying, gathering and Being. In the first sec tion we saw 
that there are four aspects to any saying: "what-is-said," "what-
is-talked-about," "communication," and "manifesting ." In Being and 
Time Heidegger emphasized the notion of "what-is-talked-about" by 
dist inguishing authentic Discourse as that which does not lose sight 
of "what-is-talked-about"by becoming too narrowly concerned with 
"what-is-said." Now Heidegger focuses on the companion aspect 
"manifesting," for insofar as we are to be concerned \vith "what-is-
talked-about" we must see how a s2.ying lets this come forth . 
The saying and discoursing of mortals 
occurs from the earliest times on as 
legein, laying. Saying and discoursing 
occur essentially as the letting-lie-
together-before of everything which, 1 laid in unconcealment, comes to presence. 
In this quote legein is seen as talking of both gathering and 
letting-lie (manifesting). We have seen the etymological support for 
interpreting it as gathering, and Liddell also confirms the inter-
pretation of laying-out, or manifesting, but as a separate listing, 
and the question facing us is how the two senses of legein work together 
as a characterization of authentic saying . 
1Early Greek Thinking p. 63. Das Sagen und Reden der Sterblichen 
ereignet sich von frUh an als legein, als legen. Sagen und Reden wesen 
als das beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen alles dessen, was, in der 
Unverborgenheit gelegen , anwest . 
In order to find the foothold for an answer 
we need to reflect on wh~t actually lies in 
legein as laying. To lay means to bring to 
lie. Thus to lay is at the same time to place 
one thing beside another, to lay them together. 
To lay is to gather . l 
This quote certainly can not serve as a completely satisfactory 
solution to our question . However, it can not be ignored, for it 
points in the direction of the gathering a letting-lie actually 
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does entail. As we shall see, letting something lie means to place 
it in a context, i.e . , within a world, and thus there is a 
gathering of the thing with its context (world) . 
It can help us to look at the Gennan \vord that Heidegger uses 
for gathering: Lesen, which in addition to gathering means to read . 
The connection between reading and gathering points the way to the 
connection of laying-out and gathering in general, for reading is 
a gathering of letters, words and sentences that lets a nexus of 
meaning come forth. Reading is a gathering that lets an explicit 
understanding take place; it gathers the various parts so that some-
thing may be there for us to listen to and think about. The parts 
which a reading gathers are easy to point out, but this is not the 
case with legein. We have seen Discourse as a gathering-laying-out 
of Understanding, and logos as a gathering-letting-Be of whatever is, 
but this takes us only part of the way toward an understanding of 
how Heidegger views the fundamental gathering of an authentic saying. 
As we shall see, a saying gathers ourselves into a fulfilling unity 
with Being, but a full elaboration of this must wait until a later 
1Ibid. p. 61. 
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point. The idea will finally come to culmination only in the 
thinking of the Fourfold (gods, mortals, sky, and earth), so for now 
we must be satisfied with the recognition that the two roots of legein 
can work toge ther to characterize a fundamental notion of a saying: 
a gathering lets something lie before us and be manifest. "Legein 
in the sense of "saying" and "discoursing" is intelligible only if 
it is thought in its most proper sense- as "laying" and "gathering."1 
We must now turn to another notion, noein. As evidenced by 
Parmenides' famous fragments "It is necessary to speak (legein) and 
think (noein) what is; for Being is, but nothing is not" and "For 
thought (noein) and Being are the same," 2 noein plays a crucial role 
for the Greeks in understanding Being. In line with this Heidegger 
attempts to rethink noein in a way free from the prejudices of sub-
jectivism which links it to the traditional conception of l egein 
and logos by understanding it in the Cartesian sense of representa-
tional thought. This traditional approach focuses on thinking as 
a non-material process of the soul which in some way re-produces the 
objective world, and as such is dependent on God or transcendental 
categorie s for a claim to knowledge. In short, this vie\v of thinking 
cuts it off from any real belonging to the world and presents us with 
an eternal dualism. Parmenides' statement thus becomes that of a 
naive thinker who dogmatically overlooked the complexities of this 
dualism. It is Heidegger's claim that this criticism of Parmenides 
1Early Greek Thinking p. 73. 
2J.M. Robinson translations in An Introduction to Early Greek 
Philosophy. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1968). 
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is based on a distinction which is not coherent with the Greek con-
ception of Being . His attempt is thus to reinterpret no ein with 
specific emphasis on Being rather than man. In line with this it 
is important to note that even in the subjective developments of 
metaphysics the connection of Being, logos, and thinking remains 
strong. But as the understanding of thinking develops more and more 
into an individual subjective process of the soul logos is under-
stood as rules of thought (logic), and thus as metaphysics culminates 
in the idealism of nineteenth century Germany, Being becomes pure 
Idea. To overcome this Heidegger states that just as the source of 
logos and legein was found in Being as presencing, and not in sub-
jectivity, so too must the original sense of no ein be retrieved . 
Noein - translated for short as thinking -
is thinking only to th e extent to which 
it remains dep endent and focused on the 
einai, Being . Noei n is not "thi nking" 
simply by virtue of occurring as a non-
ma terial activity of the soul and spirit. 
Noein qua noe i n belongs together with 1 
einai; and thus belongs to einai itself. 
In What is Called Thinkin[ Heidegger undertakes the rethinking 
of noein in terms of a receptivity or receiving, rather than as a 
grasping or prehending . The latter view sees the direction of noein 
going from the subject outHard, and thus considers it as a manipulating 
or forcing into categories on the part of subjectivity of that which 
is by itself passive and unreachable in its true Being. Heidegger 
on the other hand states: 
~at is Called Thinking p. 240. 
In noein, what is perceived concerns 
us in such a way that we take it up 
specifically, and do something with 
it. But where do we take what is 
perceived? How do >ve take it up? 
We take it to heart. What is taken 
to heart, hmvever, is left to be 
exactly as it is. This taking-to-
heart does not make over what it 
takes. Taking to heart is: to 
keep at heart.l 
Heidegger justifies this interpretation by again returning to the 
etymology, and again Liddell confirms his claims. One of the 
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early meanings of noein is "to see so as to remark or discern, dis-
tinguished from merely seeing," and therefore Heidegger's claim of 
taking to heart as a special receptive or retaining perception is 
insightfully accurate . Further, by noting the connection of noein 
to nous, or noos, we again see his interpretation confirmed. Usual 
translations see the connection of noein as thinking to noos as mind 
or reason, but there is a more fund amental interpr et a tion of noos 
that goes along with our findings on noein. The early meaning of 
noos is "the mood or temp er of man," and in such sayings as ek pontes 
no on, "with all his heart," and chaire no oi, "he is glad at heart," 
we see the connection to, and thus the justification of, Heidegger's 
und erstanding of noein. 
1 
Noein implies a perceiving which never 
was nor is a mere receiving of something . 
The noein perceives beforehand by taking 
to mind and heart. The heart is the ward-
ship guarding what lies be fore us, though 
Ibid. p. 203. 
this wardship itself needs that guarding 
which is accomplished in the legein as 
gathering.l 
64 
Thus noein as a taking to heart is dependent on legein, which 
as the gathering-letting- lie- forth provides noei~ with something 
to take up. Therefore it seems that the original naming of ].egein 
is prior to thinking, or, in terms of another phase of Heidegger's 
vmrk, the poet is prior to the thinker. Hm..rever, this is not 
completely correct, for as Heidegger states: "J_egein and poein are 
coordinated not only in series, first legein and then ~oein, but each 
2 
enters into the other." Further, Heidegger sees thinking, and as 
we shall see later also saying, as a mergence of these two terms. 
One can not be viewed as independent of the other, and thus thinking 
involves both letting- lie and taking to heart. "The conjunction of 
legein and noe in is the fund amental characteristic of thinking which 
here moves into its essential na ture." 3 
This conjunction is not the glueing together of two separate 
processes; rather we must see that each essentially entails or includes 
the other. In legein, gathering-letting-lie, we must be already taking 
to heart, for, as we saw, taking to heart is a holding of the Being of 
that which manifests itself, and thus we could not let something lie 
before us, i.e., be there, if we did not take it to heart. In other 
words, the gathering which lies at the source of authentic saying as 
1 Ibid. p. 207. 
2 Ibid. p. 208. 
3 Ibid. p. 211. 
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a letting lie can only take place insofar as there is a taking to 
heart. It is poein as taking to heart which lets authentic saying 
(~egei~, gathering-letting-lie) occur. But at the same time we 
must remember that noein can not occur except as a -~ein, for until 
there is a gathered something lying before us, only Nothing can be 
taken to heart, i.e., nothing can be taken to heart. Thus though 
they may be considered separately, on the ontological level a 
letting- lie is a taking to heart and a taking to heart is a letting-
lie, and this conjunction is what is called thinking. 
We can now return to logos. Heidegger has stated: " for 
l thinking is the legein of the logos," and elsewhere "in thought 
Being is taken up in language." 2 This relation of thinking (legein 
and noein) to Being (logos) thus rises to the foreground in our 
attempt to rethink language and Being for the Greeks. Let us briefly 
recap what we have accomplished so far. We started with a discussion 
of logos, which, though never losing overtones pointing towards 
language, has a primary meaning of Being; but Being understood in 
two ways: as gathering and as presencing. Thus be examining logos 
we are led to a thinking of the coming together of language, Being, 
presencing, and gathering, and the task is then to further progress 
our thinking towards this belonging together. To do this we moved 
to the etymological source of logos, i.e., legein. Legein started us 
1 Ibid. p. 162. We, of course, must at this point understand this 
as 11 ••• the legei~ and noein of the _;Logos_. 11 
2 11 Letter of Humanism11 p. 148. 
66 
at a thinking of saying, but led to a notion of gathering- letting-
lie. And thereby we once again r eached a belonging tog e ther of such 
notions as saying, gathering, and lying. To further clarify this 
we then examined Parmenides' statements which led us to another 
term, i.e. , noein. A thinking of ~oein starts at an understanding 
of it as thinking, but leads to a more fundamental notion of taking 
to heart. Taking as our clue Parmenides' statement that legein and 
noein are the same, we were then led to a thinking of how these two 
entail each other and belong together. In other words, Heid egger 
interprets Parmenides' TO AUTO ("The Same " ) as a belonging together 
of a mutual dependency and entailment. This point is elaborated 
in I dentity and Difference as well as the essay "Moira," and, as 
should be evident, this notion is becoming increasingly significant, 
and it shall continue to be of concern to us. 
What this l ed us to was the mutua l entailment of l egein and 
noein insofar as a gathering-letting-lie occurs as a taking to heart 
and visa versa. It is not as if they were one and the same, but 
they belong together, each requires the other. Thus thinking is no 
longer merely the equivalent of noein,nor is it understood as a pro-
cess of representational ideas by a subjectivity. Thinking becomes 
the combination (which results from the mutual entailment) of legein 
and noein. Thinking is a taking to heart which gathers and lets lie. 
Though we did not emphasize the point, the same holds for saying 
(language) as for thinking. Language and thinking are obviously 
closely tied for Heidegger, 1 but saying is no longer understood merely 
lNote for example: "Thinking of Being is the original poetiz ing. 
Language first comes to language, i.e., into its essence, in thinking .... 
Thinking is primordial poetry." Early Greek Thinking p. 19. 
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as a translation of legei~, nor essentially as human utterance. 
Saying is a gathering-letting-lie which takes to heart. In this 
way we have come quite far in thinking the belonging to gether of 
thinking and saying through an examination of the Greeks, and we are 
now in a position to return to the question about the two senses of 
logo~ (Being) as gathering and as presencing. 
Logos as presencing is the thinking-saying (i.e., legein and 
Iloein) that lets whatever i s Be what it is by a laying out \vhich takes 
to heart. We indicated that the letting-lie of legein is a gathering, 
and we saw for Her aclitus logo~ can be unders tood as a gathering of 
the transitory flux of opposites into an enduring tension of Being. 
However, for Heidegger the notion of logos as a gathering is some-
thing different - it is the gathering of thinking and Being (and 
the othe r rela tions that belong togethe r) in a mutual dep endency. 
This gathered relatedness Heidegger later calls Ereignis (Appropria-
tion) and we shall discuss it in depth in the next chapter. For now 
it is important to note that as paradoxical as it seems the relation 
of thinking and Being is Being (logos) itself. The clearest evidence 
that Heidegger considers Being as the relation of itself to something 
appears in "Letter of Humanism" where in discussing man's essense 
as ex-sistence he states: 
What relation has Being to ex-sistence? 
Being itself is the relationship, insofar 
as it retains and reunites ex-sistence 
in its existential (i.e., ecstatic) 
essence - as the place of the truth of 
Being amidst the beings ... man as an 
existing one comes to stand in this 
relationship which Being itself pro-
fesses to be.l 
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In other words, as Dasein was the meeting of man and world in 
Being and Time, logos as gathering is, for Heidegger, the meeting 
of thinking and Being. Logos (Being) as the gathering belonging 
together of thinking and Being tells us that Being as presencing 
needs thinking (and visa versa), and thus when Heidegger says 
"es gibt Sein" the it (es) which gives Being (presencing) is Being 
itself in the sense of gathering. 
But since the da\m of thinking "Being'' 
names the presencing of '1-lhat is present, 
in the sense of the gathering which 
clears and shelters, which in turn is 
thought and designated as the logos.2 
Presencing, the emergence of whatever is, can only be understood 
in the light of the primordial gathered unity of thinking and Being 
(man and world). We can see that it is out of this unity that 
presencing is possible. Further, we must note that the way or manner 
that this unity historically occurs determines what can Be present in 
that age. For example, contradictions can not occur (Be, present 
themselves) in a logically dominated era and gods can not be present 
l"Letter on Humanism" p. 159. Note also: "But in wha t else could 
the exceptional character of gods and men consist if not in the fact 
that precisely they in their relation to the lighting can never remain 
concealed? Why is it that they can not? Because their relation to the 
lighting is nothing other than the lighting itself, in that this relation 
gathers men and gods into the lighting and keeps them there." Early 
Greek Thinking p. 119-120. 
2Early Greek Thinking p. 39. 
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in a technological one. Finally, looking from the other direction, 
it is as presencing that the gathered unity is manifested or occurs, 
i.e., Being as pre sencing is the legein of Being as the relation. 
In other words, it is through the presencing of what is present that 
the togetherness of thinking and Being can show itself. Thus the 
two senses of logos (Being) actually need each other and rather than 
ambiguously shifting its meaning, as it might first seem, these 
different ways of viewing it actually work together in widening our 
grasp of its meaning. As Heidegger states in a discussion of 
Parmenides' fragment "For thought and Being are the same": 
But what is to be thought is named in 
the enigmatic key word ~ aut~, the 
Same. What is so named expresses the 
relation of thinking to Being. 
Specifically, it (the Same) reigns 
as the unf olding of the twofold - an 
unfolding in the sens e of disclosure. 
That which unfolds , and in unfolding 
reveals the twofold, allows taking-heed-
of to get undenvay towa rd the gathering 
perception of the presencing of what 
is present.l 
tUth this we drm.,r to a close the discussion of Heidegger 1 s re-
thinking of the early Greek philosophy. It has been an extremely 
important endeavor, for as the birth of t{estern philosophy Heraclitus 
and Parmenides set the course for what followed. Therefore, in un-
covering their roots we gain sight of Being as it first stood. These 
Greeks take a crucial place, for they laid the groundwork that 
determined the course of Western philosophy. We can see how as noein 
1 Ibid. p. 94-5. 
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came to mean a subjective process of the soul, legein statement or 
assertion, and lo~~ logic, they lost the sense of their original 
significm1ces, and Being qua Being, as Heidegger views it, was 
covered over. By going back to the Greeks Heidegger was able to 
contrast his quest for the meaning of Being from the metaphysical 
and logical tradition, and let Being (logos) come forth in its 
originary significance. 
The role language played in these developments is not what 
might have been expected. Lege in and log~ do not have a meaning 
of language in the sense of uttering, referring or symbolizing. Only 
when we understand the fundamental nature of language as a gathering 
letting--lie does a concern with it become relevant to the quest 
for the meaning of Being. As Heidegger says, "We have to learn to 
think the essence of language from the saying , and to think saying 
1 
as let t ing-lie-before and as bringing-forward-into- view." This is 
why Heidegger says that when we are concerned with the nature of 
language we must enter into an experience of it, and not analyze it 
as an object among other objects. In a metalinguistic analysis of 
language one language is used to examine the properties of another 
language, and thus the manifesting nature of language itself can 
never come forth. On the other hand, in an experience of language 
the attempt is to let the nature of language announce itself. "In 
experiences "'hich we undergo _!Tith language, language itself brings 
2 itself to language." 
libid. p. 91. 
2on the Way to Language p. 59. 
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In this section we have seen the nature of language as a 
gatherer which lets lie. It is in this sense that Heidegger says 
~ .. for words and language are not wrappings in which things are 
packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in 
words and language that things first come into being and are."1 
This is not the claim of a subjectivist, saying that Being is in 
the hands of our will, rather it is saying that language in its 
fundamental nature of a gathering letting-lie is necessary for 
things to stand there and manifest themselves. Human thinking and 
language do not create Being, but as we move closer to grasping 
the meaning of Being we recognize that it can not be considered apart 
from humans. 
Finally, an important point for Heidegger has emerged in this 
section without our really noticing it. \ole have seen how his approach 
to Being and the corresponding unorthodox interpretations of the 
Greeks are consistent with the etymology. Thus, though the key 
terms of the early Greeks have come to speak metaphysically of sub-
jectivity, objectivity and ratiocination, they historically find their 
roots in a speaking of Being as the gathered laying out that is 
manifested and maintained by a taking to heart. Thus what seems to 
have emerged is Heidegger's famous claim (which ~dll be discussed later) 
that we do not use language, but rather language uses us. We, in our 
tradition of metaphysical language, can not help but see the Greeks 
as the proponents of a metaphysical understanding of the world, i.e., 
1 Introduction to Metaphysics p. 11. 
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speaking of thinking and saying as processes of subj ectivity and 
Being as obj ectivity. And language also used the Greeks, for regard-
less of what they were trying to say, through the history of their 
language they spoke of the fundamental belonging together of gathering, 
letting- lie, taking to heart, manifesting and presencing. Could it 
be mere coincidence that the etymologies of the key terms of the 
great Presocratics at least allow a thinking of Being as Heidegger 
has attempted to think it? Or has Heidegger successfully retrieved 
Being as it underlay the birth, and thus the history, of philosophy? 
1 
The question is: Is Being a mere word 
and its meaning a vapor, or does what 
is designated by the word "Being" hold 
within it the historical destiny of the 
West.l 
Introduction to Metaphysics p. 35. 
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III. The Fourfold and Appropriation 
We now turn our attention to Heidegger's last phase, in which 
he becomes directly involved with Being and language. In our 
previous sections language and Being seemed to collapse into an 
identity. Logos (Discourse) was seen as one of the primary existen-
tiale of Dasein, and further elaborated into the primordial gathering 
associated with Being itself. Further, language as lege!~ (and the 
entailed noe~n) is understood as "gathering-letting-lie" and Being 
as presence is understood as a gathered lying there. However, we 
must be careful to understand identity when we say that Being and 
language are identical. In Identity and Difference Heidegger 
explains that identity means "belonging- together," and not collapsing 
into a unitary sameness. Belonging together is a mutual dependency, 
in which each of the two can only first arise out of the relation. 
As Joan Stambaugh says in the introduction to Identity and Difference: 
"It is perhaps difficult for us to think of a relation as being more 
original than what is related, but this is what Heidegger requires 
1 
of us." The notion of 'relation' has traditionally meant the tying 
of two separate and independent entities. This is obviously not 
the notion Heidegger is after since the gathered togetherness is more 
fundamental than the independent "components." This is why Heidegger 
attempts to use the term 'identity' rather than 'relation' to refer 
to the belonging together (though he too uses the word 'relation' at 
times). However, since the "components" do have separate integrities 
1rdentity and Difference p.12. 
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and can be focused upon separately we permit ourselves the use of 
I. 
the word 'relation' to facilitate our explication, but it is 
imperative to understand it as a primordial belonging together 
and not a subsequent holding together of two separate entities. 
As we shall see in this chapter, this belonging together is known 
as Appropriation. 
The relation between language and Being is expressed in the 
famous quote "Language is the house of Being." With this quote 
Heidegger tries to express the sense of identity of belonging to-
gether and needing each other. Being dwells in its house: it lives 
there, i.e., Being has a place to Be thanks to language. At the 
same time language is dependent upon Being. Language is a mere 
empty shell if it does not constantly keep Being present within its 
domain. Being, when housed in l anguage, keeps it strong, meaningful 
and significant. If language loses its contact with Being, it 
crumbles into idle chatter, i mpotency and finally non-sense (and, 
therefore, non- existence). 
However, we are getting ahead of ourselves, and in order to 
understand the relation of Being and language we must turn to an 
examination of Heidegger's development of the topics. This phase of 
' It tt Heidegger s philosophy is usually called the l a te works. However, 
it is important to realize that many of the ideas that get worked out 
in the writings of the fifties and sixties began with such works as 
"Origin of a l~ork of Art" and "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry" 
both originally composed in the thirties. Thus though the writings 
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we will be concerned with have a common bond in both subject matter 
and style, they do not represent merely a short phase of Heidegger's 
thinking. 
These works have also been characterized as the poetical phase 
of his work. Though this is a true characterization, it does not 
mean that their value lies solely in aesthetic concerns. As we 
shall see the relation of thinking and poetry is a very close one, 
in fact Heidegger will argue that authentic thinking has to be 
poetical. Therefore, when his philosophy is poetic, it does not 
reduce philosophy to unguided and non-accurate discipline. Rather, 
he is elevating poetical writing to a nethodology that first lets 
serious and accurate philosophy take place. 
There has been a latent tension in the meaning of Being through-
out Heidegger's writing. On the one hand Being has been the act 
of presencing of that which is present: appearing, da-sein, or ~~in 
or noein. On the other hand, it is the condition of this presencing: 
the gathered unity of man and world known as Being-in-the-world, 
Dasein, or .logos. In this chapter these two senses of Being become 
explicit, and the meaning of each is worked out. He start by asking 
how it is that things presence, that is, for the Being of things. 
In two short essays written in the early fifties ("The Thing" and 
"Building Dwelling Thinking")! Heidegger explores what it means to Be 
a thing. It is not the case that whatever is is a thing; for example 
man, works of art and equipment are but they do not presence as things. 
1 Both in Poetry, Language, Thought. 
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However, things are what we are surrounded with every day; they in-
elude physica l and nonphys ical, real and nonreal, abstract and concrete 
entities. Thus examining their Being provides us with the best access 
to the question of Being itself. Once we have gained an under -
standing of the Being of things ,.,e turn to the second sense of Being 
which, as we noted above, is at this stage called Appropriation. 
After unravelling the meaning of Being as Appropriation we will 
return to Being as presencing by examining the Being of entities 
other than things, and in so doing we will bring to light how the 
two senses of Being work together. 
Heidegger discusses the Being of things in terms of the unified 
oneness of what he calls the fourfold: earth and sky, divinities 
and mortals. The unity of these four, which consists in the mirroring 
entailment of all of them in each invididual one, is what grants the 
Being of things, i.e., is what enable s things to be present. As he 
states it: 
This manifold- simple gathering is the 
jug's presencing. Our language denotes 
what a gathering is by an ancient l-Tord. 
That word is: thi~g. The jug's presencing 
is the pure, giving gathering of the one-
fold fourfold into a single time- space, 
a single stay. The jug presences as 
a thing. The jug is the ju£ as a thing. 
But how does the thing presence? The 
thing things. Thinging gathers. Appro-
priating the fourfold, it gathers the 
fourfold's stay, its while, into some--
thing that stays for a while: into 
this thing, that thing.l 
1 Poetry, Language, Thought p. 174. 
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We notice right away the carry over of the notion of gathering that 
first emerged in the rethinking of the Greeks. The task must there--
fore be understood as an elaboration of the thinking of Being as a 
gathering, and that is where we will eventually be led. 
Heidegger describes the four of the fourfold as follows: 
Earth is the serving bearer, blossom-
ing and fruiting, spreading out in rock 
and water, rising up into plant and ani-
mal. 
The sky is the vaultinn path of the 
sun, the course of the changing moon, 
the wandering glitter of the stars, the 
year's seas ons and their changes, the 
light and dusk of the day, the gloom and 
glow of night, the clemency and inclemency 
of the weather, the drifting clouds and 
blue depths of the ether. 
The divinities are the beckoning messen-
gers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway 
of the godhead, the god appears in his 
presence or withdraws into his concealment. 
The mortals are the human beings. They 
are called mortals because they can die. 
To die means to be capable of death as 
death. Only man dies, and indeed contin -
ually, as long as he remains on earth1 
under the sky, before the divinities. 
Though Being is understood as the gathered unity of all four 
which is given in the mirroring interplay of the four in each one, 
it is valuable to examine them individually. At first appearance it 
seems as if Heidegger has abandoned an attempt to speak philosophically 
about Being, and resorted to a mythical explanation in terms of ran-
dam components. However, when we thoughtfully approach the four, 
we realize that though poetic, there is nothing magical nor random about 
them. 
lrbid. p. 149. 
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Since the beginning of philosophy there has been an attempt to 
define Being in terms of formed matter. From the peras and bound -
less of Pythagoras to the formal and material causes of Aristotle 
to the Categories and sense manifold of Kant, Being has been seen 
as the placing of outlines upon an undifferentiated continuum. It 
is as a development of this tradition that Heidegger introduces the 
fourfold, for he believes the concept of formed matter speaks of a very 
limited conception of Being. As he states: 
The metaphysics of the modern period 
rests on the form-matter structure 
devised in the medieval period, which 
itself merely recalls in its words the 
buried nature of eidos and hule. Thus 
the interpretation~' 'thing'fby means 
of matter and form, 'l<lhether it remains 
medieval or becomes Kantian-transcen-
dental, has become current and self-
evident. But for that reason ... it 
is an encroachment upon the thing-
being of the thing.l 
In short, the notion of Being as formed- matter limits us to viewing 
only concrete physical things which are clearly demarcated or framed 
as things, and this blocks us from thinking the Being of things in 
its fullness. 
But why the fourfold? How do these four speak of Being? 
Examining them separately we first look at earth. 
1 Ibid. p. 30. 
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(1) Earth 
Earth can be associated with the notion of matter, but it is 
broader than the traditional concept. In addition to physical 
matter, earth also means the sphere of life opposed to the spiritual, 
and it is also the planet which is our home (to some cultures it was 
even associated with a mother). Thus when Heidegger speaks of earth 
as a component of Being, in addition to speaking of the physical 
aspects of solidity and spatiality he is also speaking of the char-
acteristics that pervade the things in touch with nature: the fact 
that all living things survive from the nourishment and protection 
the earth provides. However, over and above even this presence of 
earth we often describe something as "earthy" when it has characteristics 
such as warmth, openness, and an appropriate belongingness. It is 
this notion of "earthy" that arises from the earth being our home and 
that Heidegger sees as a "component" of Being. 
It is not something that can specifically be explained, for it 
speaks of many things and the "earthiness" that all these things hint 
at is not a specific thing itself. Earth is not only being made of 
matter, being alive and feeding from the earth's fruits, or having 
something in common with these characteristics; it is also having 
roots, being fertile, welcoming and caring, yet it is more than any 
of these or even the sum of them. To further understand it,it is 
important to note that with all we have mentioned as characterizing 
earthiness, the opposites of these also involve earth. Something can 
appear as "unearthy'' only in reference to earthy categories: just 
80 
as it is only because we are seeing creatures that we can be blind, 
it is only because the categories of earthiness are relevant to all 
things can they be homeless, arid, eerie or however else we char-
acterize "unearthy." 
With this characterization of earth we now turn to things and 
see in what way earth is present in their Being. Clearly in all 
material things, whether organic or inorganic, earth is present in 
so far as all matter consists of the physical elements found on 
the table of elements. But earthiness is a substantiality and depth 
of which the substantiality and depth of physical things are only 
a part. Non-physical things such as aesthetic and emotional experiences 
and feelings, mythical beings, and even numbers are also earthy. The 
fact that some music (or other art) can envelope us, or be warm and 
refreshing, or alternatively be threatening, annoying, flat, and 
removed are a result of there being an earthy element to the aesthetic 
experience. The earthiness of the ba ss is most predominant and evi-
dent, but when we pay attention to the clear depths of experiencing 
the fragile violin runs we recognize earth there too. Even the sounds 
of words apart from their meaning have an earth element,as poets 
as well as advertising agents have discovered in manipulating the 
1 phonemes to present a desired atmosphere. 
Perhaps the hardest place to find earthiness is in the realms 
of geometry and mathematics. Do shapes and numbers have the type of 
~ote for example a current lipstick commercial where the rich 
sounds of luscious, delicious, shimmering, and moisturizing are 
effectively incorporated with the strong and colorful visual presen -
tation. 
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significance that He are speaking of? As for shapes I believe that 
the clearest evidence that they do comes from modern pa inting. 
Kandinsky once ~•rote that the effect of the meeting of an acute 
angle wit h a circle is the same as that of God's finger reaching 
out to Adam's in Michaelangelo's Sistine Chapel depiction. Though 
I can not expect the reader to agree with this equation, I do believe 
it is visually .possible to question and test it, and this testing 
in itself shows the ability to see 'abstract shapes' in respect to 
an earthiness. Perhaps there is security in the narrow-ness of the 
corners of angles, cleanliness and order in the strength of a 
square, completeness and enveloping in the perfection of a circle. 
Questions like these are being explored by many modern artists, and 
when ~ve are concerned .,.lith shapes in this way their earthiness emerges 
(whether or not we can verbalize a specific meaning of a shape). As 
for numbers, we must re~ember that the Pythagoreans were able t o draw 
an association between them and things, which shows that they are not 
purely abstract, but rather belong to the earth in some way. Further, 
the fact that some numbers welcome us as lucky and comfortable and 
that certain numbers feel different than others are a result of their 
earthiness. 
We have now shor~ how, when properly understood, earth is seen 
as a " component" in the Being of things. Besides referring to 
physica l a ttributes, earth has a more fundamental sense of belonging, 
of having a substantiality of some kind that gives it raore than a cut 
and dr y abs tract existence. The earthiness of things is what ties 
them to our world; no matter how abstract, new, or ethereal anything is, 
82 
it can not be so rarefied that it loses all reference to and gro tmding 
in earthy qualities . 
It may be argue d that all the earthy qualities of which we spoke 
are mere subjective feelings or fantasies tacked on to the true thing, 
and thus nothing more than mythical nonsense in the question of Being. 
To this criticism we respond that it is true that there is ahuman element 
in all we said about earth , but that is because we have seen that to 
speak of Being apart from man is impossible. The earthy elements seem 
to be felt by man in the heart and gut , but why should this be any less 
real (i. e ., any less a part of the true Being of things) than the scien-
tific or abstract thoughts of an analytic brain? Just because there is 
a human element does not mean that it is mere subj ec tive input up on the 
true thing. A mental effort of abstraction (i.e., an effort to ignore 
certain aspects) is needed to view thin gs apart from the ir earthy quali-
ties - to hear 1 pure sotmd 1 inputs rather than a meaningful significant 
sound that speaks to us with its earthy elements. Therefore , to con-
stitute these characteristics as mere subjective inputs is to take a 
derived state (that of the abstractly viewed thing) as the starting 
point.l Only if the mistaken prejudice of this view of reality, which 
is a carry over from Descartes and the rationalists, is overcome can 
the f ull Being of things be seen . The devastating consequences of this 
mistaken pre-judgement of what the Being of things consists in must not 
be underestimated if philosophy is to make any progress. It is for this 
1It is interesting to note tha t while Heide gge r is accused of being 
too subjective for including characteristics such as this in his analysis 
of Being, an active and difficult process of reduction performed £y ~ 
subject is needed to reach the Being of any analytic metaphysician. 
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reason that Heidegger calls on us to discover earth in our quest for 
the meaning of Being. 
\-.Te of course can not go through every thing in order to see how 
earth is present, any more than Kant could have gone through every thing 
to see how the categories were present. However, now that we have 
given a general idea of hmv earth is understood, and how it is presen t 
in the Being of all things, we can move on to the second of the four 
which is sky. 
(2) Sky 
Though each of the four mirrors the other three, sky is best seen 
as the complement of earth, as is evidenced by the way Heidegger writes 
the four: "earth and sky , divinitie s and mortals. H Earth speaks of 
the silent unchanging security that the substantiality of a home and 
roots provide . Sky , on the other hand, speaks of te mpo rality as the 
cours e o f the sun, moon and planets divide our world into segments , and 
also of the infinite wonder and beyond that all thin gs point to ("the 
blue depth of the ether"). To a scientific outlook sky might be under-
stood as a " component" of Being insofar as space-tine is needed as a 
cont ainer in which things can Be , and because light is needed for th i ngs 
to appear . However , this is only a limited way of seeing how sky enters 
Being. Space-time is not a container for things, rather things are 
spatial and temporal because sky is part of their Being. Light is not 
merely added to the Being of things so they may appear, for to Be means 
to stand forth into the open, into the light. 
Sky is the ethereal element of things, it is the heady wonder that 
is most obvious when staring at the boundless heavens on a summer night. 
But it is also the light softness of the drifting clouds of a lazy 
afternoon, and the crystal cl arity of the wint e r air, and th e vas t-
ness of op e n spaces, and the light fragrances that go fle e ting by, 
and the continual motion of the h eaven's orbit, and varying weathe r 
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and phases of the moon. Sky is all these thin gs - chan ge and motion 
yet continuance and the same, trans pa r ency and cl earne s s ye t inf inite 
wonde r. Non e of these fully or exactly des crib e it, but that which i s 
seen by viewin g them all the r e to ge the r despite their differences is 
what He idegge r me ans by sky. We may call it a he ady aspect rather than 
a heart or gut f e lt as pect of earth, but it is bas ically the myst e rious 
wonder tha t a ris es in a combination of th e passing of time (motion) and 
yet the i nfinite endurance tha t come toge the r in the sky. 
The ethereal quality of sky is evident in the Be ing of non-phy s ical 
things , but what of the most mundane phys ical be ings - a rock or a pile 
of manure? Even in th es e thin gs, i f they a r e s een in th eir Being , sky 
must be present (though of cours e we can be concerne d \vith them in ways 
that ignore this aspect). The sky is present in these solid and mun-
dane thin gs in seve ral ways . Firs t, as ge s talt theory in psychology 
and relativity theory in physics have shown, the rock has the qualities 
it does only within the horizon of it s environment. The open space 
of the sky is inte rrupte d by th e mas sivenes s of the rock, and it is 
this int e rruption of the op en sp ace that gives the rock its mas s ive , 
solid, earthy Bein g. Further, sky is pres ent Hhen we behold the rock 
in its awe inspiring age, Th e countless ri s ings and settings of the 
sun that the rock silently b eheld, th e countle ss rains that helpe d 
mold its sha pe , the stars that will still be there to watch this rock 
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long after all else is gone. In all these ways the sky is gathered in 
the very Being of the rock. 
When approaching any thing in a thoughtful way as we have done with 
the rock, we can find sky present in its Being. And again to assume 
that this is a mere subjective or poetic input is to prejudice our under-
standing of Being by a narrow analytic approach, rather than letting 
the thing in its entirety come forth. 
(3) The Divinities 
Third of the four are the divinities. The divinities play an iw.por-
tant role in Being, as attested by the emphasis God h as received in 
traditional philosophy. Divinities speak of the infinite, the eternal, 
the unknowable powers, the inexplicable crea tion and beginning, and the 
transcendent meaning of all things. Heide gger speaks of the divinities 
as messengers of the godhead which sometimes shmvs itself and sometimes 
remains hidden . If ~•e understand the godhea d as the All or the \Vhole, 
the divinities speak tmvard it in the Being of every thing. Just as in 
every action I perform, the "whole me" is somehow present (though some-
times in a hidden fashion but other times showing itself with a flash 
of startling brightness) the divinities are the aspect of the Being of 
things that allows Being itself (the All) to be present. 1 
Further, the divinities remind us of Plato's Ideas , and in a way 
they have the same ~reaning. However, because of the problems of think-
ing the Ideas as separate existences we must be careful to distingui sh 
1 By 'the All ' and 'the whole me' I do not mean the sum of every-
thing, but rather an encompassing or predominant significance. 
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divinities from them. As we have noted earlier , the four are not 
separa te existences thems elves; strictly speaking they are not, for 
Being itself only occurs as the gathered mirroring interplay of them. 
Thus something is beca us e it speaks of meanin gs and significances be-
yond itself (divinities ) but divinities are not things thems elves, not 
the Forms of individual things participating in them. In the analogy 
of myself and my actions, there are not t\vO separate entities of whom 
I am and what I do, for I am my actions , b ehavio rs and intentions. But 
though I am not other than my actions, I am more than any particular 
one of them, or even the sum of them. I am the style or harmony that 
permeates and ties togethe r everything I do, and thus my action can tell 
of who I am only by speaking b eyon d itself , announcing that it comes 
fro m some context of a set of motivations , desires, view of things and 
interpretations. In short , we can say that my actions have the Being 
they do specifically b ecause they are able to transcen d their own 
(immediate) Being. It is in this way that divinities are to be under-
stood - they are b eyond the imme diate and concrete Being of thin gs , 
yet not completely oth e r than them. The divinities are transcendent, 
but insofar as they a re gathered in what ever is, they are not separate 
or outside that in which they are present. However, the divinities 
remain greater than that in which they are gathered. As a pantheis t 
says God is in everything yet does not reduce God to any individual 
thing in which It is, the divinities for Heidegger are in everything 
yet remain greater than that which they are in. In this paradoxical 
way of being present in things (i.e., being present as transcendent) 
divinities contribute in making the Being of things what it is. In its 
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Being a thin g is ~ways more than what it is, and there is always a 
meanin g and significance over and beyond th e immediate nominalist defi-
nition b ecause the divinities are gath ered in the Being of all thin gs . 
(4) Mortals 
Finally we turn to the last of the four: mortals. By mortals 
Heidegger is obviously referring to man, and his special role in Being. 
Being mortal doe s not &mply mean that man will die, it means he is aware 
of his own death as an inescapable occurrence. The awareness of death 
is an important contribution to Being for seve ral reasons. First the 
awarenes s of death means being ahead of oneself: I am not yet dead, 
but since I am aware of it my current Being is what it is by virtue of 
its future. In this manner of bein g ahead of oneself mortals are able 
to preserve the future in the present, which is necessary for the abiding 
presence of Bein g . If the future were not so foreshadO\ved in th e present, 
the world would be disconnected moments, we could not even say a series 
of moments for there would be absolutely no connection b e tween them. 
Thus nothing could stand forth in an abiding presence, i.e., nothing 
could be. 
Mortality plays a further and more dire ct role in the Being of 
things in so far as it speaks of finitude and its opposite, infinitude. 
In the awareness of my death I am at the same time aware of what is 
beyond my limits, and as Heidegger says: 
Death is the shrine of Nothin g , that is, of 
that which in every respect is never something 
that mere l y exists, but tvhich nevertheless 
presences, even as the mystery of Being itself. 
As the shrine of Nothing dea th harbors within 
itself the presencing of Being. As the shrine 
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of Nothing, death is the shelter of Being. 1 
In other word s , it is in the face of Nothingness, or within the horizon 
of Nothingness, that whatever is can emerge or be present. As we saw 
in the first chapter, Nothing plays ar important role in the question-
ing of Being. There we raised the question "Why are there essents 
rathe r than nothin g? " in order to gain a sense of the meaning of Being 
by holding the things of the world over the abyss of non Being. 
"Noth ing is that which makes the revelation of what-is as such possible 
f h . .,2 or our uman eXlstence . It is an undefinable realm, beyond whatever 
is, that Nothing can serve to first bring Being to light. "Man's Da-
sein can only relate to what-is by projecting into Nothing . Going 
beyond what-is is the essence of Da- sein. " 3 By being aware of death 
man transcends what-is, including himself, and confronts non being, and 
therefore through man ' s mortality things stand forth against the hori-
zon of Nothingness and into the abiding ligh t of Being. 
In Being and Time Heide gge r entered a discussion of death in an 
attempt to understand Dasein in its completeness. Being capable of 
death means being limit e d, and insofar as all things have limits, i.e., 
can be discriminated in some way, mortals (and the horizon of nega tion 
and Nothingness) are present. Nothingness is the withdrawal of the 
1Poetry, Langua ge , Thought, p. 178-9. Since Nothing can presence 
we must paradoxically say that it is. However, we must understand that 
it s mode of presencing is not that of a thing's, but rather one, as we 
shall see ,that first makes the presencing of things possible. 
2
"What is Metaphysics?" p. 340. 
3 Ibid., p. 348. 
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slipping away of whatever is, it is the gap or voi d that r emains when 
all the meaning and significance of the presencing of Being withdra\vS. 
In the face of our death, when we truly confront ("our own") non b e ing, 
the meanin gl ess of Nothing stands before us . Only in this way can the 
world then stand in the light of its Being and have the solidity of 
meaning and signifi cance and abiding presence. In the face of God and 
the Kingdom of Heaven this world is imperfect, fleeting, meaningless, 
and mere appearance (Maya), but in the face of Nothing thi s world can 
once again come forth with the full strength and real'ity of Being. 
Nothing ceases to be the va gue opposite of 
what-is: it now reveal s itself as integral to 
the Being of what-is. 
"Pure Being and pure Nothin g a re thus one and 
the same." This proposition of Hegel's ("The 
Science of Logic," I WWIII p. 74) is correct: 
Being and No thing hang together, but not because 
the two things - from the point of view of the 
He ge lian concept of thought - are one in their 
indefiniteness and immediateness, but because 
Being itself is finite in ess ence and is only 
revealed in the Transcendence of Da-sein as 
proj ected into Noth ing.l ------
It is in mortals' awareness of thei r fin i tude that they are aware of the 
unlimited and undifferentiat e d void of Nothing, and it is this gathered 
tension of finite and infinite, limit and continuity, and Being and 
Nothing that Heidegger has in mind when he speaks of mortals. 
(5) Being as the gathered Fourfold 
We therefore see that rather than precludin g certain areas of Being 
with his notion of the fourfold, Heidegger has attempted to give a 
broad enough unders tanding of th e meaning of Being that (for the first 
time ) does not limit our conception of what it i s to Be to certain 
1 Ibid., p. 346. 
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areas of things or ways of vie\ving thin gs . Previous conceptions of 
Being ( e ternal Idea, formed matter, extension, individual or monad, 
spatia-temporal entity) are all too narrow in a double sense. Firs t 
they refuse to grant Being to various realms of things we encounter 
or might encounter, and second they are a subjective limitation of 
individual things insofar as they limit them in their Being. What 
allows something to Be is that it is both unique and yet common to its 
surroundings: if not unique it would "blend" into something else and 
thus not Be, and if it had nothing in common it would not be in an hori-
zon or context, \vhich is impossible. 
Further, traditional theories explaine d Being in terms of a thing 
itself - what it was to Be was to possess a certain existing trait. 
This is to be ignorant of Heidegger 's ontological difference: the dif-
ference be tw een Being and beings. In a ques t for Being to give an 
explanation in terms of another being (Idea, matter, extension, etc.) 
is really just avoiding th e question of \vhat it means to Be. \.Je have 
merely given ourselves another being and we still do not know what i t 
means to say that this being is, and is not nothing. 
Has Heidegger himself fallen into the trap of reducing Being to a 
being? We have tried to indicate that each of the four are not thin gs , 
they are merely moments of the interplay which first grants Being to 
thin gs . Even by mortals we are not designating a thing, for as we 
noted, we are referring to the gathered tension between Being and 
Nothing that is present in the awareness of death, but which is really 
a part of the Being of all things. Further, it must be remembered that 
by the fourfold Heidegger means the unity of the mirrored interplay of 
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the four, which is something different from any one of them, or the sum 
of them. "By a primal oneness the four-earth and sky, divinities and 
mortals- belong together in one ."1 It is this gathered in t erplay of 
four-in - one that Heidegge r understands as the meaning of Being , and 
this is not a thing . Thus though \ve discus s ed the four separately , and 
showed how each one is in someway pre s ent in the Being of things , the 
truth about Being is not the presence of one or the other of them , but 
r athe r the fact of the occurrin g proce ss of th e inte rpla y of the four 
into a gathered un i ty , " This mani f old-si mp le gathering i s the jug ' s 
presencin g . " 2 
Hith this notion of the tmi f ied Fourfold, Heide gge r ' s quest for 
the meaning o f Being as presenci n g or Be ing-th e re h as r e ac he d a culmin a-
tion. Thus rather than an attempt at fanciful poetry, the elaboration 
of the four f old i s a serious at te mp t to ris e ou t of t h e shortcomin gs o f 
traditiona l me t a physics , and give a via ble unders t and i n g of what the 
Being of th i n gs means. To the charge of arbitrari ne ss , and a demand 
for justifi cation , Hei de gger responds: 
1 
But it never occurs to anyone to ask whence Plato 
had a directive to think of Being a s idea , or whence 
Kant had the direct i ve to think of Being a s the 
transcendenta l clt a racter o f objectness , a s pos ition 
(being posited) .. . . I can provide no credential s 
for \vhat I h ave said . . .. Everythin g here is the 
path of a respondi n g that examines a s it lis tens . 
Any path always risks going a s tray , leading astray . 3 
Poetry , Language, Thou~, p. 149 . 
2 Ibid. , p . 174 . 
3 Ibid ., p. 185-6 . 
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It is l n.portant to note that the notion of the four f old addres s e s 
itself to Leing both CiS es s ence and ns existence. A thing is ".:l ecause 
the f ourfold is present, and it is what ~t is becaube the four are 
gathered i n the sped fie way in which th(:y are . Thus when Heidegger 
savs the ta s k of thinking is to think Bein g , he is not callin!1 for a 
mystical tran s cendence, or .Jn instantaneous behold i ng of a mere 'that-
it-is'. To think tha t-it-is me ar.s to tl-.ink Being, \vhich n,e nns to pre.-
s erve the four as they are gE. there d. l!eidegger calls th io preserving 
a d\,'elling : 
To d\vell, to be set at peace, means to remain 
at peace within the free , t h e preserve, the 
free sphere that safe guards each thing in its 
nature . The f und a mental cha rac ~ er of dwell-
ing is this s pRrin g a nd ;' reserving .l 
Thus thinking Being is a dwelling, which is a difficult process of 
contemplation and meditation . Thinking is the taking to heart which 
we have discussed in the s econd chapter. It is not somethin g tacked on 
to Be ing , but is rather nece s sary to Being itself. As he says at this 
stage: 
Staying \vith things is the only \vay in which 
the fourfold stay within the fourfold is 
accomplished at any time in simple unity. 
Dwellin g preserves the fourfold by bringing 
the presencing of the fourfold into things. 
But thin gs themselves s ecure the fo urfold 
only when they themselves as things are let 
be in their presencing.2 
To clarify this we must modify something \ve have been saying up 
until this point. Rather than calling the fourfold Bein g , Heidegger 
1 Ihid., p. 149. 
2 Ibid., p. 151. 
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calls it world: "This a ppropri at e in g mirror-play of the simple one-
fold of earth and s k y divi nities and mortals we c a ll \vorld. ,l Howeve r, 
Heidegge r goes on to s ay: "Wh a t e v e r b e collies a thin g occurs out of the 
rin ging of the world' s mi rror play."2 In othe r words , the unity of 
the f ourfo ld is c a lle d world because it refe r s sp e cif ically to th e 
Bein g o f th i n gs , it is what a llows things to Be th i n gs . But, as we saw 
earlie r, Be in g i s Bein g- i n-the-world, and thus the four f old, or \vorld, 
nee ds thi nk i n g man to pre serve it, to let i t Be. In th i nking man dw e lls , 
and dwe lli n g i s a prese rvin g o f the fourfold ( i ncludin g hims elf a s 
mortal) and t h us a pre s e rving of Be ing . "Dwe llin g , a s pres e rving , k ee ps 
the four fo ld in tha t with wh i ch mortals s t a y: in thin gs . " 3 
Thvellin g does not mean me r e ly l i v i ng in a close proxi mi t y , it me ans 
be l on gin g t o , bein g part of, bein g i nvo lve d with. It i s thus the Be i n g 
o f dwelling t ha t now b e co mes cruc i al fo r He idegger in h is que st f or the 
me an i n g of Bein g , fo r the fo urf old gav e us worl d , but wo rld n e e ds dwell-
in g man t o r ealize i t se l f and Be . At times He i degger speaks o f bein g 
involve d \vi t h a t opology o f Bein g , b e c a us e he is c once rne d with the 
area o f mee t i n g b etween ma n an d world, i. e ., whe re and ho\v they dwe ll 
toge the r. Th is meetin g i s called Appro pri a t i on ( Er eign i s ), and our tas k 
now b e comes an unde r s t and i ng of Bein g as Approp riation. 
1 Ibid., p. 179. 
2 Ib i d., p. 183. 
3 Ibid. , p • 151. 
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( 6) Approp r i a t i on 
The thinking o f Be ing a s Appropri ati on i s th e culmination of the 
idea s of Dase in and l ogos tha t took form earlie r i n his career. It i s 
an attemp t to ge t away f ro m th e th i nkin g of Being of b eings ( presencing) 
and th i nk Being qua Being (th a t wh i ch en ab l e s presencin g) . Be caus e of 
th e connot a t i ons ' Be in g ' has f rom s ome of hi s e arl ie r concerns and from 
the works of othe r philosophe r s , he tries to avoi d the \vo rd - s ome t ime s 
writ i ng it wi t h cross es through it , s ometime s wr i t i n g i t a s the ol d 
Engli s h ' neon ', b ut most of t en by r efe r r ing to it simply as Appropria-
tion . As he s umn~rizes it i n an swer t o a ques tion f r om J oan Stamb a ugh 
and J. Gl enn Gr ay : 
"Be ing i t se l f " means : Th e Ap propriation can 
no l on ge r b e thought a s "Being" in t erms of 
presence . "Appro pr ia t i on" no lon ge r names 
an o th er manne r an d epoch of "Bein g". "Bein g" 
thought wi th out r ega rd to b eings (i. e . , ahvays 
only in t e r ms of , an d wi th r e spect t o , t hem) 
means at t he same t ime : n o longer t hough t as 
"Bein g" ( pr esence ) .1 
Thi s con ce rn \vith App ropria t i on rath e r t han Being as pr esencin g is 
one way of vi ew in g th e ce l ebrat e d r e ve r sal which me t aphys i cal int e r-
pre t e r s c onsi de r to be a t urn f r om s ubj ect i vity to obj e ctivity . The 
turn i s f rom a ques t i oning of Beings of bein gs ( i . e ., da- s ein , being-
the r e , presencing) t o a ques t ionin g o f Being qua Being ( App ro pr ia t ion). 
We must no t e tha t thou gh th ese two conce rn s are di ffe r ent they can not 
be full y sepa r a t e d : 
But App r opri a tion is different i n n a ture beca us e 
it is r i cher than any conceivabl e definit i on o f 
Being. Be ing , howe ve r , in r es pec t of i t s essen tia l 
ori gin can be thought in t e r ms of Approp ri a t i on . 2 
1Th e End o f Philos ophy , p . xiii . 
2 On the Wa y to Language , footnote , p . 129 . 
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And as he says e l sewhere : "Being comes to language as the Being of 
beings . " 1 Therefore, Heidegger is not abandoning the notion of Being 
as presencing, he is merely refocusing his attention. For as he said: 
"As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws"2 and now it is time 
to recall Being itself, i.e., that which grants Being as presencing 
and thereby grant s all that is. 
"Appropri a tion" is a tran slation of the German word " Ereignis" 
the dict i onary translation of which is" e vent or occurrence." But 
Heidegger uses it in a special sense arising out of its etymological 
roots. Er- eignen speaks of eigen , own, and the sense of Ereignis is 
an unfolding into one's own, a coming to where one belongs. This is 
the sense that is attempted to be conveyed by "Appropriation", and it 
is now our task to show that coming into one's own for man and Bein g 
means belonging-together ( or dwelling as we called it above ) with each 
other - man as a preserver and Being as the presencing of \vhat is 
present. Tho ugh this will b e the ultimate significance that Appropria-
tion will have for us fue path to this point must meander fo r a while. 
The basic meaning of Appropriation is the identity of belonging together 
that first gives rise to "independen t things" which are dependent on 
each other to Be what they are. Heidegger points out that in order to 
think this belonging together we must r ecognize both identity and dif-
ference: identity at their mutual s ource of meeting and yet di fference 
in each coming into its own as what it is. Our task is to understand 
1Early Greek Thinking, p. 22. Note that this was written in 1946 
befor e the terminology of Appropriation was formulated, but the first 
"Being" must be understood as Appropriation and the second one as 
presenc ing. 
2 Ibid. , p. 2 6. 
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this sense of belonging together, and to do that we start with the 
Appropriation of time and Being and then tun1 to Appropriation of man 
and Bein g (where the significance of thinking and lan guage will become 
crucial). 
In On Time and Being the path that leads to a thinking of Appropria-
tion&ises from the questioning o f Being as presencing. Being in this 
sense means a coming into the open, an unconcealing. But, as we saw in 
Being and Time , this requires a free space or stage, i.e., the "there", 
in which to occur. In so far as in the second half of Being and Time 
temporality was shown to be the Being of Dasein,1 temporality is shown 
to lie at the root of this free space. As developed in On Time and Being, 
temporality is reveale d as the unified realm of past, present and future 
which provides the arena that first al lows things to have an enduring 
presence: 
Time-space nmv :is the name for the openness 
which opens up in the mutual self-extending 
of futural approach , past and present. This 
openness exclusively and primarily provides 
the space in >•hich space as we usually know 
it can tmfold. 2 
To clarify this idea we must note that the metaphor of a stage or 
arena is not really accurate for time is not a thin g like a container. 
Neither time nor Being are th i ngs , and thus we can not view one as 
containing, or even causing , the other. Being is the presencing of 
what is presen t, and time is the interplay of the three ecstases that 
1Bein g and Time , p. 277. "But the primordial ontological basis 
for Dasein's existentiality is temporality." 
2 0n Time and Being , p. 14. 
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turns a momentary now in which nothing could have the abiding presence 
of Being, into an extende d open realm which first enables things to Be. 
From this point it must be asked how it is that time and Being 
belong together if time is neither a cont ainer for Being nor a cause 
of it. How is it that time arises as a tmifi e d extending that enables 
things to presence? The answer to this l ies in Appropriation: 
In the sending of th e des tiny of Being, in th e 
extending of time, there becomes manifest a 
dedication, a deliverin g ove r into what is 
their mvn, namely of Being as presence and 
of time as th e r ealm of the op en. \fuat deter-
min es both, time and Being, in their own, 
that is, in their b elon gi ng together, we 
shall call: Ereignis, the event of 
Appropriation. I 
Though it sounds strange to talk of allmving or enablin g Being, 
this is just the way Heidegger views th e situation. Appropriation as 
the b elongin g t o ge ther of time and Bei n g first makes possib l e the 
comin g to pass cf th e presencing of \.Jhat is. Appropriation itself is 
tmderstood as a possibility: the possibility of b elongi ng together , 
and without thi s gift of belon ging together none of the "components " 
could come into their own. We, the r e fore, say that it is Appropriation 
which appropriat es time and Being to EE.ch other and in so doing allows 
or enables thin gs to Be. 
Howeve r, insofar a s Appropriation grants Bein g and not the other 
way around, it is difficult to know how to approach it. We can not 
even call an "it" for "it" is not something that is. 
Appropriation n e ither is, nor is Appropriation 
there . To say one or to say the other is 
equally a distortion of the matter, just as 
1
rbid., p. 19. 
if we wanted to derive the source from the 
river.l 
Therefore , whateve r is sa id about Appropriation in the mode of an 
98 
assertive statement can not be accepted as completely accurat e . Hmv-
ever, we can give ideas of how to think Appropriation, though this can 
never be a representational thought that specifically answers the ques-
tion What is Appropriation? (A ques tion that Heidegger considers mis-
guided and unappropriate.) 
In Identity and Difference the path to Appropriation is through 
the belonging together of thinking and Being: 
Now it becomes clear that Being belongs with 
thinking to an identity whose active essence 
stems from that l e tting belong together 
which we call the Appropriation. The essence 
of identity is a prope rty of the event of 
Appropriation.2 
In othe r \-lOrd s , Appropriation can be seen through the ability of think-
ing and Being to b elong to each othe r. As such it i s the mut ual 
vibrating of thinking and Being , and this belonging to gether mus t be 
unde rstood on its own terms as more primary than the independent Being 
of either of the components: 
We stubbornly misunderstood this prevailing 
belonging together of man and Being as long 
as we represent everything only in categories 
and mediations, be it with or without dialectic. 
Then we always find only connections that are 
established either in terms of Being or in 
terms of man, and that present the belonging 
together of man and Being as an intertwining. 3 
1Ibid., p. 24. 
2 Identity and Di fference, p. 39. 
3 
Ibid. p. 32. 
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Why must Appropriation be more fundamental than the "components" 
it holds to gethe r? The an s\ve r to this lies in the fact that ne ither 
one can lle apart from the other , and thus the source of their belonging 
t oge the r mus t be prior to the Be ing of any one of the m. That which 
grants their belonging together, i . e ., that which enables cons ciousnes s 
to reach out t o an object and an object to come forth and be pres ent 
for a consciousness , mus t be more fund amental than either one . In 
Heide gger ' s terms : 
Thought is , more simply , t hought o f Be i ng . 
The genitive has two me anin gs . Thought is 
of Bein g , insofar as tho ught , event uated 
by Being , b e lon gs to Bei ng . Thought i s at 
the same time thought of Being in s ofar a s 
thought listens to , he e ds , Being . l 
In other words , Being , a s presenc i ng , can only occ ur i f that which i s 
pres ent is maintai ne d in its Being b y a t aking to heart \vhi ch let s lie ; 
and thinking , a s a takin g to he art which lets li e , mus t ( a s we saw 
earlier) be unde r s t ood as a unique ki nd of pe rcep t i on or r e ce pt i v i ty 
t hat preserves but certainly do es not crea te. Th us each needs the 
other, and the poss ibili ty of this mutual belon ging toge the r mus t be 
the most fundamental . 
We now see : wh at let s the two matters belon g 
togethe r , wha t brin gs the two in to their own 
and even more , maintains and holds them in 
their b e longing toge the r • .. is Appropriation. 
TI1e matter at stake is not a relation retro-
active ly supe ri mposed on Bein g and time . The 
matte r at stake firs t appropriates Be i ng and 
t ime into their own i n virtue of their r e la t i on .... 2 
1
"L H . II 149 etter on uman1s m , p . . 
2 0n Time and Bein g , p . 19 . 
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To elaborat e furt he r this identity of thinking and Be ing we turn 
to "Le tt e r on Humanism". 
Th e standi ng in th e clearing of Be i n g I 
call th e ex-s i s t ence of man. ~1ly man 
has this way to be . Ex-sistence, s o 
unde r s tood, i s n o t only the bas i s of 
the possibili ty of r e as on, r a t i o, but 
ex-sis t ence is tha t, wherein the essa1ce 
of man prese rves the source that det e r-
min es him. 1 
And he goes on to say: 
Be i ng clear s it sel f for man i n ecst a tic 
proj e ction. But this proj e ct i on does 
not cre ate Bein g. Hore ove r, the proj e c-
tion i s essent i ally a ma tte r of b e in g 
cas t. What project s in t he proj ect i s 
not man, but Bein g i t self, whi ch de ter-
min es man to th e ex-s is t ence wh i ch i s 
the e s sen ce of Dase in. Th is des t i ny i s 
rea lized in the clearing of Bein g.2 
What eme r ges he r e is th a t Be in g nee ds man to b e prese rve d, but it 
itsel f is wha t en able s man t o b e a p r ese rve r ( i . e ., ex- sis t). }~n is 
the bein g ~vhose Being entail s an invol vemen t with Be in g i t se l f - man' s 
Being i s to s tand i n the clea ring of Bein g . 
Thus wh a t makes man un i que i s tha t he is e cs t a t ic , in the origi -
nary sen se o f be ing bey ond hims e l f . It i s as a thinking b e in g , t hou ght 
in the sense of takin g to heart an d l e tting wh a t i s s tand i n it s Bein g 
rather th an i n logical or re-present i ng thinking, 3 th a t man ex- sis t s . 
Heidegge r sta t es that a s s uch (i. e ., ex- s i s t ing) man s t ands in the 
1
"Lette r on Human ism", p. 154. 
2 Ibid., p. 163. 
3we hyphen a t e 're-presentin g ' to e mphasize the traditional mode of 
thought which is conce ive d a s s omehow mirrorin g or r e-producin g the 
exte rnal world and be ing closed upon its own pres enting of the world. 
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clearing of Being, and this clearing of Being must be seen as the open 
or fre e-space in which Being as presencing can occur. As such man is 
not an entity outside this realm, that somehow leaps into it; rather 
in his Being man belongs to it for it is what grants him the Being 
which he is. The clearing of Being is fue meeting of man and Being, 
and without it nothing could ever manifest itself. Further, since man 
is merely a "component" of this clearing and does not create it, we must 
see something else , namely Appropriation, as that which grants it, and 
th ereby provides f or the belonging together of man and Being . In so 
doing Appropriation fi r st makes possible man as ex-sistent and Being as 
presence. 
It may be asked why \ve must speak of Appropriation as granting the 
belon ging toge ther of man and Being, when it seems that they b elon g to-
gether by their o•m nature. To ans\ver this we must see that both man 
and Being are historical, and thus the nature of their belonging together 
varies historically. But no matter how it varies they must be Appro-
priated to each other in some way. Appropriation is this atemporal pos-
sibility of being appropriated to each other. It is the granting that 
somehow has enabled the "things" which need each other to belong to-
gether. It is not only the granting of the belonging togehter of think-
ing and Being, but also of time and Being, and even the four of the fo ur-
fold. In each case we can see and analyze the components separately, 
but they can come into their own only as a result o f a fundamental 
belonging together. Since this belonging togeth er is prior to the 
component s it can not find its source in either one of them, and we 
must understand its occurrence strictly on its own terms. Time, the 
102 
staying presence of Being gathered ear th and sky , divinities and mor-
tals, and man all arise as a gift of b e ing appropriated to each other; 
and the historical un folding of their interrelated des tinies could not 
occur without the original Appropriation whfch first allows them to 
belong together and thus come into their own. 
Thus Being as Appropriation becomes an Absolute outside the 
temporality that was originally exposed as the fundamental ground, and 
out side the presencing disclosure of Being. But t he notion of an 
Absolute seems so contrary to the develop ment of historicity and he r-
meneutics for which Heidegger is so well known that we must examine it 
further. 
We must first note that this Absolute (Appropriation) is not some-
thing that can be known or represented in thought. Nor is it a God's 
viewpoint on what is, that our thinking might hold above it as an ideal. 
In short , it is neither a thing (such as a Platonic Idea), a vie\vpoint 
on things or unde rlying (or rathe r overridin g) Truth of things (as 
Hegel's Absol ute), nor an eternal and necessary structure of things (as 
the categories of Kant or eidetic laws of Husser!). It is simply the 
awe-inspiring, yet undeniable fact, that man , time and Being have been 
given to each othe r. Appropriation is not only the answer to why there 
are beings rather than Nothing , but the giving of the possibility that 
we can raise the question altogether. It takes various forms through-
out history, but its f undamental truth, its originary granting of the 
possibility of an historical unfolding, always remains. We may sp eak 
of broad epochs of Being, s uch as the Greeks, the Middle Ages, the 
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Renaissance, the scientific and the technological, 1 in which the 
presencing of things, i.e. , the \vay the fourfold is stayed or gathered, 
takes a predominant style or form. However, it is only because of 
Appropriation that the fourfold can gather itself in things at all, 
and, therefore, that anything can Be. 
As the epochs of Being vary, and with them the forms of Appropria-
tion, so too within a single epoch can Being vary when we are concern ed 
with different sorts of beings. He have elaborated the Being of th i n gs 
as the gathered fourfold, and thus man is appropriated to things as a 
pres e rver of the fourfold. However, this is only the relatedness for 
authentic or thoughtful x;Jan , and, as \ve have seen inauthenticity is 
more predominant and just as "nat ural" as authenticity. Thus for the 
most part man is not appropriated to things as a preserver of their 
fourfold Being - he takes their Being for granted and is concerned 
solely with the place of things within his projects. However, this too 
is only possible because of an original App r opriation , for insofar as 
we take th e Being of things for granted, that Being must present itself, 
and thus be prese rve d. Further, since the entities are suited to take 
a place within man's projects, though they do not present themselves 
with the thought f ul Being of the gathered fourfold, they do manifest 
themse lves in the ir mm way, i.e., with the practical Being of useful-
ness. Things are only a part of whatever is, and preserving the four-
fold is only one way man is appropriated to Being. As Heidegger says 
1r distinguish the cosmic view of early scientific exploration , 
from the human centered vie\v of domin at ion, control and manipulation 
of today's technological age. 
at the close of the essay "The Thing" : 
But things are also compliant and modest 
in number, compare d with countless obj e cts 
every1•here of e qual value, compared with 
the measureless mass of men as living 
beings.l 
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Entities other than things include people, equipment , and ••orks 
of art. The Being of these entities is different from that of things , 
and thus man must be appropriated to them di f ferently. The notions of 
man as a thoughtful preserver, of Being a s the pres encing of that which 
is present, and the mutual nee d of one for the othe r, do not vary, but 
what it means to preserve and to Be does. Just as in Being and Tiwe 
Care took various forms such as concern with the ready-to-hand and 
solicitude with other humans, the pre serving function of man and the 
Being of entities takes various forms . To understand this further we 
turn to the other types of entities , and see how Appropriation lets 
them belong together with man . 
Though neidegger does not speak much of the belonging together 
of man to the Being of other humans, he does speak of the belonging to 
our own Being. This of course was the specific task of Bei,ng and Time, 
but it is also an :is s ue in all his other works. vie have seen the Being 
of man as mortal, transcending himself, and ex-sisting in Being , and 
Caring . Man's relatedness to bis Being is hi s awareness and acknm•l-
edge ment of his death and finitude , and his taking to he art the world 
t hat affec ts h im in his 0"'11 Being. In short, man is approp riat ed to 
his own Being by being aware of , an d thus preserving , his role in the 
l Poe try , Language , Tho ught, p. 182. 
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presencing of whatever is . Thus man is appropriated to other humans 
insofar as he can recognize them as special entities , who like himself 
are not mere things or tools, but rather stand in tl~ · light of Being. 
To preserve the Being of another person is not to stay the fourfold 
in him, but to preserve him in his own way of Being. However, it is 
again Appropriation itself that grants the possibility of man Being 
in a way that he can preserve and let what-is Be what it is in its 
Being, in this case let another human Be human. 
As for equipment , the most notable characteristic of the Being 
is its usefulness. That is , equipment presents itself specifically 
as an aid to accomplish a task. This usefulness can be further ex-
pressed as reliability, insofar as the equipment silently serves its 
task (i.e., is equipment) as long as it func t ions well. \-!hen it breaks, 
or in some other \vay no longer performs as it is suppos ed to, it loses 
its Being as e quipment and becomes a mere thin g in our way . This re-
liability of equipment can b e seen 2s giving equip rr~nt a Be ing charac-
terized totally in the service of something else ; the equipment itself 
remains invisible as it is transcended to the end in whose service it 
gains its Being . "The more handy a piece of equipment is, the more 
' ' ' . ,1 1nconsp1cuous 1t rematns, ... 
Man is appropriated to the Being of equipment by being a project 
oriented being , and being able to use that which is given to him to 
serve in bringing about the f uture . In other words, because man is a 
being who is ahead of himself and has possibilities (which are 
1
rbid ., p. 65. 
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possibilities of the world) , he can have equipment to serve as a bridge 
from the present to the future state of affairs . However, man could 
not be project oriented nor have equipment if Being did not lend it sel f 
to man in the way it does . Being's f u ture possibilities are fore-
shadowed in its present, but certain conditions or changes have to be 
met for the possibilities to be actualized. Because man in his Being 
stands in the light of Being he is open to these possibilities and the 
conditions needed to be satisfied. It is for this reason that he can 
be goal directed and manipulate present things s trictly in satisfaction 
of conditions neede d for the actualization of possibilities. Man do es 
not force the world into the mode of equipment , but rather because man 
and world are appropriated to ea ch other t here is eq uipment and project 
orien t e d man . Once again we see that from Appropriation man and Being 
are cast into each other ' s do main ; man as a preserver of Being and 
Being as a make r of man in his ex- sistence. Arising out of Appropria-
tion each comes into its own thanks to t he other . 
Finally, we look at the Being of a work of art. A work of art ' s 
Being consist s in its presenting or bringing forth something else . 
Hork enables some thing to emerge in its Being in a way which would not 
othen.;ise occur . 
The art work opens up in its o\m \vay the 
Being of beings. This opening up, i . e., 
this de concealin g , i . e ., the truth of 
beings , happens in the work . In the art 
work, the truth of what is has se t itself 
to work. Art is truth setting itself to 
work.l 
1
rbid.' p. 39. 
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Unlike equipment, however, work does not disappear in the ser-
vice of something else . A work is not meant as a mere tool that serves 
to merely re-pre s ent something other than itself. Rather that which 
is brought forth in a work can only errerge in its Being through or in 
the work, and to do this the work must continually present itself as 
work. An art work about an obj e ct is not the same as the object pre-
senting itself in and by itself ; the work ope ns it up in a way that 
the object does not do by :itself. Th us the work must continually and 
explicitly announce its elf as work in order not to turn into a mere thing 
isolated from the world it is meant to open to us or a mere tool that 
brin gs something about but does not open it up in its Being, i.e., let 
truth happe n. Further , as we shall see with lan guage , the way some-
thing is opene d up affects what is opened up, i.e., the Being of wha t 
is opened up s t an ds forth in a way unique to the Be ing of the ope nin g . 
Thus to u1de r stan d what is opened up \ole must maintain an awareness of 
the way it is set fo rth. 
In a work, by contrast, this fact, tha t it 
is as a work , is jus t what is lli1us ual •.•• 
The more essentially the work opens itself, 
the more luminous becomes the uniquenes s 
1 
of the fact that it is rather than is not. 
In order to preserve the Being of the work, man must be capable 
of trans cending the work's thingly character to stand in the truth it 
is openin g up. To do this h e must maintain the announcement of the 
work as work, and this consis ts in maintaining the fact that it has 
been created. "But in contrast to all other modes of production, the 
1 Ibid., p. 65. 
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work is distinguished by being created so that its createdness is part 
of the created work. ,l This is not a matter of recognizing who the 
artist is, or what his reputation is, it is rather r e cognizing that 
thi s is an opening up of the world , i.e., a created work. Equipment 
is of course also created or produced, but its cre atedness is not part 
of its Being, because its Being consists in withdrawing itself and 
not in announcing itself. 
We can therefore say that man is related to the Being of work in 
a twofold sense: in recalling its Being as created he thereby transcends 
the thingly character of the work into the openness of man and Being of 
work, work can first Be as a brin ging into nearness that ~•hich is or 
has been distant, and man can first Be as a dwe ller and unfolde r of 
that which is or has been distant. Neither the Being of t he work nor 
man is primary , they need each other, and they can both Be because they 
are appropriated to each other , i . e ., Appropriation grant ed them the 
possibility to dwell toge ther. 
At this point we draH to a close our analysis of how Heidegger 
views Being in his last phase. He have taken a round about route 
going from the Being of things to Being as Appropriation and then back 
to the Being of entities other than things. In this way we hoped to 
expose the meaning of Being , both in terms of the Being of what-is 
(presencing) and in terms of that which first grants this Being. 
Though they can be looked at separately they really belong togethe r: 
1 Ibid. , p. 64. 
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Appropriation can only be unde r s tood as a granting of the possibility 
of Being (~rescncin g) and Being (pres encing) can only be understood 
with regard to the original gift of the be lon ging together of time, 
Being and man. 
We must nCM ret urn to language , for in the light of Appropriation 
the Being of man emerge d as a preserve r, and we have earlier seen 
language's crucial role in this . In Being and Time we saw Dasein 's 
Being characterized essen tially by Discours e . In "Letter on Humanism" 
we saw l anguage calle d the house of Being, and a house must be under-
stood as some thin g that shelters and preserves. In the works on the 
Greeks \ve saw the Being of legein and noein as a gathering which pre-
serves the primordial ga thering of logos . Therefore, language emerges 
as essential to th e notion of preservation, and thereby to the notion 
of Being (pres encing) and thus, in short, to Appropriation. Our tas k 
now is to examine the work on l an guage Heidegge r did in his la s t phas e, 
and see how it stands with \vhat has been put for th in this sec tion. 
IV. The Being of Language : The Language of Being 
We do not wish to assault language 
in order to force it into the grip 
of ideas already fixed beforehand. 
We do not wish to reduce the nature 
of language to a concept, so that 
this concept may provide a generally 
useful view of language that will lay 
to rest all further notions about it. 
To discuss language, to place it, 
means to bring to its place of being 
not so much language as ourselves: 
our own gathering into the appropria-
tion.l 
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We are concerned with language strictly in terms of its Being. 
It cannot be an object among others for us to analyze in terms of 
properties, uses, and underlying structures. " ... the point is to 
think of the essence of language in its correspondence to Being, 
and, what is more, as this very correspondence, i.e., the dwelling 
2 
of man's essence." Therefore, 'He cannot take language as something 
already given, i.e., present-at-hand, we must first let it come to 
us in its own unique Being. This means that rather than trying to 
step back from language in order to examine it, we must enter into an 
experience with it. "To undergo an experience with language, then, 
means to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim of language 
3 by entering into and submitting to it." 
To enter into an experience with language means to let language 
announce itself in its Being. "In experiences which we undergo with 
lPoetry, Language, Thought p. 190. 
2"Letter on Humanism" p. 160. 
3Heidegger On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) 
p. 57. 
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1 language, language itself brings itself to language." This is quite 
different from the scientific information gathering about language 
with which the current discipline of linguistics is concerned. For 
language itself to come forth we do not want to explain it in terms 
of something else: "Instead of explaining language in t erms of one 
thing or another, and thus running away from it, the way to language 
intends to let language be experienced as language." 2 
The first step in letting language be experienced is to put 
aside our preconceived notions about it. There are three common under-
standings of language that we must avoid: 1) language is primarily 
an activity or tool of man, 2) it is an externalization of an internal 
feeling or idea, and 3) it serves to r e -present objects of the world. 
These notions about langunge presuppose that it has the Being of equip-
ment, that it is used by man in order to represent or stand for some-
thing other than itself. Though in a sense this view is correct, and 
is certainly useful for various disciplines, it does not permit a 
complete understanding of language in its Being. 
We still give too little consideration, 
however, to the singular role of these 
correct ideas about language. They 
hold sway, as if unshakable, over the 
whole field of the varied scientific 
perspectives on language. They have 
their roots in an ancient tradition. 
Yet they ignore completely the oldest 
natural cast of language. Thus, despite 
their antiquity and despite their com-
prehensibil i ty, they never bring us to 
language as language.3 
lrbid. p. 59. 
2Ibid. p. 119. 
3Ibid. p. 193. 
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But how are we to enter into this experience with language? 
Until we can actually demonstrate a new approach to language, and show 
what is learned from this, our claim of the limitations of other 
studies of language is empty rhetoric. We constantly use language 
as a tool, and it becomes difficult to still this use of it, but, 
unless we do, no new understanding of language can be reached. When 
we try to describe language we use language itself, and are thereby 
using language as a tool, the very presupposition about the Being 
of language that we are trying to overcome. How can we quiet the 
attack of language as a tool so that we can openly experience the 
Being of language? At the very point when language fails us. 
But when does language speak itself 
as language? Curiously enough, wh~n 
we cannot find the right word for 
something tha t concerns us , c arries 
us away, oppress es or encourages us. 
Then we l eave unsp oken wh at we have 
in mind and, without r ightly giving 
it though t, und er go moments in which 
language itself has distantly and 
fleetingly touched us with its 
essential being. 1 
When words fail us a curious thing is revealed, and by examining 
what happens, or rather what does not happen, the nature of language 
can stand out for the first time. Entering into an experience with 
language can only take place when we do not take it for granted and 
merely use it. The place where this can occur is just where our 
language fails us. At this limit of language we experience a demand 
1 Ibid. p. 59. 
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to be named, a desired announcement, but the failure of the naming or 
announcing to occur. There is no announcement, no telling, merely a 
beckoning. But what beckons, and what happens when the beckoning is 
reversed into a spea king? In this mystery lies the Being of language. 
The beckoning is fleeting and unclear; we cannot quite put a 
finger on it. Its nature might be made clearer by a comparison to the 
horizon in a theme-horizon configuration. The Being of an horizon 
is to stand back as a theme comes forth. However, when we scan a 
field and cannot find a theme we do not have an horizon either since 
theme and horizon are bound together in their Being. Rather than an 
horizon we have an undelineated lack. This is the sense we get when 
we cannot find the right words: we get a sense of a gap or a lack 
which we want to stabilize, in the same way as finding a theme stabiliz es 
the withdrawing field into an horizon. l-le at tempt to speak in a '-' BY 
that will hold down this beckoning mystery before it frustratingly 
slips away. We try to find words that let it echo through and come 
to stand - we know when words are inadequate to the beckoning but we 
of course cannot point out why, for then we would have found the 
adequate words. 
Thus by going to where words fail us we see that the failure to 
find words is not an inability to match or correspond words to a pre-
established (thematized) thought, for it is only in the words that 
the thought comes to ring through and become established and stabilized. 
It is a struggeling to be born, to come out into the world, r.ot the 
mere tacking on of a sign or label to something already there. There 
114 
are no items merely waiting around to be represented by the right word, 
rather language is what first allows things to come into their own and 
stand in their place. This coming into one's own and standing forth 
in the world is how we have understood the meaning of Being, and 
thus we must conclude that "It is in words and language that things 
1 first come into being and are," or as Heidegger puts it at this 
stage of his writings " ••. the word is what first brings that given 
thing, as the being that is, into this "is"; •.. the word is what 
holds the thing there and relates it and so to speak provides its 
maintenance with which to be a thing." 2 
No matter how we build up to this claim of the relation of 
language and Being, when it comes it still shocks us, and we are 
hard pressed to understand how Heidegger can seriously claim that it 
is in language that things first come to Be. Three questions 
immediately come to mind that Heidegger's approach to language seems 
to ignore: 1) certainly there was a beckoning prior to the words, 
how then can he say there is no Being of things prior to the words? 
2) how could words, as things themselves, possibly bring things to 
Being, i.e., how can something that is be the source of the is itself? 
3) if words are the source of Being, are we not back to a subjective 
grounding of Being in a human function? 
lrntroduction to Metaphysics p. 11. Since this chapter is a quest 
for the fullness of language's Being, we will be concerned solely with 
authentic language. 
2o~ the Way to Langunge p. 82. 
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There are answers to these objections, and though it will take 
some development to answer them in a way that is completely satisfac-
tory, we briefly mention how Heidegger will approach them. 
To the first we must remember that here Being means the presence 
of what is present, and that which is not (which beckons for announce-
ment) is not mere nothingness - as we have seen the encounter with 
Nothing is as significant as the encounter with things which are. 
Words let things Be, but Heidegger does not have to maintain that 
words creats ex nihilo; they arc simply what let things presence, i.e., 
Be things. 
As for the second objection, a word is not a thing among other 
things; considering it as such leaves us with the expression theory of 
language. In its Being a word is quite different from a thing: it 
is a being whose Being transcends its own presencing and grants pre-
sence to that which it announces. ''If our thinking does justice to 
the matter, then we may never say of the word that it is, but rather 
that it gives ,1 Thus it ~ only insofar as it brings things to Be, 
and we cannot say that it is simply a thing itself which after the fact 
causes the Being of things. 
Finally, to the charge of subjectivism we must come to an under-
standing of Heidegger's notion that it is not man but language which 
speaks. The relation of language, speaking, and human utterance is 
a complicated one, but at this point we can summarize it as follows: 
1 Ibid. p. 88. 
"Language needs human speaking, and yet it is not merely of the 
making or at the command of our speech activity."1 
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To elaborate these points fully and thereby understand the rela-
tion of language to Being, we return to our original attempt to 
experience language, and examine what happens when the unsaid comes 
into language. " ... language alone brings what is, as something 
2 that is, into the Open for the first time. 11 We experience language 
as an announcing, it goes beyond itself to show something other than 
itself. The announcing is guided and directed by the original 
beckoning, but in the announcement of language the ·Hithdra,ving lack 
of beckoning suddenly halts and for the first time finds a place with-
in the world. "This naming do e s not hand out titles, it does not 
apply terms, but it calls into the word. The naming calls. Calling 
3 brings closer wha t it calls." When the words are provided, that 
which is named is brought into the Open (the Nearness or Neighborhood) 
of the Appropriated belonging together of man and Being, and in so 
doing first allmvs things to Be. 
1 
Language, by naming beings for the first 
time, first brings beings to word and 
to appearance. Only this naming nomin-
ates being !£ their being from out of 
their being. Such saying is a pro-
jecting of the clearing, in which 
announcement is made of what it is4 that beings come into the Open as. 
Ibid. p. 125. 
2~oetry, Language, Thought p. 73. 
3on the Way to Language p. 198. 
4Poetry, Language, Thought p. 73. 
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In the second sentence of this quote an extremely important point 
is revealed. When Heidegger says " ... naming nominates beings to their 
being from out of their being .•. "he is referring to the process of 
coming into one's own \vhich we previously saw to be the grant of 
Appropriation. Since this coming into one's own of a thing is now 
revealed as the gift of naming we are led to understand naming in 
the light of Appropriation. "The way to language belongs to Saying 
1 determined by Appropriation." In this way we see that what escapes 
language is not mere nothingness, it is a being which has not come 
into its own, i.e., into its appropriated belonging together with 
man. Language does not create things, it provides the opportunity 
for them to presence as things. When the unsaid comes to language 
it comes from out of its own, it beckons language, and language pro-
vides the vehicle v:hereby it can first stay in the light of abiding 
presence. "Being, clearing itself, comes into language." 2 But we 
must once again attempt to focus on the nature of language to under-
stand how we can say things first come to Be in language, yet Being 
comes to language itself. 
One thing should have been made clear by now, and that is that 
the Being of language is an announcing, a letting something Be what 
it is. This Being of language Heidegger names Saying, as used in the 
quotes above and as etymologically derived from the Old Norse Saga 
lon the Way to Language p. 129. 
2
"Letter on Humanism" p. 179. 
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1 
which means to show or make appear. "The essential being E.!_ langu~ 
2 
_is Sayit!_& as Showing." Only when language Says something is it 
authentic language, otherwise it is mere chatter. Further, we must 
remember that Saying is not something tacked on to words or sentences; 
words and sentences can only be what they are if they Say something. 
Finally, we note that as uttered sounds may decay into mere chatter 
and no longer Say anything, silence, when properly employed, can 
Say a grea t deal (e.g., the silent stare of an angry parent) and thus 
must be considered as language. 
The Being of language, rather than being understood merely in 
terms of sounds and sentence structures, may now be seen as lying 
in the ability to show, reveal, or bring forth something other than 
itself. This is why Heidegger says that language speaks (Says) rather 
than mao. It is not man directly who can call forth the unsaid (though 
he is of course needed) but the power of language itself. This is 
evidenced in the everyday experience of when we are asked "Do you 
realize what you are saying?" and reflect upon all the consequences, 
shades of meaning, and implicit judgments that are entailed in what we 
just uttered. This ontic evidence indicates that ontologically the 
nature of language is to Say something, and that it is not our vocal 
cords, sentence structure, or any other human facet that is in complete 
control of this essential power of language. The power to Say belongs 
to language itself, and not exclusively to man. 
lon the Way to Language p. 93. 
2 Ibid. p. 123. 
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We must now examine how language brings forth things, i.e., Speaks. 
As we indicated, it does this by enabling the thing to stand in the 
light of Appropriation, i.e., by bringing it into the Open of the 
belonging together with man. The physicalist may stand before his 
class in a search for Being and ask "Does an animal the size of a 
skyscraper and able to fly faster than light have Being?" and expect 
an obvious "no" answer. But the correct answer is ''now it does, 
though, of course, not physically." Through language this imaginary 
creature has been called forth and placed within a world before us. 
Even \vithout being able to represent the thought of flying faster 
than light, the magical powers and strengths of this creature shine 
forth in their mysterious wonder. The significance of this power of 
naming will become clearer when we discuss poetry, but for now we 
have seen how language has granted Being to a thing by placing it in 
the light of Appropriation of which man is a part. 
This Saying granting of Being may be understood in the case above, 
but it seems more difficult to understand for objects which actually 
do have physical existence, for they certainly seem to Be prior to 
language. However, we must remember that prior to language things 
do not disappear into a sheer void, but neither are they "there" 
standing forth in their own, in their Being. "Where there is no 
language, as in the being of stone, plant, and animal, there is also 
no openness of what is, and consequently no openness either of that which 
1 is not and of the empty." 
lPoetry, Language, Thought p. 73. 
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Only when we have a name for a thing can it be called forth in its 
uniqueness, and thereby stand out in its Being. A whole world of 
a new discipline opens up as we learn its language, be it the language 
of a philosopher or a scientist, and without the language the things 
of that world remain closed to us. Without any language there would 
not be any world. Yet there is a circularity in which we must see 
that only in the opening of the world does the full significance of 
the ne\v language reveal itself. In this circular relation lies the 
Saying of language which by bringing together a world and a particular 
thing allows each to come into its o~~ and Be for the first time. 
In other words, the Saying of language brings a ,.,orld to stay in a 
thing, and only in this way can a thing Be a thing and a language 
Be a language. "In the naming, the things named are called into 
their thinging. Thinging, they unfold world, in which things abide 
and so are the abiding ones."1 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the bringing together of 
world in a thing is the gathering fourfold that grants a thing 
Being. Thus, the Saying of language which brings world and thing 
together must be the staying of the fourfold in a thing. 
1 
There arises the possibility of see-
ing how Saying, as the being of 
language, swings back into the 
presence of nearness. Quiet consider-
ation makes possible an insight into 
how nearness and Saying, being of 
the persisting nature of language 
are the Same. Language, then, is 
On the Way to Language p. 199. 
not a mere human faculty. Its 
character belongs to the very 
character of the movement of 
the f ace- to-face encounter of 
the world's four regions. 1 
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Language lets the fourfold ring together in unity by staying it in 
a thing, and lets a thing be a thing by letting a world (the fourfold) 
shine through it. The Saying of language does not create this bridge 
between thing and world by its own whim. Language, as it were, stands 
in the rift (dif-ference, Unter-schieden) between thing and world 
where they come together, and thereby lets their belonging together 
stand forth into the open; not mere ly as a gap, but for the first 
time as a mutual harmony tha t lets each one Be by virtue of its 
harmonizing with the other. "Language speaks. Its speaking bids 
the dif - ference to come which expropria tes world and things into the 
simple onefold of their intimacy." 2 
In other words, we can understa nd 'world' as a context or horizon 
and 'thing' as a theme, and language unites the two insofar as a 
word delineates a particular thing but arises out of the specific 
cultural context of the language we are speaking. \fhether it is a 
scientific ~1ord that gathers the scientific world into the thing, 
named, or a poetic word that gathers the fourfold world into the thing, 
in each case language lets two "things" which need each other (i.e, 
world and thing) come into their own through their belonging together. 
1 Ibid. p. 107. 
2 Ibid. p. 210. 
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When we deal with things in a thoughtful or poetic manner language 
gathers the fourfold into the thing, since a thoughtful or poetic 
language arises out of a world where the fourfold is still preserved. 
When we approach things in other ways, language is still an appropriating 
of thing and world, but instead of "world" explicitly referring to 
the four regions it more generally is seen as the context or field 
constituted by the discipline or way of approach. For example, 
naming a green leafy plant with a latin designation of genus and 
species gathers (appropriates) the plant with the world of the 
botanist. The plant can thereby first show its Being as a scientifi-
cally distinguished yet interrelated and placed form of vegetation 
with certain previously overlooked but now self evident characteristics 
(e.g., uses, best conditions for survival, reproductive capabilities, 
and its uniqueness from similar species). "Saying is the gathering 
that joins all appearance of the in itself manifold sho\>ling which 
everywhere lets all that is shown abide within itself."1 
Saying does not create the harmonizing unity of what is brought 
together, it merely lets this unity be manifest. It is Appropriation 
itself that first grants the belonging-together, and Saying moves 
this to its fruition. 
1 
The moving force in Showing of Saying 
is Owning. It is what brings all pres-
ent and absent beings each into their 
own, from where they show themselves 
in what they are, and where they abide 
according to their kind. This owning 
which brings them there, and which 
moves Saying as Showing in its showing 
Ibid. p. 127. 
we call Appropriation. It yields the 
opening of the clearing in which pres ·-
ent beings can persist and from which 
absent beings can depart while keeping 
their persistence in the withdrawal. .. 
That Appropriation, seen as it is shown 
by Saying, cannot be represented either 
as an occurrence or a happening -· it 
can only be experienced as the abiding 
gift yielded by Saying.l 
As Showing, Saying, which consists in 
Appropriation, is the most proper mode 
of Appropriating. Appropriation is by 
way of Saying.2 
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In short then, to Be means to presence or show itself in some way 
or another, including the presence of withdrawal. As we have seen 
earlier for a thing to appear it must be both unique and yet common 
with respect to its context. The way this happens is for a thing 
to come forth in its own individuality, but within the gathered pre-
sence of a world. It is the primordial Saying which allows the 
belonging together of thing and world granted by Appropriation to 
come forth and announce itself. Until there is, for example, a poetic 
language nothing poetic can come forth and Be. It withdraws into the 
haze of Nothingness where one might get a fleeting call from it, but 
until the Saying which gathers the thing into the poetic world is 
possible it cannot stand in the light of Being. 
So I renounced and sadly see: 3 Where word breaks off no thing may be. 
1 Ibid. p. 127. 
2Ibid. p. 131. 
3stefen George "The Word" Quoted and studied by Heidegger in 
many places in On the Way to Language. 
124 
But what of man in all this? We have seen the Being of languag e 
as the Saying which arises out of Appropriation. We have seen that 
man plays an important role in Appropriation's grant of Being. Now 
we must ask specifically how man's speech is related to Appropriation's 
Saying. 
As could be expected man's speaking is needed for the showing 
Saying of language, but man must be understood as a fulfiller and 
not as a creator or ground. 
For language, after all, remains unmis-
takably bound up with human speaking. 
Certainly. But what kind of bond is 
it? On what grounds and in what way 
is it binding? Language needs human 
speaking, and yet it is not merely of 
the making or at the command of our 
speech activity.! 
As Saying gathers thing and world and thereby lets the thing come forth 
in its Being, man's speech must preserve this Saying. As we saw, 
Being as presence and man as preserver arise in a mutual belonging 
together from Appropriation. Therefore, Saying as the presencing of 
appropriated thing and world, must also be the binding together of 
Being ("worlded thing") and man (the needed preserver of world and 
thing). Man is capable of speaking insofar as he belongs to the pri-
mordial Saying, i.e., insofar as he is Appropriated to Being. 
Saying that shows makes the way for 
language to reach human speaking. Say-
ing is in need of being voiced in the 
word. But man is capable of speaking 
only insofar as he, belonging to Saying 
listens to Saying, so that in resaying 
it he may be able to say a word.2 
lon the Hay to Language p. 125. 
2rbid. p. 134. 
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Thus man's language must be seen as a listening response to the 
primordial Saying of Appropriation, but one which is needed for the 
thing which is shown in the Saying to Be, and thus for Saying itself 
to Be. Already in Being and Time silence and listening were seen 
as essential parts of Discourse, and now we must reaffirm the essentia-
lity of these to human speaking. But to what do we listen? If 
Saying itself needs human language to be fulfilled we cannot demand 
a direct listening to it, it cannot be heard apart from our speaking. 
What we must therefore listen to is our own language. Not to the 
mere words but to a silent Saying of our language. Only then can 
we ask whether our speaking has satisfied the beckoning of silent 
Being. Perhaps Merleau-Ponty explains this best: 
Speech does not choose only one sign 
for one already defined signification, 
the way one searches for a hammer to 
drive in a nail or pincer to pull one 
out. It gropes around an intention to 
signify which has at its disposal no 
text to guide it, for it is just being 
written. And if we want to grasp speech 
in its most authentic operation in order 
to do it full justice, we must evoke all 
those words that could have come in its 
place that have been omitted ; to feel 
the different way they would have impinged 
on and rattled the chain of language, to 
know at what point this particular speech 
was the only one possible if this signifi-
cation was to come into the world ... In 
brief, we should consider speech before 
it has been pronounced, against the ground 
of the silence which precedes it, which 
never ceases to accompany it, and with-
out which it would say nothing.l 
1M. Herleau-Ponty Prose of the World trans. by John O'Neill 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern Press, 1973) p. 46. 
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In other words, it is only through some silent aspect of our own 
language that the silent primordial Saying, which beckons our speech, 
can be heard. After we listen to our speech we can ask whether it 
satisfies what was needed, and at times even recognize a lack in 
it, but apart from our own listening speaking there is nothing that 
we can hold up that allows us to merely reach into our aviary of 
words and find the corresponding one. It is therefore this silent 
aspect of our language that maintains the Saying of Appropriation, 
and we must examine it closer. 
Everything depends upon bringing into 
language the truth of Being and letting 
thought penetrate this language. Per-
haps then language requires far less 
precipitate utterance than correct 
silence. 1 
Every language presences (gathers) the world differently. 
Language speaks, but in a way unique to itself. This is most obvious 
when we consider the different things that poetic and scientific 
languages can Say, but, as every translator painfully encounters, 
there is even a difficulty in making two languages as close as Ger-
man and English (for example) Say the same thing. Every language 
has a history, both immediate in respect to current usages and over-
tones, and long range in terms of etymological developments and the 
spirit of the people who gave rise to and maintained the la~guage. 
These histories are one of the factors that influence the silent 
Saying of our language, and since the language we speak Speaks in 
1 
"Letter on Humanism" p. 167. 
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a way unique to itself, every word and sentence of that language must 
be viewed in a similar way. 
Projective s aying is saying which, in 
preparing the sayable, simultaneously 
brings the unsayable as such into a 
world. In such saying, the concepts of 
an historical people's nature, i.e., 
of its belonging to world historl, are 
formed for that folk, before it. 
A language establishes a world or context in which everything we 
say in that l anguage is ordered or "controlled;" yet we must, of 
course, understand that a language is not something prior to or 
independent of the words and sentences of that language. Thus our 
history (i.e., the history of our language) is somehow contained 
in everything we say, and what we say is therefore in the service 
of our language rather than lanbuage being in our service. 
An example of the way current usage a f fects the way a language 
speaks can be seen in the word ''freak" of the American counter cul-
ture. Originally "freak" designated an abnormal or deformed person. 
~~en a natural conservatism developed a fear and revulsion of any-
thing different or deformed, "freak" received a pejorative connotation. 
When the counter culture emerged with shocking hair styles and dress 
fashion they were called freaks by middle America, which naturally 
carried the pejorative sense of what they wanted to Say about this 
new phenomenon. Then a curious thing occurred ; the counter culture 
adopted the term themselves and used it to refer to their comrades. 
It no longer spoke negatively for those who were a part of the sub-
1 Poetry, Language, Thought p. 74. 
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culture. "A real freak" became an authentic person, one the marginal 
members of the culture admired and awed at. "Freaky" movies, songs, 
and experiences were all recommendations and not condemnations. The 
counter culture favored change and uniqueness, and thus it could 
1 
readily adopt the word as one of praise. In this transformation 
) 
of the word the language speaks differently} Says something else, 
and it is not at our control to use the word the way we want. The 
language itself speaks, and we must listen to what it Says before 
we can use language to say what we want. 
If we may talk here of playing games 
at all, it is not we who play with 
words, but the nature of language 
plays with us ... It is as though 
man had to make an effort to live 
properly with language.2 
Further, etymologica l connections to current uses of other 
words play an important role in what a language Says. For example, 
"astro-naut" is etymologically derived from "star--sailor" but because 
of the scientific usages of "astra" in such words as "astronomy," 
"astrophysics," "astrosphere," and even "astrology," the term "astra -
naut" Speaks in a much more scientific way than the more adventurous 
"star-sailor." Therefore, what man Says, 1. e. , gathers and discloses, 
when uttering "astronaut" has a specific Being that is granted by the 
silent speaking of our own language, and which can therefore only be 
fully revealed when we listen to how language speaks. 
lrt is interesting to note that this final transformation of the 
word ties it to the original etymology of the middle English "freking" 
which means whim or capricious conduct. 
2
"Letter on Humanism" p. 118. 
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The way in which the long range history of a language affects 
what it Says are harder for us to see since it has become so ingrained 
in the language. Yet it is important for us to see this in order 
to understand how human speech can only Speak by listening to the 
Saying of language. A prime example comes from Heidegger's work 
itself. We saw that one of the reasons he did not publish the com-
plete version of Being and Time was the difficulty of making a new 
approach to Being understandable in the language available to him, 
i.e., the language of traditional metaphysics. Only by returning 
to etymologies could he show what the language was trying to Say, 
and contrast that to what it actually was Saying through its meta-
physical history. The transformation of '"ha t a word Says from its 
original etymological source to its current sense reveals the his-
torical Being of a language, and the variations of the world it 
gathers and opens up. The significance of what a language Says can 
only be seen in contrast with the way it originally Spoke, as is 
clearly evidenced by the analysis of Logos, legein, and noein in 
contrast to Logic, speaking, and thinking as commonly conceived. 
The current language reflects its source and historical develop-
ment the same way as anything present contains its past; not necessarily 
as something it still specifically is, but as the context in which 
what it now is must be seen as arising out of. An ex-convict is not 
the same as someone who was never arrested, and the significance of 
Logos as rational is much clearer when we consider the historical 
development of that word. We cannot ignore the etymology just because 
the word no longe r speaks as its etymology intended, rather it is 
for this very reas on that we must consider it. 
There is no such thing as a natural 
language of a human nature occurring 
of itself, without n destir.y. All 
language is historical, even where 
man does not know history in the 
modern European sense.l 
In all these ways language speaks, and to understand this 
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means to experience the nature of language or Saying as the bringing 
forth of things in their Being. Every utterance we make can only 
result from the listening to the Being of things that our language 
allows to come forth. 
Speaking is of itself a listening. Speak-
ing is listening to the language which 
we speak. Thus, it is a listening not 
while but before we are speaking .... \\Te 
do not merely speak the language - we 
speak~ way of it .... Language speaks 
by Saying, this is, by showing, \\That 
it says Hells up from the formerly spoken 
and so far still unspoken Saying which 
pervades the design of language ... We 
accordingly listen to language in this 
way~ that we let it say its Saying to 
us. 
In short then we have seen that Saying, as the fulfillment of 
Appropriation, lies at the source of the relation of language and 
Being. First we saw Saying gathering world and thing in their 
tension and letting them come forth. Then we came to understand 
1 On the Way to Language p. 133. 
2 Ibid. p. 124. 
Saying as the essence of language to which man has somehow been 
granted access. Man belongs to the Saying, he is able to listen 
to it, and respond to it in a fulfilling utterance of his own. 
"This way-making (i.e., Appropriation) puts language (the essence 
of language) as language (Saying) into language (into the sounded 
1 
word)." In this way Saying has brought together man and things 
into the resulting light of Being. Things are because the Saying 
of language announces them in their gathered presence. 
Saying is in no way the linguistic 
expression added to the phenomena 
after they have appeared - rather, 
all radiant appearance and all fading 2 
away is grounded in the showing Saying. 
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Thus it is language that brings us to Appropriation, the source of 
Being as well as man. This is why Heidegger considers language 
the Being of man and the house of Being. In his Being man is Dasein, 
that is, he is ex-sistent, and this means belonging to Saying which 
gives him the gift of speaking. 
Appropriation, in beholding human 
nature, makes mortals appropriate 
for that which avows itself from 
everywhere to man in Saying, which 
points toward the concealed. Man's 
the listener's, being made appropriate 
for Saying, has this distinguishing 
character, that it releases human 
nature into its own, but only in 
order that man as he who speaks, 
that is, he who says, may encounter 
and answer Sayin~, in virtue of what 
is his property. 
libid. p. 130. 
2 Ibid. p. 126. 
3 Ibid. p. 129. 
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This relation of man's speaking to the primordial Saying is 
one that must now be elaborated. We have seen that man's speaking 
first requires a listening and then a response. Human speech must 
arise out of the primordial Saying and let it speak. Since the 
primordial Saying has not yet reached voice it is silent, and we 
must clarify how the voiced speaking can be true to the silent call. 
The encountering saying of mortals is 
answering. Every spoken \-lord is al-
ready an answer: counter-saying, coming 
to the encounter, listening Saying. 
When mortals are made appropriate 
for Saying, human nature is released 
into that needfulnes s out of which 
man is used for bringing soundless 
Saying to the sound of language.! 
What is the nature of human speaking that it is needed for the ful-
fillment of Saying as Showing, yet is meant to maintain the Saying 
in itself? 
As has been indicated, we must view our speech as more than 
just a sounding utterance. "What is spoken is never, and in no 
language, what is said." 2 Nor can it be viewed merely as a sounding 
utterance and a silent sense coupled together. The voiced sounding 
must in itself be determined by, and thus be a unity with, the silent 
aspects. "\fuat is sayable recei:ves its determination from what is 
3 
not sayable." In other words, only by virtue of the unsaid can the 
said say what it says, and we therefore cannot consider them as two 
distinct components. In addition to the history of a language that 
lrbid. p. 129. 
2Poetry, Language, Thought p. 11. 
3The End of Philosophy p. 78. 
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we discussed above, such thi~s as context nnd the Being of the 
speaker affect the silence of our speech, and certainly these considera-
tions cannot be seen as disjointed additions to what is said. 
In "A Dialogue on Language" Heidegger tries to make this relation 
clear by calling the word a hint, which he distinguishes from a 
mere sign. A sign points to so~ething other than itself, or repre-
sents that other by itself. Viewing language as a sign leads us 
back to the expression theory of language in which we think of the 
said and unsaid as t\vo rather than one. A hint, on the other hand, 
is compared to a gesture, of which Heidegger says: 
J:Thus you call hearing or gesture: 
the gathering which originarily unites 
within itself what we bear to it and 
what it bears to us. 
!:However, \vith this formulation we 
still run the risk tha t we understand 
the ga thering as a subsequent union .. 
J: ... instead of experiencing th at 
all bearing, in giving and encounter, 
springs filst and only from the 
gathering. 
Perhaps this difficult point can be made clearer by an analogy. 
The grandeur and excitement of an iceberg results from the fact that 
despite how big it is on top, we know that most of it remains unseen. 
Yet we can see its immensity in the visible part above the surface. 
Despite the fact that the major portion is not visible because it 
is below the surface, once we learn to understand icebergs, we can 
see the unseen portion overwhelmingly present (as an absence) in 
1 On the Way to Language p. 19. 
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the visible section. In fact, the foreboding grandeur of the iceberg 
is a result of the very fact tha t most of it is present as an absenc e . 
If the whole thing were above the surface it would certainly appear 
huge, but the fearful awesomeness that results from the mystery of 
its being mostly hidden would not be the same. Thus the experience 
of the full grandeur, fascination, and excitement (as well as the 
danger of deceiving us) can only be understood if we recognize that 
the invisible part is i_mm_ediately present in the small section above 
the surface. 
In the same way a word has the power it does because of a ringing 
silence sounded in the voiced word. "Only as man belongs within the 
peal of stillness are mortals able to speak in their own way in 
1 
sounds. " Thus, human speaking must be seen as arising out of the 
silent primordial gathering Saying , and yet is need ed for this 
Saying to show itself, just as the hidden part of an iceberg needs 
the top to make its hidden awesomeness visible. The only way this 
relation can occur is if human language continues to let the still 
depths of the thing's gathered Being resound through the word. 
When we understand our language in this way we see that words 
are not isolated things which somehow cause things to Be. Words 
and the Being of things are not really separate, they both arise out 
of Saying, and are only maintained as long as they join together as 
Saying. The thing first rings forth in Being through the gathering 
1 Ibid. p. 208. 
Saying that lets ii presence as a thing, and the human word as a 
listening r e sponse to this Saying maintains the Saying and there-
by maintains the Being of the thing as thing. 
Language has been called "the house 
of Being." It is the keeper of being 
present, in that its coming to light 
remains entrusted to the appropriat-
ing show of Saying. Language is the 
house of Being because language, as 
Saying, is the mode of Appropriation.! 
We have now presented an ontological account of the Being of 
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language as the Saying which grants both Being and man (as ex-sisting). 
We saw that an authentic speaking of man must also contain the silent 
reverberation of a list ening . It is clear that for the most part 
our language is not, and cannot be, this language of Being. \fhen 
concerned with information and calculation we are concerned with 
getting everything as explicitly de lineated as possible. Further, 
through constant use our language necessarily becomes matter of fact, 
we take it for granted, and it can no longer speak tm.;ards-and - from 
Being. 2 However, when concerned with things in a thoughtful way, 
when we are concerned with things in their Being, then we have to 
avoid information language and "used up" expressions. In short, we 
1
"The Way to Language" p. 135. 
2rhis is not to deny that our everyday language has its own 
silent history that gathers its own world and is thus still tied to 
Being, but it remains oblivious to the world it gathers and is 
characterized in its Being as a forgetfulness of Being. 
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have to be what Heidegger calls poetical. This does not mean that 
all thinking must be reduced to poetry, but it does mean that all 
thinking must proceed within the poetical. "Poetry and thinking 
meet each other in one and the same only when, and only as long 
1 
as, they remain distinctly in the distinctness of their nature." 
To understand this, and thereby further elucidate the Being of 
language, we now seek out an understanding of the relation of 
poetry, language, and thinking. 
By poetry Heidegger does not mean rhyming cuplet or any other 
categorization by verse structure , but rather a specific mode of 
language. We can understand the different modes of language as a 
scale ranging from formal logic at one end to poetry at the other. 
While logic is precise and accurate, the poetic is rich yet vague, 
and therefore not suited for certain areas of information trans-
ference. But what is the nature of poetic language, and for what 
is it suited? The answer is of course for thinking Being, and this 
is what we must now explore. 
"Poetry's spoken words shelter the poetic statement as that 
which by its essential nature remains unspoken." 2 In this way 
poetry characterizes authentic language in that its speaking is 
what it is by virtue of guarding the unspoken. Only insofar as the 
unspoken remains unspoken, yet is listened to as such, can the speaking 
~oetry, Langua ge, Thought p. 218. 
2 On the Way to Language p. 188. 
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of poetry take place. However, thinking too must t ake place with 
authentic language , and in order not to reduce thinking to poetry 
we must, as lleidegger indicated in the quote above, find their 
sameness (authentic language) in their differences. 
But since like is only like insofar 
as difference allows, and since po etry 
and thinking are most purely alike in 
their care of the word, the two things 
are at the same time at opposite poles 
in their essence. The thinker utters 
Being. The poet names the holy.l 
The poet names the holy. But what is the holy? "The element 
of this ether, that within which even the godhead itself is still 
present, is the holy." 2 Thus in naming the holy the poet calls forth 
what was previously sho\m to be one of the fourfold - the gods or 
divinities. But, in the naming the gods themselves must r emain 
unspoken, for they are brought to us in their absence. " •.• the 
god who remains unknovm, must by showing hims elf as the one he is, 
3 
appear as the one who remains unknown." Thus the poet's task is 
not to give us any answers, but merely to bring us into the presence 
of the mystery of the unknowable. The poet calls forth the silent 
mysteries that are gathered in all Being, and lets them stand, but 
stand as a beyond that \ve can never fully know. This is why Heidegger 
says poets stand between men and the gods, and what is ordinarily 
referred to as poetic wonder. 
1 
"What is Hetaphysics" p. 360. 
2Poetry, Language, Thought p. 94. 
3 Ibid. p. 223. 
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But insofar as the gods are brought to stand as unknowable, man 
is able to dwell in his proper place. \fuen we experience a poem 
with the awe filled attentiveness that good poetry calls for, we 
get a glimpse of the silent mysteries. We experience how foreign 
and delicate a thing that which the poet is trying to Say really is. 
We hear the words and they propel us over an abyss that our cogni-
tive faculties cannot fully grasp, that even the poet's words cannot 
completely contain. In naming the holy (the gods, the abyss) the 
poet brings to the fore a realm that was totally ignored simply 
because it could not be conceptualized. In this way as the divinities 
are held before us, we simultaneously bring ourselves forth in our 
finitude. We see ourselves dwelling as mortals, before divinities, 
on earth, and under the sky. 
The poet himself stands between the 
former-the gods, and the latter-the 
people. He is one who has been cast 
out- out into that Bet\.reen, between 
gods and men. But only and for the 
first time in this Be t ween is it 
decided who man is and where he is 
settling his existence. "Poetically, 
dwells man on this earth."l 
Poetry is a primordial naming, it lets the gods be present 
(in their absence) in words. To turn the gods into knowable and 
explainable entities is the tendency of popularized religion, to 
ignore the gods is the tendency of scientific thinking. Both over-
estimate man's place- the former claiming we can know the infinite, 
and the latter saying that what we cannot know can have no place. 
Only when the gods are named in their mystery by the poets can 
language become language, i.e., a Saying which says what it does 
1
"Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry" in Existence and Being , p. 288. 
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because what is unsaid resides in the said ; and only then can man's 
Being d\vell in its place. "Hence poetry never takes language as 
a raw material ready to hand, rather it is poetry which first makes 
1 language possible." Thus poetry do es not use authentic language 
but makes it authentic in its responding to the gods. 
In the naming of the gods poetry is true to the understanding 
of language we reached earlier as the bringing of things to Being . 
However, that which poetry is concerned with is our place before 
the holy, a necessary step towards thinking Being, but not 
equivalent. Thinking, like poetry, always proceeds with l anguage, 
and while poetry now is clear as the naming of the holy, we must 
see how thinking utters Being. 
Thinking 's saying would be stilled in 
its being only by becoming unab le to 
say that which must remain uns poken. 
Such inability would bring thinking face 
to face with its matter. 
What is spoken is never, and in no 
language, what is said.2 
This quote reiterates what Heidegger said in the quote above 
from "lfuat is Metaphysics?": "poetry and thinking are most purely 
alike in their care of the word." Both poetry and thinking must 
let language speak towards-and-from the unsayable silence. But in 
1 Ibid. p. 283. 
2Poetry, Language, Thought p. 11 
what ways are their concerns different? Heidegger is never clear 
on this issue, but we can take as a clue something he said in 
"Remembrance of the Poet": 
The vocation of the poet is homecoming 
by which the homeland is first made 
ready as the land of proximity to 
the source.! 
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As we saw above, the poet allows man to dwell in his place by 
giving him a language that allows the gods to be present. This allowing 
of man to dwell in his proper place is the homecoming. But this is 
only the preparation, for now that man dwells and has a language 
that allows the quiet stillness to ring through its words, he can 
begin to think, i.e., to explore himself and his world in the full-
ness of their Being. 2 "And only when man speaks, does he think." 
And it is poetry that lets man's words speak. 
Only insofar as we dwell or belong can we explore the nature of 
things (in~luding ourselves) in their Being, and not merely in a 
subjective re--presentation. Poetry gives us dwelling, thinking is 
the exploring. Poetry is the language that first brings things into 
Being, thinking is the preserving elaboration of the Being of these 
things. As J. Glenn Gray describes thinking in the introduction 
to lfuat is Called Thinking: 
Thinking is not so much an act as a 
way of living or dwelling •.• It is 
!"Remembrance of the Poet" in Existence and Being_ p. 266. 
2What is Called Thinking p. 16. 
a remembering who we are as human 
beings and where we belong. It is 
a gathering and focusing of our whole 
selves on what lies before us and a 
taking to heart and mind these 
particular things before us in order 
to discover in them their essential 
nature and truth.l 
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In naming the holy poetry gives us a language that lets us speak 
of things in their Being, and that means it first lets thinking utter 
Being. It is not that thinking must wait for poetry to give it 
specific words with specific meanings, rather, thinking is dependent 
on poetry to make the nature of language rich and powerful, to re-
verberate with the still depths of the unsaid. Though both poetry 
and thinking stem from the primordial call of Appropriation (Saying), 
and thus good poetry must be thoughtful and true thinking must be 
poetical, their tasks are different. Poetry gives mortals their 
place and language; thinking proceeds with this language to explore 
Being, i.e. , the place of himself and the things he encounters. 
Without poetry a language becomes flat and sterile, and thinking can 
be nothing more than information. Thus, we see poetry is to thinking 
as language is to Being. Neither half of the analogy is a relation 
of equivalency, but they need each other and spring from a common 
source - the gathering Saying of Appropriation. Neither side is pri-
mary, for though poetry gives thinking the language it needs and 
language lets things Be, poetry must start as a thoughtful listening 
to the holy, and language does not create by fiat, but rather is a 
lwhat is Called Thinking p. xi. 
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responding to the primordial gatherdness of Being. In short, "The 
being of language: the language of Being." 1 
Everything depends upon bringing into 
language the truth of Being and letting 
thought penetrate this language. Perhaps 
then language requires far less precipitate 
utterance than correct silence. Yet who 
amongst us today would like to imagine 
that his attempts at thought were at home 
on the path of silence?2 
As a tourist can never understand the Being of a foreign land 
as long as he merely observes from the outside, a thinker can never 
achieve his goal until he dwells and learns to hear the silent 
world that is gathered in mal~ing the manifest manifest. Perhaps an 
example can show how a thinking which pays heed to the silence of 
language proceeds as opposed to other approaches. We choose the 
topic of friendship, more or less at random, but also because it 
is an important phenomenon to all of us and one that Aristotle 
thought worthy of two books of his ethics yet has since been ignored 
as an area worthy of philosophy. We as thinkers ask for the Being 
of friendship. Aristotle in his scientific style, describes 
different types of friendship, situations conclusive to it, important 
characteristics of it, and a guide of proper behavior between friends. 
As interesting as many of the points he makes are, they tend to be a 
l"The Nature of Language" p. 94. 
2"Letter on Humanism" p. 167. 
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list of facts that may describe certain properties of friendship, but 
fail to capture the significance and life of that which he himself 
indicates is the most important good there is. 
This approach of Aristotle is carried out today in various 
scientific studies. 1 There are anthropological approaches which study 
friendship patterns among a variety of cultures (including animals) 
and attempt to find biological, psychological, and social causes 
of friendship. 2 There are also psychological approaches which study 
the causes of friendships by isolating variables of a test group of 
people some of whom become friends and some who do not. In these 
studies we again gain possibly interesting and useful information 
about friendship, but over and above the assumed understanding we 
must have had in the beginning in order to study its causes, condi-
tions, and behavioral manifestations, we gain little or no insight 
into what friendship is. 
An alternative to these studies is to turn to art, and view hmv 
friendship has been portrayed in books, poems, and paintings. As 
Samuel }fcChord Crothers says in his introduction to The Book of Friendship: 
1 See for example: Elliot Leyton editor, The Compact, Selected 
Dimensions of Friendship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974). 
2 See for example: 
Personal Constructs. A 
Wiley & Sons, 1973). 
Steven W. Duck Personal Relationships and 
Study of Friendship Formation (London: John 
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"No abstract or philosophical description can satisfy us in regard 
to an intimate personal experience Yhich ye all have f elt."1 Through 
these art forms the beauty, intensity, and struggles of friendship 
are brought before us, and in this Yay we are brought to dwell be-
fore the divine bonds of friendship. It is here that thinking of 
the Being of friendship can begin. To help our thinking Ye may turn 
to famous quotes and aphorisms about friendship, not to collect more 
information and facts, but to silently reflect and meditate on the 
richness of these sayings and how they light up with greater and 
greater clarity the dimensions of friendship ~•hich ye noY hold before 
us. By listening to our own statements and thoughts, as well as 
2 / those of others, their truth and richness grows - even cliches can 
sometimes regain their original strength of insight. 
No one statement serves as a definitive formularization of the 
essence of friendship, but they all h e l p ho l d it b ef ore us in the 
richness of its actual Being. We do not yant to cover up friendship 
itself with Yards, theories, causes, and explanations; we Yant it to 
revea l itself. Though Ye can not here attempt a full philosophy of 
fri endship it may help to suggest a fourfold: the divinities are the 
godlike bonds of friendship which are invisible yet can be stronger 
lsamuel McChord Crothers editor The Book of Friends hip (Freeport, 
N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1910) p. 5. 
2or of cours e the opposite can hap pen, the sta t ement r eveals it-
self more and more as shal low or mi s directed. But this can only hap pen 
i n so fa r as t he truth of friendship sh i nes cleare r in t he light, and 
t hus by a r eve rse me thod r eflection on the statement still brough t 
out t he Being of Friendsh i p. 
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than any physical test of them. "Two friends, two bodies with one 
soul inspired." 1 (Homer, The Illiad Bk xvi ). Mortal is the reality 
of the hardships, questions, and limitations of true friendship. 
"0 my friends, there is no friend." (Chilo). Sky is the ethereal 
beauty of a good friend - the loneliness of when you are apart or 
the pleasure in sharing a treasured moment. "In love one has need 
of being believed, in friendship of being understood." (Abel Bannard 
The Art of Friendship). Earth is the arm around arm comradeship of 
an adventure together. "All for one and one for all!" (Dumas, The 
Three Muskateers). However, if these four are approached merely as 
a list, a combination of properties, they will not bring to light 
the Being of friendship. Only if we listen to the silence of the 
unity of their interplay, letting that to which and from which they 
speak reveal itself, are we properly unde~·ay to thinking. 
But there would be, and there is, 
the sole necessity, by thinking our 
way soberly into what (his) poetry 
says, to come to learn what is un 
spoken. That is the course of the 
history of Being,2 
The thought of Being guards the Word and 
fulfills its function in such guardian-
ship, namely care for the use of language. 
Out of long guarded speechlessness and 
the careful clarification of the field 
thus cleared~ comes the utterance of 
the thinker. 
1 All of the quotations used in connection with this discussion of 
the fourfold are from The Home Book of Quotations edited by Burton 
Stevenson (N.Y.: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1964). 
2Poetry, Language, Thought p. 96. 
3"What is Metaphysics?" p. 360. 
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V. Conclusion. Being , Languaee and Philos ophy 
At this point we have come to an end of the examination of 
Heidegger's published work on Being and language. By unravelling 
the key concepts we have attempted to show the important place the 
thinking of language has in Heidegger's quest for the meaning of 
Being. We must now recapitulate what we have accomplished, and 
then raise the question of where it has left us and where we are 
to go from here. 
Though not an explicit task of this work one of its major 
si.gnificances was to show a continuous development from Being and 
Time to the late works. An easy attack on Heidegger could have been 
made by juxtaposing apparent subjectivist or idealist statements 
against objective or realist ones, and thereby rejecting Heidegger 
as a confused and contradictory thinker. For example, comparing 
the claim in Introduction to Metaphysics that "It is in words and 
language that things first come into being and are." (p. 11) and 
the one in On the Way to Langua ge that states "But man is capable 
of speaking only insofar as he, belonging to Saying, listens to Saying, 
so that in resaying it he may be able to say a word," (p. 134) we 
might find an excuse either to reject Heidegger completely, or at 
least to consider him to have made a complete reversal regarding 
the relation of words and Being. 
However, it is necessary to see these two statements not as 
contradictions, nor even as two opposing directions on the same issue, 
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but rather as a developed saying of one and the same thing. If we 
fail to do this, we continue to view Ileidegger within the context 
of subjectivity and objectivity, the very categories of Being that 
his life's work was intended to overcome. A critique of Heidegger 
based on subjectivist and objectivi st interpretations of various 
quotes immediately places the issues in polar tension rather than 
letting them speak together on their own terms. To ask for a 
solution to dualism,yet insist on dualistic structures of every 
approach to Being, will leave philosophy entangled in its own net. 
To evaluate Heidegger we must first understand '"hat he says, and to 
do this we must learn his language and meaning, and not persist in 
translating it into a form he rejects. 
For this reason the first chapter of this work started with 
an interpretation of Dasein that attempts to show Being and Time 
as raising the question of Being from the meeting point of man and 
the world, and not from the idealistic standpoint of man qua 
immanence. In line with this, the discussion of Discourse, as an 
existentiale of Dasein, was primordially concerned with it as the 
announcement of Being, and not as expression, statement or communication. 
Unfortunately, at this stage of his career Heidegger considered 
Understanding and its corresponding temporal dimension of the future 
to be primordial ("The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic 
1 temporality is the future.") and, he therefore explored Discourse 
1 B~ing and Time p. 378. 
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as the announcement of the silent structures of Under s t anding ("Both 
discoursing and hearing are based upon Understanding .'')! 'His conc ern 
with language as an announcement of Being was of course never aban-
doned, but as his understanding of the meaning of Being developed, 
he realiz ed that the grounding of meaning (the silent source of 
Discourse) strictly in Understanding and the future was short-sighted. 
He even recogni ze s this at various points in Being and Time : 
When the "there" ha s been comple t ely 
disclosed, its disclosedness is con-
stituted by understanding , state··of-
mind, and falling; and this disclosed-
ness becomes articulated by discourse. 
Thus discourse does not t emporalize 
itself primarily in any definite 
ecstasis. 2 
This is the direction the rest of Heidegger's \.7orks moved in, 
and the next stage of his development led him to a study of the 
meaning of Being through the source of Western thinking. By exploring 
logos as a gathering-which-lets-presence, his path towards Being is 
disclosed, and the significance of language to this path is also 
indica ted. Being of things is understood as original presencing, and 
the Being of language as the primordial synthesis which first enables 
things to come forth and Be. The crucial belonging together of 
language and Being is thereby exposed by their common root in one 
of the most crucial words of Western philosophy. 
1 Being and Time p. 208. 
2 Ibid. p. 400. 
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The meaning of the belonging together of Being and language lies 
in the gathering, but ~his relation cannot be fully seen until we 
advance our understanding of both Being and language beyond their 
initial roots in Jogos. Thus, our third section attempted to ex-
plore the meaning of Being, and our fourth the meaning of language. 
We traced Being through the various 'vays entities may be present, 
to that which enables anything to be present, i.e., Appropriation. 
He smv Appropriation as that primordial mystery that is prior to 
Being itself, insofar as it grants the belonging together that is 
needed for things to Be. Since a theme needs an horizon and an 
horizon needs a theme, their belonging together must be prior to 
either one, and in the same way the granting of the belonging to-
gether of thing and world, Being and time, and Being and man cannot 
arise out of one or the other 'component'. Appropriation is nothing 
specific in itself, but insofar as whatever is arises out of its 
primordial gift of Nearness and Neighborhood, whatever can be re-
vealed about anything comes from, and thus must point to, Appropria-
tion itself. It is in this context that Heidegger considers thinking 
a thanking1 - when thinking of things in the fullness of their Being 
we pay hommage to that which makes things and their availability to 
us possible. In not losing sight of Appropriation by being overly 
concerned with facts and uses of things we preserve it and thereby 
pay it its due. 
1 See \fuat is Called Thinking part II lecture III. 
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Finally, we saw in the fourth section that it is through a 
careful r e lation to language tha t Appropriation is acknowledged, 
for when we pay thoughtful heed to the silence of our language we 
are fulfilling the silent Saying of Appropriation that first grants 
things their Being. ''Accordingly, what preva ils in and bears up 
1 the relation of human nature to the two- fold is language." This 
is the meaning of the phrase "language is the house of Being," and 
why language becomes an intricate part in Heidegger's quest for 
the meaning of Being. Only through man's ability to fulfill the 
gathering·-showing of Saying can entities stand forth in the light 
of Being. 
However, as the Being of language is revealed as the Saying 
which gathers thing and world and the reby lets things come forth 
in their Being, \•e must ask why Heidegger considered spoken language 
(and its alterna tive of s i l ence) as the primary mode. One of the 
limitations of most approaches to language is that they look for the 
essence of language in \-That is unique to spoken language (e.g., sem-
antic and syntactic structure) and thereby treat it in a way that 
overlooks its primary philosophical Being as an opening of (to) the 
world. They treat language as an isolated thing whose unique essence 
can be found by the traditional metaphysical analysis of form 
(structural analysis) and matter (phonology and morphology). However 
1
on the Way to Language p. 30. The two- fold refers to the unified 
difference of things and Being, i.e., things in their Being. 
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useful these studies can be they typically start from a recognition 
that in its Being our speech is just one of many ways that we are 
open to the world. Understanding our spoken language's unique 
essence is an important project, but its commonness within the 
context of Being as a whole must also be considered. 
Heidegger's thinking apparently falls into a parallel trap. 
Though he examines the Being of language in the context of Being 
as a whole, he then unjustifiably assumes that only our spoken 
language has this Being, and thereby erroneously acknowledges 
linguistic analysis as the primary study of the opening of the world 
(Saying). In discussing various modes of art, wh i ch have similar 
modes of Being to language, he states: "Allar~, as the letting 
happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentiallY-
poetry."! In itself this claim is not threatening because we could 
interpret it as expanding the notion of poetry to its Being as an 
opening of the world, rather than reducing art to our presently 
narrower conception of poetry. However, this attempted interpretation 
fails to be maintained for Heidegger goes on to say: 
1 
Language itself is poetry in the essent-
ial sense. But since language is the 
happening in which for man beings first 
disclose themselves to him each time as 
beings, poesy - or poetry in the narrower 
sense - is the most original (ursprUnglichste) 
form of poetry in the essential sense .... 
Poetry, Language, Thought p. 72. 
Building and plastic creation, on the 
other l1and, always happen already, and 
happen only, in the Open of saying and 
naming .... They are an ever special 
poetizing within the clearing of what 
is, which has alreadl happened un-
noticed in language. 
What is troublesome is not the claim that spoken language 
(poesy) must temporally come before any other art form, this very 
well may be true, but that all other art forms lie within the do-
main of its Saying. In this way language seems to be defined by 
its traditional ontic conception rather than the ontological 
examination of Saying. Music, painting, dance, and all the other 
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arts Say something that emerges within the world of the speaking of 
their own languages, and not within that of poesy and the spoken 
word. We have seen that the spoken word is not a representation of 
a pregiven, and thus there is no ground on which to claim that its 
language has a special priority in the emergence of Being. Every 
art form ga t ; ers and opens Being in a way unique to itself, and to 
limit Being beforehand to the world of spoken language is not to 
let the other art forms Speak, but (to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty) to 
2 
verbalize in paint or music. 
When learning a foreign language we initially translate what 
we learn into our native tongue, and even describe the new language 
(both syntactally and semantically) in the one we are more familiar 
lrbid. p. 74. 
2
rn discussing the English ''the man I love" and the French "1' homme 
que j'aime" Merleau-Ponty states: "Thus we must disabuse ourselves of 
the habit of understanding the relative pronoun in English. That is 
speaking French in English, it is not speaking English." Prose of the 
World p. 29. 
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with. But eventually we hope to reach a place where the inability 
to discuss something of our now second language in terms of our 
first is no longer a sign of non-understanding, but rather one of 
true understanding. In the same way as we learn to listen to the 
language of various art forms we resort to spoken language for 
explanations, but eventually we must make a leap to let the art 
form Speak (i.e., gather and announce) on its own terms. This is 
not to say that words will no longer have any place in the realms 
of the other art forms, but the words must enter into a true dia-
logue with the piece and, further, be in constant service to the 
speaking of the piece and not an explicit alternative to it. In 
short, words can tell us how to look or listen, but not what we 
see or hear. Only the art work itself can do that, and words can 
at best lead us to this non-verbal presencing. 
Thus one of the first tasks left open to philosophy is an 
examination of similarities and differences of the various ways in 
which Being is opened. This was the attempt of Sartre ' c What is 
Literature and Merleau Ponty's "Indirect Language and the Voices of 
Silence," but much more work is needed in this line. If it is to 
do this philosophy will of course have to proceed with words, but 
its speaking can never replace the other art forms, but simply give 
us access to them and thus a broadened openness to Being. Spatiality, 
colors, textures, tones, harmony, etc. all gather a world and there-
by open Being in ways we must learn to preserve. As our spoken 
language can decay into idle chatter, it seems probable that the 
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other art forms can do the same. Though it would be up to the 
artist to rejuvenate their medium, philosophy can help by showing 
what certain epochs of art can and cannot Say. In discussing the 
relation of poetry and thinking Heidegger says that we must learn 
how to have these two enter into a dialogue with each other. When 
we recognize that all art forms are in their Being an opening of 
1 Being, we see that from the ontological definition of language 
as a gathering-opening Saying, all art forms can be called languages. 
This of course is not to say that all art forms are expressive or 
representational, for that is not the fundamental Being of 
langua ge. Nor is it to say that all art forms are reducable to a 
common form, since they are alike only in that they are all 
openings to and from Being - as we saw this means that they all 
gather a world and thing in their belonging together, but each art 
form silently speaks from and gathers a different world. In short, 
we see that all art forms (including poeisis) "dv.rell near to one 
another on mountains farthest apart," and thus one of the great 
tasks Heidegger has left us with is an examination of the unique 
Being of each. 
If Heidegger has left us with these questions we must ask what 
he has given us that will aid us in this and other directions of 
philosophy. The first thing we must conclude is that his final 
achievement of the thinking of Being qua Being will not serve any 
1 See section on the Being of a work of art in chapter III. 
use in the development of philosophy. Heidegge r hims elf accepts 
this for he distinguis hes his thinking of Being from philosophy, 
and goes on to say tha t as king f or a use of the thinking of Being 
is to miss its point. To clarify this we must remember that the 
thinking of Be ing has two dimensions: the thinking of entities 
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in their Being and the thinking of that which makes this possible, 
i.e., the beholding of Appropria tion. This latter, however, when 
considered in and by itself is simply a meditation on the un-
changing, unknowabl e , unexplainable giver of Being and our ability 
to think Being. There is no doubt that this granting of the 
belonging together of man and world is a primordia l occurrence 
that is awe inspiring and powerful. We should not ignore the 
non- productive value of meditation on Appro pria tion , but unless we 
think Appro pria tion in its sp eci f ic forms of the belonging to gether 
of entitie s in their Being , we achieve some th i ng closed upon it-
self. In the quest to understand ourselves and our world the be-
holding of Appropriation is too broad to give us anything but the 
horizon in which all our answers must rest. Appropriation is the 
horizon which l e ts us ask questions and give answers, but in it-
self giv es no answers to our never ending explora tions. Tha t is not 
a fault of the thinking of Appropria tion, merely its limita tion. 
Thus, though the value of beholding Appropria tion should never be 
underestimated, unless we are foolishly content with just that, we 
must look for help from Heid eg ger elsewhere than this final achieve-
ment. 
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This does not mean that Appropriation has no place in our exploring 
thinking, but it must be approached as the appropriated Being of 
entities and not as the abstract Absolute which is "thought H'ith-
1 
out rega rd to beings." In fact, perhaps the most i mp ortant notion 
Heidegger has given us is the belonging together of man and Being. 
As an outgrowth of Husserl's intentionality and the life- world in 
his later works, Heidegger developed the concept of Being-in-the-
world that finally led him to Appropriation. The consequences of 
this exposed interrelation affects the theoretica l foundations of 
every discipline . Once we know that in each case the Being of 
the examiner is always an intricate part of that which is disclosed, 
every discipline must examine itself in order to understand its 
subject matter fully. Connected with this is the his torical dimen-
sions of Being, and the r esul ting problems of hermeneutics tha t is 
beginning to influence a large variety of disciplines. Further, 
heightened by his devastating critique of a correspondence not i on 
of truth (which we did not discuss in this work) and r eplacing it 
with an underst anding of truth as disclosure, the growth of per-
spectival approaches to a subject matter has gained respect; 
perspectives are not just subjective limitations but the truth of 
Being itself. Finally, Husserl's characteriza tion of phenomenology 
in the proclamation "to the things themselves!" is carried out in 
~he End of Philosophy p. xiii. 
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Heidegger's meditative thinking. As we saw, Heidegger opposes his 
thinking to a subjective will dominated thinking that forces the 
things into predetermined categories. Thus Heidegger's methodo-
logical call is "let things be," and by bringing us along the path 
of his thinking he has clarified and developed the basic meth-
odological tenet of phenomenology. 
In all these ways Heidegger has made important contributions 
to the general intellectual endeavor. But given the concerns 
of this work, the most important developments Heidegger has made 
lie in his work on language. Ontologically revealed as the house 
of Being language is forever at \vork in whatever we do. Thus 
the work Heidegger has done on how our language speaks, and the 
consequences of our language on what we can Say, are of critical 
importance to everything we do. The revelation of the intricate 
belonging together of silence and the voiced, and the decay of 
the silence in a fallen language, first teaches us what we are 
Saying in everything we say. When we learn this we recognize that 
language speaks, and thus we learn that only by listening can we 
speak. Thus in any endeavor of communication or statement our rela-
tion to language is of extreme importance, and Heidegger has given 
us the first adequate examination of this relation. 
Though some of these issues are beginning to have an input in 
various areas, Heidegger's greatest effect is still in philosophy. 
The hermeneutic work of Ricoeur and Gadamer, and all the work spun 
off from these figures, finds its source in Heidegger. Perhaps 
most significant is the connection of Merleau- Ponty's work on 
language, and all the issues that arise out of it, to Heidegger's 
work. Already in Phenomenology of Perception Merlea~Ponty had 
a chapter on language, and throughout his career the thinking of 
language played an important role. His reflections on language 
centered around two of the same issues that Heidegger found 
important: the role of the silent (or invisible) in all language 
1 (" •.. language lives only from silence.") and the connected point 
that thought can only come to fruition in language and thus 
language cannot be viewed as the translation or re-presentation 
of a ready made thought ("thus speech, in the speaker, does not 
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translate ready- made thought, but accomplishes it.") 2 In examining 
these points Merleau- Ponty expands the phenomenology of language 
in important ways, but h is prime concern is showing the significance 
of the analysis of language in psychology and social philosophy. 
Language certainly has an inner content, 
but this is not self-subsistent 
and self conscious thought. vfuat then 
does language express, if it does not 
e.xpress thoughts? It presents or rather 
it is the subject's taking up of a po-
sition in the world of his meanings. 
The term 'world' here is not a manner 
of speaking: it means that the 'mental' 
or cultural life borrows its structures 
from natural life and that the thinking 
subject must have its basis in the subject 
incarnate.3 
lMerleau- Ponty Visible and the Invisible trans. by Alphonso Lingis 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968) p. 126. 
2Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception trans. by Colin Smith 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) p. 178. 
3rbid. p. 193. 
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We therefore see that Heidegger's work has paved the way for 
many areas of study. An examination of language was necessary to 
reach a thinking of Being. The thinking of Being results in a re-
juvenation of language into its original power, which at the same 
time rekindles our ability to think and not merely juggle the 
world around in worn out categories. 
But the emptiness of the \>Jord ' 'being," 
the total disappearance of its appella-
tive force, is not mer ely a particular 
instance of the general exhaustion of 
language; rather, the destroyed rela-
tion to being as such is the actual 
reason for the genernl misrelation 
to language.l 
Thus Heidegger is right when he says that while it is true that we 
cannot do anything with the thinking of Being qua Being, we should 
not consider the project valueless, because th e thinking of Being 
2 does something with us. Most of our studies are concerned with 
increasing the horizontal breadth of our knowledge, Heidegger's 
thinking has hopefully led to an improved vertical depth of know-
ledge wherever it is applied. Thus, rather than putting an end 
to the philosophical endeavor, Heidegger has actually laid the 
groundwork for a new beginning, a new era of thinking. Thinking 
and poetry dwell near to each other in their service to language, 
and now that our approach to Being has helped rejuvenate language, 
or at least shown the path towards rejuvenation, the arts and 
1rntroduction to Metaphysics p. 42. 
2rbid. p. 10. 
thought can enter a new dialogue with each coming into its own, 
and thus a new era of both has gotten Underway. 
No transfor~mation comes without an 
anticipatory escort. But how does 
an escort draw near unless Appro-
priation opens out which calling , 
needing, envisions human being, 
that is, sees and in this seeing 
brings mortals to the path of 
thinking, poetizing, building. 1 
Whether we take up the path of thinking is the question now 
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facing us. Heidegger has given us th e way, he has onc e again brought 
us before the power of Being; if we follow it, rather than exclusively 
and blindly staying on our path of information, manipulation, and tech-
nology is the most important choice we must make. 
1 
Most thought-provoking is that we are 
still not thinking - not even yet, 
although the state of the world is 
becoming const antly more thought-
provoking.2 
The End of Philos ophy p. 110. 
2 ~at is Called Thinking p. 4. 
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